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Abstract
This work examines the scope of non-practicing entity behavior and whether the debate on
remedies can lead to changes that encourage the goals behind a patent system. Innovation is
often the stated goal but the significance of innovation commercialization is often ignored.
Furthermore, there has been an increase in business models that involve alternate means of
monetizing patents, not all of which were contemplated in the purpose of the patent system.
Using the goals of the patent system as a backdrop, this work provides an overview of the impact
of remedies available to courts in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States on patent
systems. The courts have the tools in each jurisdiction to grant remedies appropriate to the
infringement. However, systemic limitations in each patent system often prevent the courts from
reviewing disputes.
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Introduction
Growing economic reliance on intellectual property development and use has led to a
significant rise in patent applications, patent grants, and patent litigation. Increases in patent
grants have led to more patents in the marketplace, not all of which can be used to put the
underlying innovation into practice. Each patent comes with rights conferred by the grant,
regardless of the patent owner’s use of the underlying innovation. The combination of strong
patent rights and increased patenting volume has encouraged business practices that exploit the
rights that come with a patent rather than use the underlying innovation. Instead of using patents
to create goods and services for consumers, a variety of businesses have begun to actively use
patents to not only obtain licensing revenues but also to employ strategies that may actually be
anti-competitive. The non-practicing entity has become a hotly debated concern in jurisdictions
where intellectual property is becoming a significant economic driver. Some scholars have
begun to see non-practicing entities (NPEs) as a concern because of a perceived negative impact
on innovation, on the pricing of goods and services, on investment, and even on invention
marketing. There is a perception that current efforts to encourage the intellectual economy are
creating regimes that encourage business models that prize patent accumulation and rent-seeking
rather than invention or invention marketing.
Non-practicing entities are not something new, but in light of increasing business
development relying on patented innovation non-practice, a debate has started over the merits of
the current system in encouraging innovation versus patent accumulation and rent-seeking. This
has been fuelled by what is perceived to be exorbitant court awards to non-practicing companies
at the expense of companies that are actually producing goods. A debate has ensued between
groups that see nothing wrong with current strategic use of patents and those that see it as
detrimental to the goals of a patent system. NPEs, and a subset known as patent trolls, are at the
heart of the debate over the proper functioning of patent systems.
NPEs have been a particular concern in the U.S., where the specter of the patent troll has
raised debate about the workings of the entire patent system. The volume of patents issued has
increased dramatically over the past twenty years, leading to innovation. However, this has also
led to creative patent drafting and a robust trade in patents as a commodity, separate from the
underlying innovation. Troll success has also encouraged companies to come up with new
business models that defend against troll practices, and also to find new ways to exploit the
1

patent system. As trolling has become more sophisticated and specialized, large companies have
not only created defensive systems to combat this behavior but they have also created their own
business models that emulate and expand on trolling behavior. Offensive and defensive tactics
have exploited areas of the patent system that were previously little used, developed, or even
considered.
A patent system exists to encourage innovation. It has always been held that the strong
property rights that come with a patent, particularly the right to exclude, would encourage
innovation and benefit society. But it seems that there has been an inadvertent consequence
where rent-seeking has increased at the expense of commercialization. The proliferation of
patents has led to the creation of markets, market-makers, auctions, and a general increase in
patent trade. Commercialization has always been assumed as part of the “innovation” goal but
commoditization and trade are not the same as invention commercialization. While patent trade
has increased, that does not mean that the innovations represented by the patents are being put
into use; nor does it mean that the rights granted by a patent have been used to increase general
social benefits. The legal system has been used effectively in both offensive and defensive
situations to obtain nuisance settlements or questionable remedies. These dispute resolutions
potentially disrupt society and border on punitive, rather than compensatory. Thus the grant of
strong property rights in a patent has led to a robust patent trade and licensing regime. However
the innovation supposedly stemming from the increase in patenting and increased rights is
questionable. These strong property rights have led to a significant patent trade through
auctions, cross-licensing, and aggressive enforcement; yet the questionable public benefit of
strong rights has raised only limited discussion.
In the U.S., there has been a recent focus on limiting remedies available to NPEs.
Scholars, commentators, and practitioners have been debating the merits of establishing a
remedy system that treats different entities differently when granting relief for patent
infringement. The U.S. debate has moved to other jurisdictions but the debate has been on the
merits of U.S. approaches rather than an analysis of business practices within these other
jurisdictions. Rather than learning from the U.S. experience and being proactive, other
jurisdictions have remained silent on the operation of NPEs within their borders.

2

This work will look at patent infringement remedies in the U.S., Canada and the United
Kingdom.1 Through a comparison of patent infringement remedies and approaches in these three
common law jurisdictions, this work will detail the benefits of flexibility when courts are settling
disputes that involve at least one non-practicing entity. All three have very similar approaches to
patent law and property law but with sufficient distinctions to warrant examining the merits of
these differences in relation to NPEs. Since economic considerations are part of the
examination, comparing Canadian, U.K., and U.S. approaches to remedies is an attempt to gauge
the success that NPEs have had in establishing their business models in small, medium, and large
economies. Much of the scholarly work related to non-practicing entities has come from the
U.S. This work will examine some of the issues that exist in the three patent systems that courts
either face or may face. While NPE business models may be prevalent throughout the U.S., that
does not mean that these businesses will not expand into other markets to take advantage of the
world-wide embrace of increasing intellectual property protection. There are already indications
that NPEs are tailoring business methods to take advantage of the laws of different jurisdictions.
This work will first review approaches taken by scholars to patent infringement remedies,
particularly economic analysis of legal remedies and the impact these remedies have in relation
to the goals of the patent system. The economic debate has centered on whether a propertybased or a liability based remedy system provides greater incentive and results that more
accurately reflect market-oriented compensation. The debate also touches on the impact of
patent trolls and how best to limit their impact on the patent system, or whether it is even
desirable to limit trolling.
The second part of this work is intended to establish a starting point for analysis by
illustrating the theoretical debates over idealized remedy regimes in comparison to the existing
legal framework for patent remedies. It starts by determining what a patent system is designed to
achieve. Patents have been deemed property but because of their intangible nature they differ
from physical property. Starting with an initial definition of property, ideological approaches to
property are placed next to the laws established by all three jurisdictions to determine the extent
of property rights that exist in a patent under their respective laws. Once the extent of property
1

Since the vast majority of patent infringement cases take place in London, this work will look at English courts
(including England and Wales). Within the United Kingdom, Scottish and Northern Irish courts are the only other
courts that can hear patent disputes. While they are competent to handle patent issues, very few cases come
before the Scottish or Northern Irish courts. Therefore they are not considered in this work. The term England or
English courts are heavily used and have been used interchangeably with U.K. or U.K. courts.
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rights that come with a patent are defined, the remedies available to patent owners when there is
a transgression of those rights are reviewed. Remedies fall under either property rules or liability
rules and through this grouping, the remedies available in all three jurisdictions are reviewed.
Current remedies are well tailored to dealing with patent infringement and courts have
considerable flexibility in applying these remedies to balance the demands of the patent owner
with the goals of the patent system.
The third part of this work examines various NPE business models and how the system
encourages these models under its current structure. Trolls have been vilified by a significant
group of commentators and it is only natural to start by determining which patent holders fall
under that term. In light of the emergence of patent trolls, inventor motivations to obtain a patent
are reviewed. Based on empirical data, it appears that the patent system provides very different
encouragement than what is theoretically intended. While marketing is a goal of the patent
system, inventors often have several reasons for getting a patent only one of which is marketing
the underlying innovation, and it is often not the primary reason. This is followed by an
examination of what is meant by patent “practice” and the difficulties that exist in
commercializing or marketing a patent. In light of the varying motivations inventors have to
obtain a patent and the difficulties that exist in commercializing a patented invention, the
business methods of patent trolls are examined. It appears that trolling practices have
encouraged other aggressive patent use tactics that have received far less scrutiny. These tactics
may even be deemed “legitimate” practice. It also appears that trolls provide a benefit to a
segment of inventors, and may also provide services which encourage certain patent system
goals while thwarting others. Other NPEs have embraced business strategies which encourage
patent accumulation but do little to encourage commercialization or follow-on innovation, and
these practices may even hamper competition. Despite concerns over patent trolls, their business
models have found a niche within the current system. Concern over trolling practices outside the
U.S. is muted but there are indications that NPEs have made attempts to enter the Canadian and
the U.K. markets.
The fourth section examines the flexible remedy approach, highlighting some of the
benefits while pointing out the limitations of both extreme and one-size-fits-all approaches. It
starts by reviewing the flexible approach to injunction awards illustrated by the U.S. Supreme
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Court in eBay v. MercExchange.2 Despite a strong leaning towards property remedies in all
three jurisdictions, the respective courts all have powers to provide fact-dependent remedies.
Powers to grant flexible remedies is followed by a review of the feasibility and accuracy of court
calculated damages under a liability theory rather than a property theory. The section also
examines the benefits as well as the limitations of property remedies and analyzes the debate
among scholars as to whether property remedies lead to overcompensation, under-compensation,
or something else.
Part four further considers the limitations on court powers in upholding the goals of a
patent system. It reflects, as well, on other ways the patent system encourages NPEs. NPEs take
advantage of several gaps in the patent remedy system, and their practices rely on these gaps to
obtain revenues. Current economic analysis when it comes to NPEs focuses on a specific goal
rather than all the goals of a patent system, and it fails to differentiate among the motivations of
the patent seekers. In order to accurately perform an analysis of the system, scholars should start
with an accurate accounting of its goals, followed by an examination of various business models
and motivations to patent. Courts have considerable powers when granting and tailoring
remedies to meet the goals of the patent system while appropriately compensating patent owners.
A flexible approach to remedies that incorporates all these factors will best determine the
appropriate compensation for a patent owner, in light of the rights held and the harm inflicted.
In summary, courts have considerable powers to grant appropriate remedies. Under
current patent laws, there are gaps that will encourage certain business models that may be
different from what was intended when the patent regime was established. While it appears that
patent trolls and other forms of NPEs have created business models that are likely to remain for
the foreseeable future, such patent owners do not necessarily have to receive the same
compensation or same remedy as would a patent holder who is successfully embodying the goals
of the patent system. Despite the powers available to the courts, there are systemic issues which
cannot be addressed through legal remedies and which require serious scrutiny if the goals of the
patent systems are to be achieved.

2

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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Chapter One
Literature Review
The following literature review is an examination of the patent infringement remedies
available to a non-practicing patent holder. The literature is from the United States where a
particular non-practicing entity, known as the “patent troll”, has been the subject of significant
concern when it comes to the proper functioning of the patent system. The material covers three
areas. The first part will provide a very brief overview of the varying reasons for the existence
of a patent system, including the objectives and goals sought in establishing one. Next, patent
trolls, their business models, and the impact that these entities have on the patent system are
considered. Remedies are often intertwined with any discussion on patent trolls. The third part
of this literature review will focus on infringement remedies. Scholars have divided patent
remedies into what are termed property rules and liability rules. This section examines the
spectrum between pure property and pure liability rules. While no one seems to call for either
spectrum extreme, several approaches to remedies are reviewed. Robert Merges calls for strong
property rules with some flexibility. Roger Blair and Thomas Cotter prefer strong property rules
but with greater accuracy for damage calculations. Peter Menell recognizes the property aspects
of patents but concludes that there are sufficient differences between intellectual and real
property to warrant a more flexible approach to patents. Finally, Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro
call for damages in lieu of injunctions when non-practicing entities are involved.
Purpose of a Patent System

Before examining the impact that changes to infringement remedies can have on the
patent system, the objectives for establishing a patent system need to be clear; and those
objectives, as understood by the commentators, should be articulated. According to Robert
Merges, Peter Menell, Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro, the purpose in creating a patent regime is
to foster innovation.3 Roger Blair and Thomas Cotter expand upon this statement by indicating
that a patent system should maximize social values by subtracting social costs from social
benefits.4 The social benefits are to encourage discovery and dissemination of new ideas.5 The
3

Robert Merges, The Trouble With Trolls, 24 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1583, 1589 (2009); Peter S. Menell, The Property
Rights Movement’s Embrace of Intellectual Property: True Love or Doomed Relationship?, 34 Ecology L. Q. 713, 722
(2007); Mark A. Lemley and Carl Shapiro, The Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking: Reply to John Golden, 85 Tex. L.
Rev. 2163, 2173 (2007).
4
Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 1, 44,45 (2001).
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social costs are: 1) the “systemic costs of processing, enforcing, and maintaining patent rights”;
2) the potential of existing patents to inhibit invention, by raising the cost of follow-on
inventions; 3) duplicated efforts by multiple inventors; and 4) the existence of “deadweight”
losses arising from patent monopoly rights.6 The social benefit of giving exclusive rights to a
patentee should outweigh the social costs and any existing patent system should do this better
than any alternate schemes.7
The purpose of a patent system is not just to encourage innovation for the sake of
innovation but to foster innovation which will benefit society. Few of the authors go into detail
about the purpose for having a patent system; however the social considerations indicated by
Blair and Cotter cover both a broader purpose and a greater number of stake holders in a patent
system than those indicated by the other authors.
An inventor receives a patent in exchange for public disclosure of the invention.
Innovation is embodied through the patent requirements. In addition to disclosure, elements such
as non-obviousness and utility must also be satisfied before a patent can be granted to the
inventor.8 The incentive is derived from a form of property right in the patent, giving the
inventor certain privileges. 9 These privileges include the right to exclude others from making,
importing, using, or selling the invention. Merges focuses on factors that encourage innovation
but ignores any social costs. Blair and Cotter examine the risks that exist for the inventor when
embarking on the innovation process, and concede that there must be a sufficiently high
inducement to offset the risks.10 However, they also note that protections to one stakeholder
must be balanced against the social costs that arise if incentives actually stunt innovation and
result in extreme monopolistic pricing that affects consumers.
The Non-Practicing Entity (Patent Trolls)

There is a particular group of non-practicing entities, known as patent trolls, that have
been accused of abusing the patent monopoly and acting contrary to the goals of the patent
system. Robert Merges writes that, while patent trolls are acting within the law, their actions are
5

Id., at 45.
Id. at 46.
7
Id.
8
Merges, Supra note 3, at 1589.
9
Id. at 1588-89.
10
Blair & Cotter, Supra note 4, at 48.
6
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detrimental to innovation and the patent system as a whole. Timo Fischer and Joachim Henkel
performed an empirical study of several firms that they considered to be patent trolls. They, too,
deem any benefits provided by patent trolls be outweighed by their detriments. However,
Fischer and Henkel also concede that patent trolls have an effective business model and they are
likely to retain their niche within the patent system.
Robert Merges defines a patent troll as entity that engages “in inefficient, socially
wasteful patent transactions.”11 Trolls often refer to themselves as market makers, indicating
that they provide a beneficial function within the patent system. In this case, market-making is
considered a function where an entity purchases an undervalued patent to market it to other firms
who are unaware of its existence. Merges indicates that this is a false definition used by patent
trolls to give legitimacy to their actions.12 In his estimation, there is no social value to these
actions and they only serve to encourage litigation. Trolls are often middlemen in a transaction.
They purchase a patent from one entity and then find entities already using the patented
invention, from which they can extract a royalty payment in exchange for continued use of the
patented invention. They use the threat of litigation to obtain payments from entities that already
practice the patent. While trolls like to be referred to as market-makers or middlemen, they do
not create markets that facilitate patent trade, nor are they necessarily resellers of patents. They
are merely seekers of royalties. This raises the question whether there is something wrong with
finding value in something overlooked by others?
Merges believes that these transactions do not contribute to the innovation process and
actually impede innovation through “rent-seeking” behavior that often rises to the level of
blackmail. Rent-seeking occurs when a property owner does not exploit the owned property,
leaving others to use it in exchange for a fee.13 Thus, the owner “rents” the property to others to
use and exploit. In the patent world, this behavior occurs when an inventor receives a patent for
his/her invention but does not practice that invention, instead exacting payments from others who
already use and exploit the invention. The patent in this case, does not encourage innovation for
social benefit, but merely as an instrument for collecting rents.14 Merges considers this a
11

Merges, Supra note 3, at 1588.
Id., at 1599-1600.
13
Id., at 1587-88.
14
Id., at 1587.
12
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strategic use of gaps in the laws where the patent holder uses the threat of litigation to procure
payments from a manufacturer or socially productive entity.15 This behavior is becoming more
extreme as it becomes a regular strategic maneuver.
Increases in rent-seeking actually discourage innovation. With complex technologies, a
troll that obtains a patent for a relatively minor part can threaten the already producing
technological manufacturer with an injunction unless the manufacturer consents to pay a
substantial royalty.16
Propertization provides a significant incentive for inventors to innovate. However, the
growing treatment of patents as property, independent of the underlying innovation, has also led
to increased rent-seeking behavior. While rent-seeking is not necessarily bad, if it is combined
with transactions that diminish and suppress innovation then it may be a detriment to society. 17
Nonetheless, Merges contends that the use of property law theory for patents is still preferable
despite its potential to encourage rent-seeking. Increased innovation is the goal of the patent
system and this incentive is necessary despite increased rent-seeking. Merges cites Adam Smith,
calling for a distinction between productive and unproductive transactions where self-interest
should be tempered by ‘“ethical virtues such as justice and prudence.”’18
Merges also posits that people who argue that trolls are performing a genuine marketmaking function, by acting as middlemen to transactions between sellers and buyers, ignore the
impact of such transactions. These middlemen, unlike those in other industries where they help
to develop and market, or facilitate commercialization, do not perform their own research and
development, nor do they add to the existing innovative pool. Trolls merely increase the volume
of litigation. If trolls actually serve a function by encouraging patent trade, that may be a useful
function. However, if trolls call themselves middlemen but merely purchase and sue, that is
another matter.

15

Id. at 1592-1603.
Merges, Supra note 3, at 1590-91.
17
Id. at 1603-07.
18
Id. at 1602.
16
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Merges contends that trolling behavior is a form of blackmail, an act with no social virtue
or benefit.19 Blackmail is a wasteful economic transaction because a party uses resources to get
information and in exchange for suppressing that information, receives a payment from another
party.20 While Merges may liken trolling to blackmail, a patent is part of the public record.
Trolls trade in patents that have not yet been enforced against parties that are allegedly practicing
the underlying innovation described in the patent, with the intent to seek rent from the allegedly
practicing parties. The threat of litigation and a potential injunction forces a payment from the
alleged infringer. There may be some similarity to blackmail in the potential injunction that
threatens to deprive the alleged infringer of a revenue source; but more significantly, it threatens
to make society poorer by removing a potential product from the marketplace or raising the cost
of production and ultimately, the cost of the product. However, a better analogy may be that
trolling is really champertous behavior since a troll is less interested in depriving society of the
patented product and more interested in being paid for someone’s use, by using injunctions and
the courts as negotiating levers.
Historically, the courts have been effective in placing limits on troll-like behavior. These
judicial decisions were interpretations of the existing law, but they prevented more extreme
solutions from being implemented through new legislation resulting from public outcry.21
Timo Fischer and Joachim Henkel take a closer look at patent trolls through a statistical
analysis of data collected to examine and clarify characteristics of trolling behavior.22 Their
study concludes that: 1) patents obtained by trolls are generally broad and have a high likelihood
of being infringed; 2) the patents purchased are generally part of “thickets” and have a high
substitution cost; and 3) patents sought by trolls tend to be higher quality than those of practicing
entities, resulting in a higher probability that patent validity will be upheld by a court.23 The
19

Id. at 1599-1602.
Merges, Supra note 3, at 1600-01.
21
Id., 1583, 1607-1609.
22
Timo Fischer & Joachim Henkel, Patent Trolls on Markets for Technology - An Empirical Analysis of Trolls' Patent
Acquisitions. at 3, Paper presented at "Opening Up Innovation: Strategy, Organization and Technology" at Imperial
College London Business School, June 16 - 18, 2010,
http://www2.druId.dk/conferences/viewpaper.php?id=501834&cf=43 (last visited Dec. 12, 2010); see also
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1523102&rec=1&srcabs=1498390 (alternate source last
visited Dec. 12 2010). Their research determined that there are patent trolls operating throughout the European
Economic Zone and not just in the United States.
23
Id., at 2.
20
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study by Fischer and Henkel did not delve into business method patents (which are available in
the United States) or situations that involved relatively weak patents but were resolved out of
court.
Fischer and Henkel define trolls "as individuals or firms that seek to generate profits
mainly or exclusively from licensing or selling their (often simplistic) patented technology to a
manufacturing firm that, at the point in time when fees are claimed, already infringes on the
[troll’s] patent and is therefore under particular pressure to reach an agreement with the [troll].”24
Trolls should be distinguished from other non-practicing entities such as pure research firms or
licensing firms that seek to license to others before infringement is detected.25 However, they
recognize that the term “troll” may cause confusion because their definition encompasses not
only entities who hide their patents until they are infringed but also inventors who are failed
licensors who later enforce patent rights once they discover infringement.26 Fischer and Henkel
further point out that trolls may also have a positive effect because these entities may force large
corporations to respect the rights of small or financially constrained inventors.27 Thus it seems
that trolls may be reviled because of their willingness to litigate but they may be nonetheless
beneficial for a segment of patent owners. However, Fischer and Henkel still denounce trolling
behavior because its detriments outweigh its benefits.
Patent trolls are active buyers and sellers of patents, purchasing or licensing patents in an
effort to obtain revenues through reselling the patent or through licensing agreements.28 This
behavior challenges the belief that increased patent rights improve market functions for
technology.29 What distinguishes trolls from other purchasers is that they are entities interested
in purchasing a patent solely for its exclusion rights and not for the underlying technology.30
Furthermore, transactions involving trolls do not generally concern technology transfer but rather
the selling or licensing of patent rights to an entity already using the patented technology.31

24

Id. at 3. Fischer and Henkel use the term “troll” and “shark” interchangeably throughout the paper.
Id.
26
Id. at 4.
27
Fischer & Henkel, Supra note 22, at 4.
28
Id., at 3.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
25
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These patent-only transactions are part of the business model used by trolls.32 Purchasing
patents for enforcement and not commercialization is what has caused consternation among the
patent community.
Fischer and Henkel proceed to clear up some misconceptions about patent trolls. There is
a generally held belief that patent trolls purchase patents of dubious quality but their most
commonly used business strategies would indicate otherwise.33 Three business strategies or
combinations of strategies are commonly used by trolls: 1) an injunction-based strategy; 2) a
damage-based strategy; or 3) a cost-switching based strategy.34 An injunctive strategy employs a
low-quality patent to successfully induce an infringer to settle if a potential temporary injunction
would immediately affect the infringer, but defensive measures to invalidate the weak patent take
years.35 A damage-based strategy requires a higher quality patent since the troll is going after a
monetary award from a court and invalidity proceedings to overturn the patent are generally part
of such a suit.36 A troll uses a “switching cost-based” strategy because it would be costly for the
infringer to switch to a non-infringing alternative.37 This strategy exploits the high cost of
moving to use of a non-infringing product through the threat of a potential injunction award by
the courts. The latter two strategies require a full trial and eventual judicial remedy. They take
time and higher quality patents are required because a troll will have to overcome invalidity
proceedings in order to be successful.38
Patentee friendly injunctions and high damage awards encourage the patent troll business
model.39 Since courts, especially in the U.S. rarely take into account an infringer’s cost in
switching to a replacement technology due to an injunction, Fischer and Henkel argue that this
can lead to excessive damages particularly in cases where a non-infringing technology can easily
be used.40 Excessive damage awards are common, as shown by the “holdup” analysis conducted
by Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro, described below. Fast and easily obtained pre-trial or
32

Fischer & Henkel, Supra note 22, at 3.
Id., at 4.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Fischer & Henkel, Supra note 22, at 4.
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preliminary injunctions increase a troll’s leverage over the infringer, thereby increasing the
potential to obtain high royalties.41
A patent troll is more likely to acquire a patent with a broad scope because there is a
greater chance that such a patent will be infringed, whereas a practicing firm is less concerned
with a broad scope since its primary concern is to prevent others from making similar products.42
Since one strategy employed by trolls is to attack infringers who face a high cost of employing
alternate technologies, a troll will likely focus on purchasing patents with a “high-degree of
overlap” or those that are a part of complex technologies, or those patents that are part of
thickets.43 Over the last decade larger companies have not only diversified the business-side of
their intellectual property but they have also learned how to defend themselves from trolls and
use tactics to exploit competitors. Yet, companies are still not immune from troll attacks.
Despite recent efforts by courts, Fischer and Henkel believe that the patent troll business
model will continue to be successful. They feel it will continue because 1) determining patent
boundaries is complicated, making it difficult for inventors to predict whether a new product will
infringe; 2) there are an ever increasing number of patent application filings; 3) not all countries
have made legal changes to curb trolls; 4) laws requiring patent practice may easily be
circumvented by creating nominal production facilities; and 5) the switching cost-based strategy
is not affected by any of the current legal changes.44
The business models which trolls employ favor the troll over practicing entities when it
comes to identifying and purchasing patents.45 Patent trolls are adept at identifying suitable
patents and extracting value, as both are core competencies of the troll’s business model.46 By
contrast, practicing firms are generally in the business of using the patented invention and will
extract value from patents by 1) preventing imitation, 2) cross-licensing, or 3) licensing.47
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Obtaining full value from a patent will generally involve some licensing.48 Attempts to receive
royalties may be difficult because without an amicable agreement another practicing entity may
counter-sue for other product infringement, or the attempted licensor may be in a business
relationship with the potential licensee.49 Trolls are not vulnerable to either type of countersuit.50

While firms that obtain patent can be said to be in the business of using the patented

inventions, there is a push to patent as much as possible, creating an abundance of patented
innovations but no clear use for these innovations, leading to greater efforts by companies to find
commercial value for their intellectual property portfolio.
Remedies and Their Impact

To understand the impact of remedies on the patent system the origins of how economic
analysis has divided remedies into property rules and liability rules should be examined. Despite
the existence of a hybrid system, there is still considerable debate on whether a pure property
remedy system is superior to a pure liability remedy system. Robert Merges argues for a
property based system. Blair and Cotter argue that a property system is necessary but that
damages would be better determined by a tort law analysis. Finally Peter Menell argues that
patents are very different from tangible property and the same property rules should not be
applied to both tangible and intangible property.
Before the term “patent troll” was coined, Robert Merges examined whether property
rules or liability rules were more conducive to patent infringement remedies. In the wake of
increased concern over patent trolls and potential patent system changes to curb troll behavior,
there has been increased debate on which set of rules would make better remedies to combat
patent infringement. Economic analysis under these rules stems from the Coase transaction
theorem and the subsequent expansion by Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed.51 Merges
describes a property rule as a legal entitlement where the entitlement holder sets an anticipated
price and only after reaching an agreement with a second party through bargaining can the
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entitlement be lawfully used by the second party.52 Injunctive relief is the expected remedy for
patent infringement and only through achieving an agreement with the infringing party, will the
patentee allow the infringer to use the patented invention.
A liability rule accepts infringement, but is followed by a tribunal proceeding after
infringement occurs to determine appropriate compensation for the infringement.53 Such a
remedy is perceived to be a compulsory licence, usually granted by the courts, allowing an
infringer to continue using the patented invention in exchange for money.
Merges states that under Coase’s theorem, if the transaction costs are zero, property
rights allocations will eventually be transferred “to their highest-value use through private
bargains.”54 However, if transaction costs are greater than zero, a transfer of property to a higher
value user may not occur. This is an example of a property rule. The theorem was initially
applied to physical property but also applies to patent transactions where it is certain that either a
valid patent right does or does not exist.
Merges accepts the limitations of the theorem, noting that the problem of applying
Coase’s theorem to intellectual property rights arises from the property’s intangible nature.
Infringement detection and the severity of that infringement, or valuation, are not easily
determined because a patent’s scope or boundary is often unclear. The value of prior patented
creations on a current product or process and the uncertainty over whether an independently
created invention infringes a previous one further blur the boundaries. Valuation is further
complicated as patented works can be cumulative and even interdependent. The boundary
uncertainty also makes it difficult for parties to effectively negotiate a transaction. Furthermore,
neither strategic behavior nor the use of blocking patents is part of the Coasian consideration.
Both of these tactics will result in conflict rather than a negotiated, equitable division of assets
and resources. All these complications indicate high transaction costs which will prevent
efficient transactions.
Calabresi and Melamed expanded upon Coase’s theorem, indicating how shifting
transaction costs may change a property rule to a liability rule and vice versa. A liability rule
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will likely be preferred if transaction costs are high, there are many parties to a transaction, or
transaction valuation between the parties is complicated. Conversely, if transaction costs are
low, there are few parties to a transaction, or valuation is easy, a property rule may be better
suited. Merges argues that patent cases fit the Calabresi/Melamed property rule criteria. In a
patent dispute there are two parties to a transaction, transaction costs between the parties are
relatively low, and courts have a difficult time properly determining the value of the patented
invention due to the complexity of the patented invention and specific market conditions.55 In
Merges’ opinion, the parties to the transaction are best suited to accurately value the technology
while courts are less able to determine the value of complex intellectual property transactions.56
Thus a liability rule will create inaccurate results when damages are determined by the courts
and a property rule would allow a more accurate resolution. Courts are readily able to make
complex calculations with tangible property. However, there is a general perception among
many U.S. intellectual property scholars, that the intangible nature of patents confuses
assessment by all parties who are not the plaintiff and defendant. However, accurate valuation is
really not possible when interested parties differ in their assessment and one uses a lever, such as
an injunction, to pry more royalties out of the pocket of the other.
There have been arguments that transaction costs are actually high and not low, because
patents and patent transactions are both complicated. This makes a liability rule more suitable
for deciding patent disputes. Rather than preventing patent transactions, Merges contends that
the presence of strong property rights will actually facilitate patent transactions rather than
preventing them because private parties will force institutional changes to lower transaction
costs.57 For emerging technological industry segments, he holds that the current presence of high
transaction costs should not be changed through government intervention but should, for the time
being, be resolved through private transactions.58 Others argue that the pervasive transaction
costs should lead to the use of liability rules and even compulsory licenses.59 However, strong
property rules should continue even in the face of high transaction costs because they have led to
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private institutional changes which eventually lowered transactional costs.60 Strong property
rules actually led to private contracts that established private liability rules through the creation
of patent pools.61 Merges contends that statutory liability rules enforced by courts would lack
the flexibility that private institutions and institutional agreements have.62 However, in making
this claim, Merges ignores the potential anti-competitive nature of patent pools and also assumes
that private institutions lack the bureaucracy and other externalities which confuse court
assessment.
Without a right to injunctive relief, Merges believes that a patent will be worth
considerably less and this loss of value would diminish the incentive to invent.63 He further
asserts that although using injunctive relief as a bargaining chip in negotiations may lead to
overcompensation, a damages based system will likely undercompensate.64 This point is
discussed below in greater detail. While there is some truth to such economic claims, perfect
compensation is unlikely regardless of the method used to determine it and terms such as
overcompensation and undercompensation are relative.
Calls in the U.S. to change the current property rule system of dealing with infringement
to a liability rule system require closer examination. Merges believes that compulsory license
awards are a rash decision and parties should be allowed to examine creative solutions to resolve
impasses.65 Scholars should examine a wide range of enforcement technologies and techniques,
in addition to institutional changes and arrangements using property rights theory.66 It would
also appear that small adjustments to the patent system (such as those outlined in the eBay
decision below) appear to appeal to Merges.67 Merges recites a common U.S. position towards
compulsory licenses, but it has also become a position taken by Canada and the U.K. in recent
years.
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In a more recent work Merges finds that patent trolling has caused a re-examination of
whether patents should be treated the same way as physical property. Examining patent rights
under a property law theory is problematical because patents are based on an underlying
technology. Infringers and courts often have a difficult time defining the exact boundaries of the
patented technology. This causes an increase in measurement costs (litigation fees) to determine
the boundaries. Merges indicates that, while measurement costs are an increasing problem,
attempts to ameliorate these increases should be handled with subtle methods rather than with
wholesale changes to patent law. Large scale and significant changes to the law may actually
cause unforeseen results which may destabilize the system rather than resolve the problems.
Merges supports a private solution rather than changing the existing patent laws. This is
the preferred solution in a market economy; wholesale systemic changes may be avoided if a
private solution can be found, particularly if private solutions are diminished and greater public
involvement takes place. This is an ideological position lacking a long enough historical
timeline to show whether it is a correct position. Merges notes that overly strong and inefficient
property rules can be overcome if the cost of coordinating a solution between private parties is
low, but firms will race to acquire more patents if “coordination costs” are high.68 Coordination
costs are the cost of establishing private cooperative transaction systems as a means of
overcoming strong property rights.69 However, property rights in patents do not lend themselves
to a collective private solution since increased property rights push inventors to compete with
one-another. High competition is likely to encourage inventors to lobby for stronger patent
rights, encouraging a legislative solution. Nonetheless, Merges contends that legislative changes
should be discouraged because only some parties will be consulted through the legislative
process. There is also a great deal of lobbying from groups with widely differing interests.
Furthermore, the legislative process is slow-moving and the process’ deal-making nature may
create undesirable changes.70 There is a certain irony in this position because patent law is a
legislative creation, already shaped by some of the interests Merges feels will make undesirable
changes.
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There have been numerous calls for changing the U.S. patent laws to combat trolling
behavior, but competing interests have created a legislative impasse. Even if legislation were
passed, the potential side effects could cause unforeseen harms to property rights. The
unforeseeable impact on property rights dictates that minor institutional adjustments may be
better suited for determining damages in patent cases.71 Such an adjustment was made when the
U.S. Supreme Court limited the use of automatic permanent injunctions in the eBay v.
MercExchange case, greatly limiting a powerful bargaining tool that trolls use to exact royalty
payments. The Supreme Court’s directive was a prime example of how the legal process and the
courts were effective in combating problems with the patent system. Judicial discretion to limit
injunctions was encouraged so that disproportionate damage settlements can be curbed when a
patented invention is a component of a complex multi-component device.72 With eBay in mind,
Merges suggests that the Court should fashion a test to limit damages to strict conformity with
the actual economic value of the patented invention. The test should examine the infringer’s
profit with the patented invention minus an estimate of the infringer’s profit using the next
alternative.73
Problems with both the legislative process and self-regulation lead Merges to suggest that
the courts are the most capable entities for dealing with the impact of trolls on the system.
However, even the courts have difficulty. Complex technologies and the difficulty of
apportioning the value of a patented component in relation to a whole device are challenging
issues for judges (and juries in U.S. courts). That is why valuation rules should be established to
clearly define differences in profit between the infringer’s product including the infringing
component and the profit using an unpatented alternative (the next best thing). This solution,
like the eBay decision for injunctions, would be a minor change and would help limit the rentseeking behavior of trolls.74
Merges believes that current remedies must be further refined. Expert testimony refers to
an apportionment “rule of thumb” entitling patentees to between a quarter and a third of profits
of the infringer’s product. The use of this rule leads to further valuation problems for complex
71
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devices consisting of several patents.75 Patent drafting also leads to expansive interpretations of
inventions, even though the invention may only be a small component of the entire device.76
Finally, patent trials are generally very complex. This complexity leads judges to deny evidence
showing that other patented or non-patented components are significant to the invention.77 These
are problems with the patent trial system which relatively minor changes may resolve.78
Roger Blair and Thomas Cotter are more concerned with greater accuracy in patent
damage calculations. They indicate that tort law principles are well suited to patent remedy
analysis.

Blair and Cotter start by stating that a patent system should strive to maximize social

values, where social costs are subtracted from social benefits.79 They argue that the most
economically efficient approach to meet the goals of the patent system in the U.S. is through the
tort law “cause-in-fact” standard (“but-for”) and proximate cause concepts can be applied to
accurately gauge damages, promote innovation, and encourage disclosure. 80 Tort-law concepts
could be used to more accurately assess infringement damages. Despite their desire to see these
concepts commonly applied by courts, Blair and Cotter are firm believers that injunctions should
still be awarded as part of patent remedies and that the same remedies should be available to
patent holders, regardless of whether the holder is practicing the invention or not.
In supporting their argument, Blair and Cotter describe the current damage remedies
available under the U.S. Patent Act. These include lost profits and a reasonable royalty. The
availability of lost profits and reasonable royalties as infringement awards are moves towards a
“tort-law framework,” despite reluctance of courts to treat patent damages as other torts.81
Disgorging profits attributable to the infringement, under the theory that profits are held in trust
for the patentee, has not been a valid remedy since 1946, due to the perceived expense, time and
complexity of accounting for profits.82 The Patent Act currently entitles patentees to recover
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“damages adequate to compensate for infringement,” but no less than a reasonable royalty.83
Current compensation awards for lost profits or reasonable royalties have never been defined by
statute but calculation methods have nonetheless been left up to the courts.84 Courts lack residual
authority to award restitutionary damages; but under statute, courts can award up to treble
damages for willful infringement.85
Lost profits are one method of determining damages because infringers can reduce
patentee profits by: a) diverting sales; b) causing lower sale prices due to competition with the
patentee; c) increasing patentee costs through advertising and marketing expenditures; and d)
causing lost sales for products sold in conjunction with the patented product or non-patented
products that compete with the infringing products.86 To determine whether lost profits should
be awarded, courts have used a four factor test established in Panduit Corp v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre
Works, Inc. These factors are: 1) demand for the patented product; 2) absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes; 3) manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit invention demand; 4)
the amount of profit the patentee would have made.87 To determine the amount of profit, courts
take into account the price at which the patent owner would have made increased sales but also
the costs associated with making increased sales.88
Historically, lost profits calculations have been complicated because of substitutability
and apportionment.89 The concept of substitutability requires courts to determine whether there
are non-infringing products which could be substituted for the infringing product.90 However,
determining whether a product is a substitute can depend on several factors including
technologies involved and the prices of products.91 If a substitute exists, the patentee’s sales
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would be lower even if there was no infringement.92 The concept of apportionment was used by
courts to try to determine what part of the infringer’s profit is the result of using the patented
invention, when the infringing technology is only a small part of the finished product.93
Since the mid 1980s, U.S. courts have implemented tort law cause-in-fact and proximate
cause standards in determining patent damages.94 Blair and Cotter contend that this adoption has
resulted in a simpler analysis but it has also required courts to become more economically
sophisticated than they previously were.95 Determining the profits a patentee would have earned
but-for the infringement is still not without problems.96 It has resulted in a more flexible
application of the Panduit test regarding the following two factors: 1) a partial absence of noninfringing substitutes exists (factor two of the original test) and 2) where infringement has
resulted in lost sales of unpatented products (factor three of the original test).97 Recent analysis
of Panduit factor two indicates that apportionment calculations have given way to a market share
calculation approach.98 This is because the availability of substitute products is no longer
measured on a technological basis but through a consumer demand basis and because substitutes
tend to be imperfect, resulting in sales by non-infringing competitors.99 Therefore, either a
patented component is the reason for product demand, entitling the patentee to its entire market
value of lost profits on sales; or a product without the patented component is a non-infringing
substitute and lost profits attributed to the patented component result in no lost profits.100 In a
“but-for” analysis of patent infringement damages, apportionment calculations become
unnecessary.
There have been three cases where the court applied a “but-for” analysis permitting
recovery for damages resulting from lost profits on the sales of unpatented products.101 In Paper
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Converting Machines v. Magna Graphics, the court found that industry standards indicated that
every purchaser would buy an entire line of products and that patentee would have sold patented
and non-patented products together but-for the infringement.102 In Rite-Hite v. Kelly the court
stated that cause-in-fact and proximate cause applied to patent infringement, allowing damage
recovery for “reasonable, objectively foreseeable consequences of infringement.”103 King
Instrument v. Perego indicates some problems with a “but-for” analysis because the court
allowed a non-practicing entity to collect lost profits due to infringement of its patent, even
though the lost profits were for sales of non-patented products.104 Blair and Cotter opine that the
Federal Circuit rightly decided that a reasonable royalty would not be sufficient compensation in
King. However, lost profits are normally not awarded to non-practicing entities and could not be
justified through a “but-for” test or even a standard causation test.105 There does not appear to be
a clear answer and the precedential value of King is questionable, especially since it can
potentially result in punitive damage awards.
If lost profits cannot be shown, a patentee can still be awarded no less than a reasonable
royalty in damages.106 To determine a reasonable royalty, courts have relied on either the
Georgia Pacific factors or the analytical approach.107 The Georgia Pacific factors are a series of
fifteen factors which can be considered to determine a reasonable royalty.108 Not all fifteen
factors need be considered and courts often focus on only a few to determine a reasonable
royalty.109 By contrast, the analytical method subtracts the infringer’s rate of return on noninfringing goods from the rate of return of the defendant’s infringing goods, multiplying this rate
by the number of infringing goods sold to determine the royalty.110
Blair and Cotter note that the Georgia Pacific factors assume royalty calculations based
on a hypothetical willing licensor and licensee at the time of infringement.111 The rate tends to
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leave some profit for the infringer because the calculation falls between the “maximum
incremental profit (or cost savings)” expected by the infringer and “the maximum profit the
patentee could have expected to earn from her next-best alternative to licensing the invention.”112
Blair and Cotter indicate that while royalties are regularly determined by U.S. courts, there are
problems with royalty calculation methods when it comes to accurately determining a royalty.
The first difficulty is the assumption of a hypothetical negotiation. Infringement and a valid
patent have been conclusively determined by the courts prior to an award of damages based on
the hypothetical negotiation. In a real negotiation patent validity and infringement are
commonly both uncertain and this uncertainty often factors into negotiations.113 The second
issue is that courts may take into account events that occur after infringement to determine the
royalty rate, removing further uncertainty which would exist in a real negotiation.114 Risk
removal by the courts would seem to inflate the reasonable royalty rate. While a reasonable
royalty may seem to leave the infringer no worse off than before the infringement, infringers still
face a significant penalty because of litigation costs and the general coupling of an injunction
with the royalty payments as part of the final remedy.115 Another issue with the reasonable
royalty calculation is that a willing licensor and licensee may not actually reach an agreement,
making the royalty calculation a substitute for lost profits.116 A final issue with a court
determined royalty rate is that courts may have to apportion the damages where the patented
invention is a small part of the whole product while entire market calculations are used to
determine rates when the patented invention is the reason for market demand.117
It appears that Blair and Cotter do not support the use of a reasonable royalty because
there are too many factors which skew the awards. Although a reasonable royalty is considered
part of a liability rule, it does not really conform to the “but-for” tort standard that they advocate.
The lack of accuracy does not make it suitable for a liability remedy. Not only does a reasonable
royalty award lack accuracy but it is generally coupled with an injunction. The injunction gives
the patent owner considerable leverage in future negotiations and can potentially result in a
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windfall. Nonetheless, the reasonable royalty award appears to be a fixture of the patent system
and courts are striving for greater accuracy in situations where it is an appropriate remedy. The
appropriateness of this remedy will be discussed later.
Blair and Cotter state that the objectives of a patent system should be to “maximize social
values” or the difference between social benefits and costs.118 The social benefit of patent
protections should outweigh the social costs and the resulting system should do this better than
any alternate patent schemes.119 Blair and Cotter next use economic arguments to support
remedies that would return the patent owner to the position she would have occupied but-for the
infringement.120 Their arguments point to a conclusion that a liability oriented approach can
better achieve the goals of the patent system by promoting invention and increasing disclosure.121
The current patent system is theoretically based on market transactions and incentives.
The incentive is that inventors gain the right to exclude others from the marketplace for a period
of time.122 This right to exclude is protected by a property rule granting the inventor an
injunction against infringers, rather than a liability rule which would allow infringement but with
indefinite damage payments.123 It is widely believed that injunctive relief encourages licensing
negotiations which more accurately reflect the market value of the invention rather than a
compulsory license granted by the courts under a liability theory.124 A second theory supporting
injunctions is that an inventor requires injunctive relief as an incentive to try to recover the
investment in the invention.125 Blair and Cotter argue that a better method would be one where
inventors are made no worse off and infringers no better off as a result of the infringement.126
However, this would require that a patentee be awarded the greater of her lost profits or the
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infringer’s profits attributable to the invention, a rule rejected by U.S. courts.127 Nonetheless, a
liability rule can be adapted to the current system to best serve the goals of the patent regime. 128
As part of their analysis of the patent system goals, Blair and Cotter examine some of the
risks faced by inventors. Determining whether to invest in the inventive process entails risks,
such as: 1) the risk of failure; 2) the risk that even if the invention is created, there may be no
market for it; 3) the unknown cost of creating the invention; and 4) the risk of infringement.129
These risks exist even if there is a patent system. Without a patent system to protect inventors,
the cost of copying an invention may be small compared to the cost of invention.130 Alternatives
to a patent system may cause the inventor to keep the invention secret or to enter the market in
an attempt to capture the marketplace by virtue of being first to market.131 Because of the risks,
some protection is necessary.
If courts were to adapt the current system to one where an inventor would be put in the
position the inventor would have been but-for the infringement, lost profits would be the
difference between the inventor’s actual profits and the amount potentially earned but-for the
infringement. Royalties would amount to the value to which the parties would have agreed to
but-for the infringement.132 This system would also have to include legal fees without current
limitations imposed by the courts, accounting for interest due to time between infringement and
final payment, and extending damages for potential future losses beyond the trial.133
As part of the lost profits analysis, Blair and Cotter examined three types of infringement
behaviour in an attempt to show that infringement damages can accurately be modeled. The first
behavior is known as Cournot Behavior, where competition affects production quantities.134
Two time frames were examined. The first case examined a situation where the infringer plans
to be in the market for a short period while the second is where the infringer expects to be on the
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market for an extended period because infringement will be difficult to detect.135 In the short
period situation, due to an increase in the quantity on the market, the price of the patented
product falls, decreasing patentee’s profit because of price erosion.136 In the long period
infringement, damages to the patentee result from price erosion due to an increased quantity of
patented goods on the market and also because the patentee will be forced to decrease the
quantity produced.137 In the short and long period models, damages amount to the difference
between patentee’s actual profit and the “but-for” profit, while infringer profits are less than the
damage amount.138 In the short period, price erosion accounts for the damages but the infringer
profits are lower than damages.139 In the long period, price erosion and lower quantity account
for the damages; but again, infringer profits are lower than actual damages.140 Even if restitution
were available, it would undercompensate the patentee.141
The second type of infringement behavior is known as Bertrand Behavior, where patentee
and infringer compete on price.142 This model assumes that the patented and infringing products
are substitutes for one another and that the infringer enters the market with a lower-priced
product than the patentee.143 In a situation where the infringer enters for a short period,
consumers will purchase the lower-priced product, leaving the patentee with no profit while the
infringer earns slightly less than patentee’s potential profits but-for the infringement.144 For a
long-period situation, the patentee will be forced to lower prices to compete, so that the product
price will be equal to costs, resulting in no patentee or infringer profits.145 In the short-period
study, restitution would approximate patentee damages (assuming costs remained equal).146 In a
long-period situation damages would still be equal to but-for profits; but since the infringer also
earns no profit, restitution does not adequately cover the damages.147
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Chamberlain Behavior represents the third type of theoretical infringement behavior,
where parties do not compete but split sales between them.148 The price would remain constant
but sales would be divided evenly, resulting in damages due to sales erosion.149 In this case,
damages would be equal to infringer profits due to the infringer half of sales.150 This theory
ignores certain externalities such as the first mover’s advantage and assumes that all other factors
between the parties (including production, marketing, demand, supply, market access, etc.) are
equal.
These three models indicate that damages are calculable and the difference between
actual and “but-for” profits can be determined.151 While accurate remedies will depend on courts
taking into account the correct economic behavior, as well as other variables, accurate
measurements are possible and courts are capable of developing accurate remedy calculations.
Blair and Cotter further provide a method of determining whether courts should grant
royalty payments or require that lost profits be awarded. In examining a reasonable royalty,
idealized calculations would lead to a license agreement where patentee would not agree to a
royalty less than profits that could be made by manufacturing the invention, while the infringer
would agree to a royalty no higher than potential profits from using a non-infringing
alternative.152 If a patentee can earn higher profits manufacturing the invention, the patentee
would not have granted a license and this would result in a lost profits calculation.153 However,
if profits cannot be calculated a reasonable royalty calculation would be used to serve as a
deterrent.154
Up to this point, Blair and Cotter have ignored “that patent infringement is a strict
liability tort and that independent discovery of an already patented invention is not a defense.”155
The question arises whether it is economically optimal to demand “but-for” damages from an
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infringer who discovered the invention independently.156 Under these circumstances Blair and
Cotter indicate that economic considerations should take into account which party bears the
burden of patent notice and patent search, and of how these considerations impact damage
calculations. If the burden of notice lies with patentee, he will provide notice of the patent when
the benefit exceeds the costs.157 If the burden lies with the infringer, she will conduct a patent
search if benefits exceed costs, taking into account the probability that someone else already
patented the invention, the likely damages in an infringement suit, and the expected cost of
litigation.158 Ideally, a patent system will allocate the burden of notice or search depending on
the level at which it would encourage or inhibit innovation, but this is not easily determined.159
The current patent system requires patentees to provide notice in order to recover
damages160 but there are issues with the current law because: 1) constructive and not actual
notice is required; 2) no notice is required for processes; 3) if patented goods are not marked then
actual notice must be given to infringers; and 4) entities that hold patents but choose not to
market their inventions do not have to provide notice.161 If tort concepts are to be more readily
applied notice rules need to be better at providing notice.
Blair and Cotter apply a further tort law principle, proximate cause, to the remedy
calculation. Even if a breach exists, and the breach causes injury, liability is limited to injuries
which are proximate to the breach.162 In a patent remedy situation, even if the injury would not
have occurred but-for the breach, the injury may not be foreseeable, or it may be too speculative,
or too remote.163 They argue that proximate cause can easily be applied to U.S. lost profits
analysis due to unpatented goods that compete with the infringing product or loss of sales for
convoyed goods.164 However, in a situation where an infringer is aware of the patent,
infringement is considered intentional and any damages resulting from the infringement,
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including collateral and unpatented goods, are foreseeable.165 Proximate cause has a greater
applicability for the innocent infringer without notice, since damages to convoyed or unpatented
goods may be too remotely connected or unforeseeable.166 However, a further problem exists
when proximate cause analysis is applied to an injury that would be the same whether a patented
invention was used or a non-infringing alternative was used. Blair and Cotter point out that by
ignoring the non-infringing alternative the infringer increases the probability of harm to the
patent owner and should thus be liable for the injury.167
Blair and Cotter lastly move to examine patent non-use. They note five reasons why an
inventor may not commercialize her patent.168 These reasons are: 1) the patented invention may
not be commercially viable; 2) the patented invention is less viable than patentee’s other
technologies; 3) the invention is not viable within the patentee’s area of expertise; 4) willing
licensees are unavailable; or 5) the new invention would compete with patentee’s existing
products.169 There are other reasons not to commercialize a patent. However, Blair and Cotter
fail to mention purely strategic reasons for patent applications and focus on areas where
commercial value can be gained from the patent itself. It is their position that reasons 1) - 4)
should result in reasonable royalty damages.170 However, because of Rite-Hite and King
Instrument, a party who did not market or license his patented invention for reason 5) may be
able to recover lost profits.171 This is further supported by proximate-cause analysis which could
result in lost profits from lost sales of other non-patented goods and, in the opinion of Blair and
Cotter, would be consistent with the purpose of patent law.172
Under current U.S. law, patent non-use is perfectly valid and the Supreme Court has
stated that it will not invalidate a patent for failure to work.173 Some commentators have stated
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that non-practicing patent owners should not receive the same protection as practicing entities,
going so far as to state that infringement should be encouraged in some cases. However, Blair
and Cotter indicate that these positions pose problems related to disclosure, pre-emptive
patenting, and enforceability. Nonetheless, U.S. practice indicates that remedies may be affected
by use and non-use.
Pre-emptive patenting is anti-competitive behavior. It is where an inventor already has a
patented invention but patents a subsequent invention to suppress the subsequent invention, in an
attempt to extend the monopoly on the first invention.174 Yet, an economically rational patentee
would not use a subsequently patented invention if using it lowered overall profits or if the lost
profits on the sale of other products would be greater than the royalty received as a result of
licensing the subsequently patented invention.175 Blair and Cotter feel that economically rational
behavior will rarely result in pre-emptive patenting. Thus the rare occurrence of pre-emptive
patenting should not lead to exceptions to patent protections for such actions.176
Blair and Cotter further take the position that any rule penalizing patent non-use would
impact disclosure because an inventor would likely choose to keep an invention secret if there
were no way to enforce rights without marketing the invention.177 However, this also seems to
imply that the importance of the freedom to use or not use would trump the importance to the
inventor of both the protections and potential damages. Thus under this reasoning a patentee
would rather suppress an invention rather than receive less than the full potential royalty value of
a patented invention. If patent protections such as injunctions were removed and damages
limited to just a reasonable royalty, Blair and Cotter believe that an inventor, faced with the
prospect of patenting two inventions but only practicing one, would likely choose to suppress the
non-practiced invention rather than patent it.178 Of course this creates a risk that without
patenting the second invention, someone else will patent it. This may not have been
contemplated by Blair and Cotter, since at the time of writing, the U.S. was still operating under
a first-to-invent system. Even if the inventor patents both inventions but only practices one, the
lack of an injunction will encourage infringement since the worst penalty faced by an infringer
174
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would still amount to a compulsory license.179 Finally, it may also not be economically or
socially beneficial to patent both inventions and market them merely to maintain patent rights.180
To summarize, Blair and Cotter support an absolute right to an injunction as a remedy for
patent infringement, but they recognize that damages are also part of the remedy. They call for a
tort-law analysis for damages and point out that even though the current system does not support
disgorgement as a remedy, lost profits are well suited as a remedy under a “but-for” analysis.
While they seek to reform infringement damages, Blair and Cotter are very much against
awarding a reasonable royalty except where no other remedy is available, and they do not
support the award of damages in lieu of an injunction.
Peter Menell is another voice in the debate over whether property rights should be
applied to patents. Merges, Blair, and Cotter are strong supporters of treating patents as
property. However, Merges also recognizes that there may be limits to the effectiveness of
awarding an injunction for every infringed patent. Like Merges, Menell supports a patent system
that incorporates some flexibility to avoid decisions which lead to results contrary to the goals of
the patent system. However, while Merges, Blair, and Cotter, support property rights in a patent,
Menell directly attacks attempts to treat patents like physical property. Menell would greatly
limit the property rights associated with a patent.
Menell believes that peculiarities in the nature of a patent should discourage courts from
treating patents in exactly the same way as physical property. Ideological movements should
yield to the proper working of an efficient intellectual property system, because a system that
treats patents as an absolute property right may actually hinder the goals of an intellectual
property system. A continued Utilitarian approach rather than an absolute approach is better
suited to the continued well being of the U.S. patent system. Menell examines some of the
problems that exist in granting absolute property rights to intellectual property. To support his
examination, he illustrates the differences between physical property and intellectual property,
especially the incompatibility of absolute property rights when applied to intellectual property.
He further indicates that there are competing interest groups in the battle over the applicability of
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property rights to intellectual property and that these groups often have widely differing
motivations.
Menell notes that the philosophy of John Locke considers life, liberty, and property to be
an inalienable right and is a motivation for the Property Rights Movement (PRM).181 The PRM
supports strong - even absolute, property rights. While there are calls for this absolute vision to
apply to all property, including patents, the natural rights theory has really only applied to
inventorship in U.S. IP.182 Menell posits that the framers of the constitution had no intention of
granting absolute property rights in intellectual property, since powers to promote science and
the useful arts were given to Congress. Since Congress was given this power, it seems to
indicate a more Utilitarian approach rather than the granting of an absolute right. Utilitarianism
has played a greater role in developing actual intellectual property law than absolute property
rights.183 Menell indicates that under both the natural rights and utilitarian theories, private
property is considered exclusive, transferable, and free from government interference.
Utilitarianism, through neoclassical economic theory, examines property as a bundle of rights,
with the bundled rights being adjusted as needed to promote science and progress.184 The rights
in the bundle are owned and transferable but can also be limited.185
Intellectual property protection is justified because the competitive market is unable to
support efficient innovation in areas where research and development is costly but the outcomes
are easily and cheaply duplicated.186 Protecting innovation is a legal solution to a market
problem. By granting exclusive use to a person for a period of time, knowledge development is
protected. However, such a grant creates a monopoly, resulting in a deadweight loss to
consumers and potential limits on further research use of the knowledge. 187 Patent law attempts
to balance protections with disclosure and public access.188
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Protections granted by a patent come in the form of a grant of certain property rights.
Despite this, Menell states that treatment of property rights should vary with the type of
resources.189 Patents are significantly different from physical property. There is a utilitarian
goal in granting property ownership, including a belief that private use will be more efficient
than others. However, the goals in granting property rights to land or physical property are
different than those of patents and come with different conditions. One difference is that patents
are intended to promote innovation. To achieve this goal, associated laws must be flexible
enough to change with public policy, technology, and economics. 190 Another difference is that
patent exclusivity is limited because of the non-obviousness, novelty, utility, and disclosure
requirements, the experimental use defense, and other limitations.191 A further distinction
between property and patents is that use of a patent by one party does not limit or prevent use of
that knowledge by another, whereas physical property use is more limited, despite the ability for
physical property to accommodate multiple interests.
Menell points out that the PRM seeks to establish strong property rights and apply these
rights to both physical and intangible property. Their motivation for strong protection is
primarily ideological in nature, whereas patent owners see property rights as a means of profiting
from investments in invention and innovation.192 These owners “tend to be far more agnostic
about government intervention” particularly since government tends to provide funding for so
much technological research.193
In addition to ideological differences, there are significant other differences between
tangible (physical property) and intangible property (patents). Physical, tangible property can be
depleted through over-use while intellectual resources cannot be depleted in such a way.194
Exclusive rights, such as those given to real property owners, could lead to under-utilization of
intellectual property, limiting the cumulative nature of technological progress.195 The PRM
group believes that all resources should be owned, but patent law limits ownership protection for
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certain knowledge and attempts to place much in the public domain.196 Ownership is also
limited to a certain period of time. A second issue over making absolute property rules for
patents is that boundaries are ill-defined for most patents, while they are quite clear for tangible
property.197 Monitoring and enforcement costs can be very high for infringement because of the
need to observe the flow of knowledge, whereas tangible property can be easily monitored. 198
Finally, considerable debates among patent owners over limits and application of property law
prevent a unified front. Certain technological areas support strong protection, while others
support weaker protection or weaker protections in certain cases.
The PRM is tied with a social, political, and economic ideology. The movement supports
strong property rights, minimal government involvement in markets, and individual liberty.199
While property protection plays a role in fostering progress and invention, very strong protection
could stunt innovation, which is dependent on the cumulative nature of knowledge.200 These
strong rights might also prevent optimal use of IP resources because of the potentially high
transaction costs in obtaining licenses.201 Strong property rules could limit the flexibility
currently built into the IP protection system.202 Finally, in certain technological fields, a trend
towards collaborative efforts would be hindered by strong property rights.203
Because of the philosophical, religious, functional, structural, and political differences
between proponents of PRM and IP owners, it is unlikely that there will be a viable marriage
between the two. While there are similarities and property law plays a role in IP protection, if IP
were to adopt protections of the kind advocated by the PRM group, the purpose of IP protection
would likely be thwarted.
Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro also support a more flexible patent system which limits
absolute property rights, in particular for situations involving certain non-practicing entities.
They specifically mention trolls as the non-practicing entities that are the most egregious abusers
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of patent property rights, creating holdup and royalty stacking situations. Lemley and Shapiro
provide an economic analysis for why flexibility is necessary, particularly with certain nonpracticing entities. A patent holdup occurs where a patentee uses an injunction award or the
threat of injunction to gain exorbitant royalties from an infringer who is heavily invested in the
use of the patented technology.204 For a holdup to occur, it is a necessary condition that the
infringer is invested heavily in using the patented technology and the prospect of having to stop
using the technology is costly.205 If a litigation outcome determines that a patent is valid, the
patentee’s bargaining position is extremely strong. If post litigation negotiations fail, the
infringer must stop using the infringing product and attempt to design around it or wait until the
patent term expires.206 The result will be that the infringer will likely pay more than the actual
value of the patent in order to avoid the costly alternative of not using the patented technology.
Continuing the analysis, Lemley and Shapiro state that in a situation where a producer
has no competition, that producer will make the most profit.207 However, if there is a competing
product on the market the producer’s profits will be reduced.208 To support their holdup
argument, Lemley and Shapiro developed a calculation to determine a natural benchmark for a
negotiated patent. The benchmark is supposed to indicate the royalty rate that two parties would
agree to under normal negotiating conditions. If the negotiations take place before litigation, the
litigation outcome’s uncertainty is part of the patent valuation. Because of this uncertainty,
Lemley and Shapiro determined that the resulting royalty rate will be directly proportional to the
patent strength.209 Prior to litigation, infringement and validity are both uncertain. After
litigation, patent validity and infringement will both be conclusively determined. Therefore
negotiations taking place before litigation will result in a royalty considerably lower than a
royalty negotiated with certain patent validity and certain infringement.210 The negotiation
which takes into account uncertainty is considered the benchmark for what a reasonable royalty
should be.211 Lemley and Shapiro based their benchmark calculation on the per-unit value of the
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patented feature to the infringing firm (V), the patent strength (θ), and the bargaining skill of the
patent holder (B).212 Both the patent strength and the bargaining skill are measured on a scale of
0 to 1. This benchmark calculation (V x θ x B) is used for comparisons to post-litigation court
awards and royalty rates made through negotiations with a looming threat of injunction.213
Lemley and Shapiro examined the impact of injunctive power using two strategies that
can be used by an infringer facing litigation: 1) litigation alone and 2) litigation and product
redesign.214 If the infringer gambles and loses using the litigation strategy, the infringer will face
redesign costs plus lost sales due to market absence.215 Lemley and Shapiro calculated royalty
rates in these circumstances and compared them to the benchmark rate. Using an example where
only 10% of total sales are lost due to market absence, their model shows that an infringer will
agree to a royalty amounting to 110% above the benchmark royalty rate in order to avoid an
injunction.216 This rate will increase as the redesign complexity increases.217 If the infringer
chooses to redesign during litigation, the infringer not only incurs the litigation costs but the
redesign costs. In order to avoid redesign costs, especially on a weak patent, the Lemley and
Shapiro economic model indicates that the infringer would be willing to pay a 40% premium
above the benchmark rate.218 In situations where the patented invention adds no value to the
infringer’s invention, Lemley and Shapiro determined that all royalty above the benchmark rate
is the result of a holdup and makes no economic contribution.219
Royalty stacking is the situation where the components or manufacturing methods of a
company’s single product are covered by several patents, leading to multiple royalty payments to
multiple parties.220 Royalty rates in a stacking situation are affected by rates that other firms pay
to the patentee because of 1) rent splitting, 2) shutdown, and 3) a situation known as the Cournot
complement.221 In a rent splitting situation, a firm pays royalties to multiple patent holders,
cutting into its profit margins. If that firm pays royalties to many patent owners, its margins will
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be reduced and so will the amounts it can pay to potential licensors. The relatively small profit
margin on the product will likely limit the power of a threatened injunction by any one
patentee.222 If the downstream firm’s royalty payments are each above the benchmark royalty
limit, the company may still be able to operate; however the firm will shut down before the profit
margin becomes less than zero.223 The Cournot complement arises when multiple downstream
firms “with market power sell complementary products.”224 A holdup results in a product price
increase leading to reduced demand and output, ultimately increasing the economic deadweight
loss and resulting in a net social detriment.225
Infringement can result from an overt act to use a patented technology or it can be the
result of independent development. The point in a product’s development timeline is also
significant as to how strong a patentee’s bargaining position is. The threat of an injunction early
in product development will have little effect, as the infringer can design around the patented
invention. However, once the product is developed and on sale, the threat of an injunction can
be extremely effective because of the potential cost of production shutdown and the cost to
design around the patented invention. Lemley and Shapiro assume that the cost to design around
the patented innovation will be large, but this will often vary with what is actually patented and
the technological field. These circumstances clearly make it more profitable for a patentee to
engage in strategic behavior, waiting until the infringer is already in production before providing
infringement notification. 226 This delay and surprise create a holdup situation. If there are
multiple patents that cover an invention, this may result in multiple holdups and a royalty
stacking situation, imposing costs on the infringer that are out of proportion with the actual value
of the patented inventions.
Holdups and royalty stacking are amplified after courts have determined that a patent is
both valid and infringed. Not only are damages disproportionately large but they are often
followed by a permanent injunction. This creates a twofold burden on the infringer. Based on a
benchmark calculation model developed by Lemley and Shapiro, post-trial negotiations, the
failure of which may result in an injunction, will result in royalties that are significantly higher
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than the benchmark value. The royalty is 110% greater than the benchmark in situations where
the infringer solely decides to wager on the outcome of litigation, and loses.227 If the infringer
redesigns the product during litigation, the award will be 40% higher than the benchmark rate;
but that amount will depend on both the redesign cost and the probability of litigation success. 228
Lemley and Shapiro indicate that royalties tend to be particularly disproportionate in
situations where a component of the infringer’s product is patented, but the rest of the product is
predominantly non-infringing.229 The single component may result in an injunction preventing
sale of the entire device. Thus it is not uncommon for an infringer to pay a high royalty fee
simply to avoid litigation and the threat of an injunction.230 Lemley and Shapiro believe these
situations are ripe for abuse, as illustrated by the results of NTP v. Research in Motion, where the
parties agreed to a settlement eighteen times the reasonable royalty award.231 The size of
reasonable royalties damage awards are a significant concern, particularly in electronics and
semi-conductors.232
Courts will generally rely on the Georgia Pacific factors to determine a reasonable
royalty. The fifteen factors are applied based on hypothetical negotiations at the time of the
infringement.233 Lemley and Shapiro determined that a court royalty award ends up being higher
than the benchmark royalty partly because validity and infringement risk, assumed in a real
negotiation, are removed.234 Calculations not only ignore risks inherent in a real negotiation but
they also do not account for the unwillingness of the parties to agree.235 They list three further
reasons why reasonable royalties overcompensate patentees: 1) reliance on industry rates are
from past legal battles and not private deals; 2) experts overcompensate because private
agreements are not publicly disclosed; and 3) determining the royalty rate for a patented
component can be messy and inaccurate, particularly if apportionment calculations need to be
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made for a component.236 In relation to the third reason, calculations can further be skewed
when applying the “entire market value” rule, which also permits royalties on unpatented
products so long as the patented product drove sales.237 The strength of the Lemley and Shapiro
argument depend on many assumptions and their arguments will be analyzed in greater detail
when several economic approaches to patent remedies are examined in Part IV.
Lemley and Shapiro make several policy recommendations to curb strategic patent
holdups and royalty stacking by non-practicing entities. There should be limits on injunctions
and imposition of stays for certain patentees.238 After an infringement suit is completed, if the
patentee is a non-practicing entity and the cost of the redesign burden for the infringer is very
high, the courts should stay an injunction and allow parties to negotiate a licensing agreement. 239
If the parties cannot reach an agreement, then the court should decide on a continuing reasonable
royalty that would allow the infringer continued use of the patented innovation. If the redesign
burden on the infringer is low and the patent adds to the infringer’s product, the court should
award an injunction and allow the parties to negotiate a licensing agreement.240
In component situations, courts should also determine royalty assessment by comparing
the value of the patented component to the next best non-infringing alternative.241 This would
reflect a truer valuation of the actual component.242 This comparison has a precedent in
determining damages for lost profits because courts limit damage awards due to the presence of
non-infringing alternatives.243
Finally, in order to more accurately assess the value of the patented invention, Lemley
and Shapiro believe that courts should also take into consideration other non-patented
components of the device.244 This will allow the court to more clearly see the value of the
patented invention in the context of the whole device.245 Court procedure could be modified
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during damage assessment to allow courts to consider the royalties on other components in the
device.246 Alternatively, since modifications to allow other agreements into evidence may cause
greater complications, parties could introduce evidence indicating the value of other nonpatented components to buyers.247 This would allow the courts to assess the value of the
patented device in the context of a multi-component product.248
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Chapter Two
Purpose of a Patent System
Before examining how remedies can affect a patent system, there should be some
indication what the goals of a patent system are. Why create a patent system at all? The United
States (U.S.) constitution clearly states that Congress can make laws to promote science and the
useful arts.249 Canada’s constitution entitles Parliamentary regulation of patents and copyrights,
but it does not describe the goals, or encompass the breadth of control given to U.S. Congress. 250
Nonetheless, Canada’s federal government still has significant power over the regulation of
patents, compulsory licensing, and property rights.251 Powers to regulate patents are not
constitutionally enshrined in the United Kingdom (U.K.), but making laws to regulate patents,
inventions, and the sciences is well within the law-making power of Parliament.252 While neither
the U.K. Constitutions Reform Act 2005 nor the 1977 Patent Act state intellectual property
goals, there is an unwritten assumption that the patent act is to benefit society.253
Commentators often stress that encouraging innovation is the goal of a patent system.254
Of course it is true that patent systems are designed to encourage innovation, however that is not
the only goal. Innovation is just one of several goals and these other goals should not be ignored
when analyzing a patent system. 255
David Vaver states that a patent system is supposed to “create incentives for innovation,
without unduly limiting access for consumers and follow-on innovators.”256 There must be a
balance between protection and access to allow others to expand upon the patented works. 257
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The incentive should not only encourage innovation but also encourage the inventor to develop
and market the invention. An effective patent system should also allow an inventor to recover
the cost of creating the invention and even make potential profits. However, an ideal system
would also keep rewards in proportion with the effort put in by the innovator. Financiers and
distributors should also have an opportunity to make a profit since they are responsible for
making the inventions or inventive results publicly available. There must ultimately be a
balancing of rights between patent owners and potential beneficiaries of the invention.
Amy Landers, like Vaver, indicates that the patent system has several goals beyond
innovating for the sake of innovation. She notes that a patent system should encourage
commercialization in order to truly be a system that benefits the public.258 Innovation as a goal
encourages patent accumulation. However, patent accumulation also encourages patent-only
transactions, which does not necessarily lead to greater commercialization.
Similarly, Roger Blair and Thomas Cotter look beyond just encouraging innovation as
the sole goal of the patent system. They indicate that the patent system should be designed to
“maximize social values” or the difference between social benefits and costs.259 Encouraging
discovery and dissemination of new ideas are social benefits of a patent system.260 These
benefits include not just the creation of new ideas but also commercialization or use of the
inventions to ultimately benefit society. As noted earlier, the social benefit of giving exclusive
rights to a patentee should outweigh the social costs and any existing patent system should do
this better than alternate schemes or systems.261
These goals are significant in the context of encouraging access to innovation
information, economic development, investment, and commercialization. The beneficiaries of a
patent system are not only inventors. They are also future inventors, investors, and consumers.
The benefit to society stems from these directly related goals.
An inventor’s attempt to create an invention involves certain risks which can have
economic implications, such as: 1) the risk of failure or not creating the invention; 2) the risk that
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even if the invention is created, there may be no market for it; 3) the unknown cost of research
and development; and 4) the risk of infringement.262 These risks exist with or without a patent
system and whether or not the inventor is cognizant of them. They also indicate how tenuous the
position of the inventor may be even if the inventor has the protection of a patent. Each of these
risks involves significant financial and labor investments with potentially limited rewards.
Even if the patent owner is capable of overcoming all of the risks, she may still choose to
sell the invention or license it to another. There are several business reasons to do this, even if
the buyer or licensor is a competitor. The incentive is greater profit through patent trade.
Optionally, the patent owner may choose to neither license nor sell the patented invention, opting
to do nothing. Each of these marketing avenues is available to the patent owner. While profiting
from an invention is a great incentive, there are a myriad of reasons why a patentee may choose a
particular marketing strategy.
The initial financial risks associated with the research and development process fall to the
inventor. Upon completing an invention, the inventor may attempt to commercialize it in order
to receive compensation and potential profits for her labour. However, if the inventor does not
have the resources to market the innovation or if there is no market for it, she will receive no
compensation. At this point, an inventor is a non-practicing entity because the innovation is not
being used. In an effort to recover some of the invested costs, she may try to sell or license the
innovation to someone who is more capable of marketing it. If the inventor is lucky enough to
find a patent licensee or buyer, then some or all of the risk will be transferred to the buyer. The
buyer will have to overcome similar risks in finding a way to recover the cost of paying for the
patent. From an economic standpoint, the buyer will face the potential that there is no further
market for the invention and the risk that the patent might be infringed or invalidated. Thus the
risk has shifted to the purchaser and the purchaser must try to recover the expenditure as well as
the potential cost of the risks. Despite the protections afforded by a patent, the risks are
considerable. As Blair and Cotter indicate, there is a risk involved in creating an innovation but
there is also a risk in marketing the innovation. The patent system will ideally create incentives
for innovators to encourage taking these risks.
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Without a patent system, an inventor who devotes the time, effort, and resources to create
an invention will face the possibility that another party may copy and market the invention
without having to devote the resources to invent.263 The cost of copying an invention is usually
small compared to the cost of research and development in creating the invention. Since both the
copyist and the inventor would have to expend resources in commercializing the invention, the
copyist avoids the costs devoted to the inventive process, creating a competitive advantage. This
generally puts the inventor at a distinct disadvantage when the two parties compete in the
marketplace. This may be less of a disadvantage if the inventor is a large company with
significant resources, but it puts small inventors with limited resources at a significant
competitive disadvantage. Big or small, there is a disincentive to put forth the time, money, and
effort to create since someone might just copy the resulting invention before a company can
successfully reach the market. A system that lacks adequate protection may cause the inventor to
keep the invention secret unless she can enter the marketplace and capture an overwhelming
share of consumers by being first to commercialize the innovation.264
Without patent protection, invention will go on but there will be less willingness to
publish information and more care taken before goods are openly sold. An inventor would either
have to be first to market or would have to keep the invention secret. In being first to market the
inventor would use that position to gain such a significant hold on the product market that
competitors would have difficulty convincing consumers to switch to their product. Achieving
market supremacy is difficult. Even if an inventor manages to be first to the marketplace, there
is no guarantee that the inventor’s product will sell. The copyist may actually have an advantage
by being patient. By collecting marketing data on the product, the copyist can enter the
marketplace at a later time and use the marketing data to nullify any advantages the inventor may
have due to the head-start. The alternative to gaining overwhelming market share is for the
inventor to keep the invention secret. This may work if the patent is for a process but it becomes
difficult to prevent others from re-constructing materials or machines. Secrecy also limits followon inventions because information is not published or shared. This also puts fewer products into
the stream of commerce, thus affecting society.
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The patent system is an attempt to correct the market inefficiency created by copyists by
providing protection for inventors in an effort to encourage innovation.265 A patent system
should do this by protecting inventors from copyists and by providing incentives to create, to
disclose or publicize, to commercialize, and to encourage others to use this information for
further invention. The system should further create a disincentive for copyists. Publication and
disclosure allow other inventors to improve upon existing inventions. Protection for inventors is
also intended to encourage research and development (R & D), which provides jobs and
encourages scientific education within a country. R & D spending also increases manufacturing
and commercialization efforts as viable inventions enter the marketplace. Invention
commercialization also provides new and better products for consumers. If these results come
about because innovation is encouraged, then it is clearly beneficial for a country to find ways to
encourage innovation.
However, a patent system should not provide incentive to innovate for the sake of
innovation. Nor should such a system exist to solely protect the inventor or create barriers that
exclude users and future inventors.266 Encouraging innovation is intended to ultimately benefit
society at large and not just inventors or invention owners. However, a system that disseminates
innovation without protecting the inventor actually discourages other inventions. A patent
system should strike a balance between protecting inventors, follow-on inventors, and
beneficiaries.
Blair and Cotter list social costs which arise when patent protection exists and these
should be balanced against the social benefits. These costs include: 1) the “systemic costs of
processing, enforcing, and maintaining patent rights”; 2) the potential for existing patents to
inhibit invention, by raising the cost of follow-on inventions; 3) the increased cost of the
inventive process and ultimately the products created, due to patent infringement searches; 4)
duplicated efforts by multiple inventors; 5) the existence of “deadweight” losses arising from
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patent monopoly rights; and 6) the potential litigation costs due to unclear patent boundaries.267
There should be a net social benefit when balancing benefits and costs.
William Landes and Richard Posner indicate that disclosure is a significant reason to
create a patent system, even as they question other reasons given in support of the system. 268
Without a patent system, Posner and Landes believe that inventors would invest more heavily in
methods of maintaining trade secrecy. There would also be greater funding for inventions that
could be kept secret. Posner and Landes propose that another consequence of keeping
manufacturing processes secret would be a generally less efficient manufacturing
system. Disclosure through a patent allows process licensing to someone who would be better
able to use the innovation, while trade secrets make such licensing difficult. If a trade secret
were the only option, there would be no way of efficiently exchanging information about a
process that may be useful in other industries or in other areas. The innovator may never learn of
other potential uses and a manufacturer in another industry would have no easy way of learning
of the invention. A system relying on trade secrets is not a particularly efficient system and the
goals sought under the current system would be difficult to achieve. Landes and Posner indicate
that patenting may be unnecessary where a monopoly exists but it is needed in high-competition
environments. To increase profits, owners of a monopoly can both lower costs and raise prices
on their innovation. Innovations that are difficult to reverse-engineer give the inventor an
experience advantage which can also act as a barrier to entry. Landes and Posner further note
that without patent protection, an inventor would have to use superior efficiency or economies of
scale to create barriers to entry for other manufacturers. The advantages of experience and low
costs can allow a company without a patent to entrench itself and limit competition. However, a
patent is necessary in competitive industries because companies have neither the economies of
scale nor expertise superior to their competitors. In high competition environments, a patent
rewards innovation by giving innovators a limited monopoly to gain an advantage over their
competitors, in exchange for disclosure. Landes and Posner finally conclude that even if a patent
would be unnecessary to encourage innovation, patenting is essential to follow-on innovation
because it encourages disclosure.
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If the cost of obtaining, maintaining, or enforcing a patent is high innovators will not
resort to patents and will seek alternative ways to protect their innovations. This indicates that
patent applications and awards should be reasonably available to inventors. Dispute resolution
should be accessible and remedies should be credible in order to prevent infringement.
However, the protections given by a patent should not be so strong that new inventors will be
discouraged from wading into the creative waters for fear of being bitten by patent enforcers. A
balance must be maintained. There must be a system to notify others that an invention is
patented and there must be a means of finding these inventions without undue cost. Boundaries
should also be clear to limit boundary disputes, to prevent the unwary from infringing, and to
prevent patent holders from claiming well beyond their bounds. Independent inventors face the
highest burden because their efforts may be for naught. An ideal system would limit duplicated
efforts. Finally, deadweight losses are economic losses faced by consumer society because of
higher than optimal pricing and lower than optimal access to the invention. Each of these costs
will have a detrimental effect on inventive efforts and each provides an obstacle to an ideal
patent system.
Attempts to balance costs and benefits are reflected, to an extent, in infringement
remedies in Canada, England, and the U.S. because all three jurisdictions have remedies that are
not intended to punish infringers but to compensate inventors269. However, existing gaps in the
system have allowed certain patent holders to obtain very high profits, not as a result of their
creative abilities or marketing prowess but because of their willingness to litigate. Longstanding approaches to patent remedies may fall short in certain situations and may not be
maintaining the goals of the patent system. Furthermore, debate in dealing with a certain nonpracticing patent holders has focused entirely on patent holders and infringers but not on the
other stake-holders. As legal interpreters, it should fall to the courts to mitigate potential
inequities in the system and to protect other stake-holders.
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A Short Summary of Property Rights in Patents
Property can be defined as a legal thing with an “objectively defined area for valueproducing activity and choice.”270 Ownership is created through an operation of law, and that
law ultimately dictates the level of control that an owner will have over that object.271 The level
of control granted will entitle owners to use the object so long as it is within the boundaries of
the law. Therefore, to facilitate efficient resource usage by private persons, rights and control
must be legally defined before a person can make decisions related to the property.
Property rights, in their broadest form, entitle a person to complete control and ownership
over a thing while excluding all others from control and ownership.272 A property right creates a
legal entitlement in the owned property. This entitlement gives the property owner a legal right
to use the property and a right to prevent others from using the property. Non-owners are not
entitled to use the property, and only with the permission of the owner can anyone else obtain
rights or entitlement to the property. In a pure free-market system the entitlement holder sets an
initial price, and only after reaching an agreement through bargaining with a second party can the
entitlement be legally infringed or taken by the second party.273 The bargain reached may entail
a partial or complete transfer of control and ownership.
There can be many property rights but these will often include a right to exploit the
property, a right to property alienability, and a right to exclude others from the property. It is
often stated that the most significant entitlement is a right to exclude. It is not that the right to
alienability, the right to exploit, and any other rights are unimportant but they are often limited
by a country’s statutes.274 While the right to exclude may also be limited, that limit generally
pertains to the government’s use and not use by other parties. Included in the patentee’s right to
exclude is the right to prevent others from making, using, selling, or importing the innovation
which is the subject of the patent.275 A person or entity has no right to use the patentee’s

270

Emily Sherwin, Property, Rules, and Property Rules, Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers, 38 (8-16-2007)
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops_papers/26/ (last visited September 27, 2011).
271
Id., at 38-9.
272
Menell, 34 Ecology L. Q. at 720-21.
273
Merges, Supra note 52, at 2655.
274
See U.S. Patent Act, Canadian Patent Act, and U.K. Patents Act 1977. See also below discussion on Patents as
Property in Canada, England, and the United States at page 55.
275
See U.S. Patent Act, Canadian Patent Act, and U.K. Patents Act 1977.

49

invention and may even have a duty not to use the patentee’s invention. 276 A person or entity
may acquire rights to use the patented innovation if authorized by the patentee. However, quite
often patent acquisition may be limited by the state.
A further aspect of the right to exclude is that knowledge or intent is not a factor in
determining liability for a breach of that right. Anyone using a patented invention without the
patentee’s authorization has breached the patentee’s rights. The breach is known as patent
infringement and it is a strict liability issue. Infringement, like a physical trespass, requires no
intent or knowledge. Innocent infringers and even good-faith avoiders are just as liable as the
willful one.277 Only an authorized right to enter or use the property would be valid while all
others would face sanctions.

Patents, Property, and the Property Rights Movement
It is commonly stated that economic theory justifies creating patent protections because
the free-market is unable to support efficient innovation in areas where research and
development is costly but the outcomes are easily and cheaply duplicated.278 Patent protection is
a legal solution to a market problem. In order to provide incentive for inventors to put in the
time and effort to innovate, knowledge is protected by granting exclusive use to a person for a
period of time. This prevents the copyist from taking advantage of the labors of another and
encourages people to invent. However, there is a question of whether the patent incentive is
really necessary. William Landes and Richard Posner have found that the incentive will vary
depending on the industry and that the cost of copying will vary depending on the innovation. In
many industrial applications the cost of duplicating an industrial innovation will be very high,
creating a cost disadvantage for the imitator.279 Even without a patent, the inventor will gain an
advantage by being first to market and the first to develop expertise in producing the innovation.
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The exclusive grant creates a monopoly, resulting in an economic deadweight loss to
consumers and potential limits on further research use of the knowledge. 280 A deadweight loss is
a result of monopolistic pricing, creating higher prices for the patented invention and lower
supply, as patent law attempts to balance the protections with disclosure and public access.
Limits on further research arise under strong property rights rules because any use not-authorized
by the patent owner is prohibited. This creates the need for licensing (which is not a bad thing),
but would stunt innovation if the property right were so strong that a researcher would be afraid
to commence research for fear of infringing.
Peter Menell believes that treatment of property rights should vary with the type of
resources.281 While patents are considered property in each of the three jurisdictions, they are
also property distinct from physical property. One distinction is that patents are intangible
whereas physical property is tangible. This is significant because tangibility is directly related to
the scarcity or limited availability of physical property. Communal property is considered to be
inefficient and wasteful in a free-market economic system because everyone will want to use and
abuse the property because of its lack of scarcity. By contrast, private ownership is supposed to
encourage efficient use of scarce resources and property. However, with a patent, it is not the
scarcity of resources but the lack thereof, which is really a concern. While physical property use
is limited and cannot easily be used by multiple parties, the use of a patent by one party does not
limit or prevent use of that knowledge by another. Limitless patent usage is what actually
requires a property right because access to a patented innovation would otherwise be easy. The
property right granted in a patent is intended as incentive to invest in the innovation process.
Thus patent owners are given the right to exclude all others for a period of time, essentially
giving the owner exclusive use for that time. The property right is not granted for efficient use
of scarce resources. The incentive of property rights in a patent is granted to encourage
innovation, and it is widely believed that continued protection will further encourage
commercialization.
While efficient use of property can be attributed to patents rights, the incentive to
innovate and use of scarce resources are very distinct goals. Efficient use of scarce resources
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may be a policy for providing property rights in land or goods but for patents it is the complete
lack of scarcity which the property right attempts to address. The property right, through the
right to exclude, provides a limited period where the inventor can commercialize the innovation
in an attempt to profit (and recover R&D costs). As Landes and Posner point out, the monopoly
and property protection granted to an innovator will influence the mark-up in price for the
innovation but will not have a bearing on costs incurred in making the innovation.
Patents also entail an exclusive property right created with the intent to promote
innovation and commercialization. Economic efficiency is behind calls to adjust aspects of
patent rights. Economic efficiency is a separate concern apart from the original goals of
promoting innovation and subsequent commercialization. Improving efficiency may help the
system but it is not a goal of a patent system.
Additional concerns in a patent system entail that the exclusive right in a patent is
tempered by laws that allow flexibility capable of adapting to changes in public policy,
technology, and economics.282 Such exclusivity limits can be seen in the duration of a patent and
by a threshold requirement that the underlying invention is non-obvious, novel, useful, and is of
an appropriate subject matter.283 A specific duration limits the exclusivity timeframe and allows
the patent to eventually enter the public sphere. A requirement for an invention to be nonobvious, novel, useful, and of appropriate subject matter limits the scope of what can be patented
to new inventions, ones that differ from existing inventions, and have commercial applicability.
Laws of nature or abstract thoughts cannot be patented.
Under international agreements, Canada, the U.S., and England have all established
patent terms of twenty years. Physical property ownership may last a lifetime or even longer,
while patent property rights are limited in duration.284 This duration is significant because
patents fall into the public domain after the twenty year period.285
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There are also functional and structural differences between tangible and intangible
property which require different treatments than physical property. Scarcity applies not only in
regard to the amount of physical property available but also to the depletion of property value
through over-use. The intangible nature of a patent prevents it from being depleted either
through overuse or scarcity.286 Physical property has very distinct and usually obvious
boundaries; patent boundaries are far less clear and rely on interpreting claim language
intentionally written to claim as much as possible. Finally, enforcement costs can also be very
high for patents because of the need to observe the flow of knowledge. By contrast, land can be
much more easily monitored.287 The lack of clear boundaries makes both avoiding and
monitoring infringement complicated because neither the patent owner nor the infringer is
necessarily clear when the boundary lines of the patent have been crossed.
Under natural rights, private property is considered exclusive, transferable, and free from
government interference. The natural-rights philosophy of John Locke considered life, liberty,
and property to be inalienable rights.288 While there are calls for this absolute vision to apply to
all property, including patents, the natural rights theory has limitations. Despite the best efforts
of property rights supporters, patent property is not considered absolute. Property inalienability
is limited in each of the jurisdictions, whether by constitution or through limited protection under
laws or both. Support for strong property rights also appears to be misguided in the case of
patents because the property right created in a patent is a statutorily created right in all three
jurisdictions under examination. The statutory rights also contain limits and allow for
considerable government interference. As will be seen, strong property rights have caused
concerns in the current system.
Utilitarian ideals, while not reaching the level of property inalienability, also considered
private property to be exclusive, transferable, and free from government interference.
Utilitarianism, through neoclassical economic theory, examines property as a bundle of rights. 289
Each of the rights in the bundle is owned and is transferable.290 Utilitarianism, rather than
natural law, has played a greater role in developing patent law. This can be seen in the U.S. and
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Canada because their respective constitutions give their federal legislative bodies the power to
promote the progress of science and to make laws regarding patents.291 These philosophical
underpinnings can also be seen in England through the development of the patent as a property
right and also in limitations imposed by the government through moral and equitable principles.
Furthermore, each country has adjusted the bundled rights as needed to promote science,
progress and economic benefits. While the patent system in each country has been relatively free
from interference in property rights in recent times, interference is possible under each statute.
There has been a substantial push to establish strong property rights for all physical and
intangible property owners. There are many groups which support this property rights
movement, and naturally, patent holders support the idea of strong property rights for their own
intangible property. But there are ideological differences between patent owners and property
rights advocates. Propertizing everything so that it can be bought and sold with no government
interference may not be as feasible for patents. Menell observed that strong property rights
supporters want strong private property protection because of free-market, anti-government
ideology while patent owners tend to see property rights as a means of profiting from research
investments.292 What motivates the parties in their property rights support is actually quite
distinct. Patent owners “tend to be far more agnostic about government intervention”
particularly since governments tend to provide funding for so much research.293 Patent holder
views on propertization apply insofar as they can profit from it. Ideology plays far less of a
motivating role. Patentee support for strong property rights also varies with the technological
area. Pharmaceutical companies want extremely strong protections whereas other technological
areas are more flexible. Patentees waver in their views on strong property rights, supporting
strong propertization when they are patent owners. When they are being accused of
infringement, their view may be quite the opposite.
There is also no small irony in property rights advocates’ support for strong property
rights for patents. In particular, their demand for government non-interference directly opposes
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the statutorily created rights and protections for patents.294 It is strange that intellectual property
rights are part of this movement, especially since patent laws are already a form of government
intervention in the market-place. Without patent laws, an inventor’s labors would be for naught
because a copyist would not have to expend the research and development cost and effort but
could merely copy the invention. Without patent laws inventors are likely to keep information
secret, or be forced to take risks to enter the marketplace in such a way so that the invention
would prevent others from entering into competition with the inventor. In order to prevent
inventors from keeping innovations secret and to eliminate some of the risks for inventors, the
patent system provides protection from copyists by giving inventors a limited monopoly and
property right in the patent. Thus it is government intervention which is responsible for
maintaining the property rights enjoyed by intellectual property holders (government
intervention also maintains the rights of holder of land and goods). Otherwise harsh free-market
conditions would prevail.
Despite this ideological push, countries have kept patents from becoming like physical
property. Each of the governments has retained considerable control over patent rights and has
created circumstances where patent rights can be limited.

Patents as Property Under Statute in Canada, the United States, and England
The specifics of property rights will vary from country to country. However, in Canada,
the U.S., and England patent property rights are treated similarly. Each country has a strong
sense of property rights that is entrenched in its laws and social consciousness. The specifics of
patent rights vary, but the general concepts are very similar. Each country grants a property right
in the patent, but each country also recognizes that the right is not absolute. There are limits
defined in each country’s statutes.
Canada

The Canadian Patent Act provides the patent holder with what seems like an affirmative
right, to make, use, construct, and sell the patented invention.295 The patent act states that a
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patentee has “the exclusive right, privilege and liberty of making, constructing and using the
invention and selling it to others to be used[.]” This language, along with language in other
sections of the Patent Act, indicates that patents are viewed, under the statute, as property.296
Section 27(4) refers to the “boundaries” of the patent as property and s. 49 details the
requirements that must be followed to assign a patent.
Canadian courts have often treated patents as a form of physical property but more
recently have used language which emphasizes that patent rights are really just the right to
exclude.297 In his dissenting opinion in Harvard College v. Canada, Justice Binnie stated:
“[T]he Patent Act gives the owner, as against the rest of the
world, ‘the exclusive right, privilege and liberty of making,
constructing and using the invention and selling it to others to be
used ...’ (emphasis added), and in that respect is framed as a
positive right, its effect is essentially to prevent others from
practising an invention that, but for the patent monopoly, they
would be permitted to practise. In exchange for disclosure to the
public, the patent protects the disclosed information from
unauthorized use for a limited time.”298
It is clear from the legislation and case law language that Canadian courts view patents as a form
of property with rights and privilege that come with such ownership. This quote also indicates
that the right to exclude is understood as paramount despite the other affirmative language in the
statute.
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Yet despite case law and affirmations of property rights in parts of the Patent Act, rights
entailed by the patent may be limited for national security and defence purposes.299 Canada has
also specified very detailed rules for exporting drugs for humanitarian purposes, thus creating a
further limitation to property rights through the grant of a compulsory license.300 There is also a
section of the patent act which entitles the government to grant a compulsory license to another
party if the patent right is found to have been abused.301 Thus the disclosure, sale, use, the right
to exclude, or any other right associated with patent as property are far from absolute and may be
limited by the Canadian government.
United States

The U.S. Patent Act provides that a patent holder has the right to exclude others from
using, making, importing, or offering for sale, or selling.302 The Act further states that for the
purposes of ownership and assignment, patents “shall have the attributes of personal
property.”303 In Patlex Corporation v. Mossinghoff, the Federal Circuit Court unequivocally
stated that patents are property. 304 This view is reinforced by the concurring opinion of Chief
Justice Roberts in the recent eBay v. MercExchange decision, where he reaffirms support for
traditional property rights associated with patents.305
Property in the U.S. is commonly viewed as a bundle of sticks, with each stick in the
bundle representing an exercisable right. In patent law, the right to exclude is considered the
most powerful right, or biggest stick, held by the patent holder.306 It is also the right that is
specifically granted by statute. It is not that other rights are less important, but there are certain
conditions under U.S. patent law which may limit other rights. There are specific provisions in
the patent code which may prevent disclosure of patented information for national security
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purposes, and there may be limitations on the sale of patents if the sale creates a situation that
would be contrary to anti-trust or competition laws.307 A recent decision in Zoltek v. United
States has indicated that use of an unlicensed patent by the U.S. government is not a taking under
the eminent domain protections of the Fifth Amendment but as a creation of federal statute; and a
waiver of sovereign immunity exists through the Tucker Act.308 The Tucker Act creates a
procedure whereby a patentee can claim compensation when the United States government uses,
manufactures, or has manufactured a patented invention.309
England

The U.K. Patents Act 1977 explicitly states that a patent shall be considered personal
property and the property owner can mortgage, assign, or license either the patent or any rights
under the patent.310 The right to exclude can be seen from the remedy associated with a violation
or infringement of the patent grant. The Patent Act not only confers property rights on patent
holders, but also confers the ability to bring infringement proceedings under s.61 of the 1977 Act
and to seek the appropriate remedy or remedies for the infringement.311 These remedies include
enforcing the right to exclude as well as other equitable remedies and damages, but remedies will
be covered in more detail below.312
There are also limitations to the patent grant and the absolute property nature of the
patent. The 1977 Patent Act allows patent grants to be limited if they are contrary to public
policy and morality.313 Public welfare is assumed within the patent granting process.
Considerable power is retained by the government to control property rights in a patent
grant. Limitations may be placed on the property right if an invention relates to national

See 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-188, Chapter 17, Secrecy of Certain Inventions and Filing Applications in Foreign
Countries; and see Department of Justice 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property,
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/0167.htm (last visited Sept.24, 2011).
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security, government use, public welfare, or emergency.314 There is also a process whereby a
license may be granted by the government to another if specific conditions are met.315 While
there is no requirement to use a patent, this power may be exercised to create a compulsory
license. Finally, the right to sell or license a patent may be curtailed by the government if it is
found that exercising those rights would impede competition.
An aspect of U.K. law that is quite different from Canadian or U.S. law is that the
patentee can apply to have an entry made on the register indicating the availability of licenses as
of right for an already registered patent.316 Registration makes it known that a patent holder is
offering licenses on reasonable terms to any applicant and that, if the parties cannot agree to
terms, the U.K. Patent Office will set the licensing terms. This lowers patent renewal fees for the
patentee but it essentially precludes making claims for infringement and, since an infringer can
seek a license as of right, royalty demanded by the patentee can be limited.
One final consideration in granting a property right is the morality element under the
1977 Patent Act. Even if all the other conditions are met, the state reserves the right to deny a
patent grant due to morality and public policy considerations.317
Similarities and Differences

In any jurisdiction, the rights assigned by law define the scope of the property right. The
bundle of rights or available rights may vary according to the statutory language. The statutory
language in the three jurisdictions indicates general similarities and slight differences in rights
held by patent holders.
In Canada, the statutory language indicates a right to act in utilizing the patented
invention. However, the Canadian Supreme Court indicates that patent rights are primarily
prohibitive. Even though the Patent Act frames a patent as containing an explicit right, privilege
and liberty to make, construct, and use, it is the right to exclude that the courts interpret as
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supreme.318 There is little guidance on the extent of the rights, privileges, and liberties in
making, constructing, and using, despite statutory support; but it can safely be assumed that they
exist unless proscribed elsewhere in the statute.
By contrast, the U.S. statutory language merely confers a right to exclude others from
using the patent. It does not provide a right to actually use the patented invention. Patents also
have the attributes of property, but there is no place in the Patent Act that specifically refers to a
patent as being property. Patent rights, including the right to exclude, exist insofar as the statute
does not prohibit or limit the right.
Under English law, a patent is actually referred to as personal property, entailing all
property rights as well as enforcement options through the courts. Unlike the Canadian and U.S.
statutes the U.K. 1977 Patent Act provides for the affirmative right to trade in either the patent or
rights associated with it. This would appear to indicate that there is strong support for patent
treatment as property. However, the act is also quite thorough in assigning rights and remedies
to this intangible property.
However, in the discussion over the grant of property rights there is a distinction in the
treatment of rights among the three jurisdictions. Morality is missing from the discussion when
dealing with property in the U.S. but it is very much a part of the grant of rights in England.
David Vaver indicates that a property right in the U.S. is independent from the use of that
right.319 Patent rights are granted without consideration for morality or public policy and
regardless of whether the invention is “good” or “bad,” leaving the morality associated with
property use as part of other laws. In England, a property right has a moral quality to it and
property rights may be denied if these rights would be contrary to public policy or social
morals.320 Thus there appears to be a tempering of the absolute nature of property rights in
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England, and this view may also extend to intangible property rights in patents. This is both a
common law approach to property and an approach supported by statutory language.321
In Canada, as in the U.S., there is no statutory support for morality, but the Canadian
Supreme Court has made patent granting decisions based on morality and has allowed the Patent
Office some moral discretion.322 While, it seems that patent granting decisions and the property
rights associated with a patent may be limited on moral or public order considerations by both
the courts and the Patent Office, the recent Amazon.com v. Canada seems to have curtailed that
notion.323 It also appears that the usefulness requirement for patentability may still be used in
Canada to potentially limit patentability if an innovation can cause public harm, or at least,
provide no public benefit.324
Despite the differences in morality and public policy treatment among the three
jurisdictions, each of the three jurisdictions has national security limitations on patent grants. It
is not clear to what extent national security measures may be used to encompass morality related
issues when a patent will affect the public and public order.
While there are differences between the three jurisdictions, the case law and the statutes
make it clear that patents are considered a type of property in all three, but that limits exist to that
property right. Furthermore, each of the three jurisdictions emphasizes the patent holder’s right
to exclude others in the enjoyment of the patent, with their respective legislatures retaining
certain powers to limit those rights. The patent holder gains that right once a patent is issued.
Yet each statute also specifically indicates certain conditions where the patent is treated as
property. Each statute also defines limitations for the right to exclude and conditions where that
right may be curtailed. There are also limitations on the right to sell, use, or license. It can be
said that a patent is property, but the operation of law limits both the scope of ownership and of
control over that property in each of the jurisdictions. Whether a patent has attributes of property
rights or is considered property, rights in a patent are conferred by statute in all three states.
321
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Property Remedies
A property rule is designed to generally prevent intentional violations of a property right
without express consent from the property holder. Such a rule imposes severe penalties on a
person who violates a property right so that the penalties will act as a deterrent.325 The penalty is
generally severe enough so that potential rights violators will either bargain with the property
owner or decide to avoid violating the right, rather than trying to infringe.
A breach of rights entitlement is usually enforced against an infringing party in the form
of an injunction granted by the courts. An injunction is a property rule remedy. It prevents the
infringer from continuing the property trespass and prevents the infringer from taking or using
the property. Property remedies are ordinarily not merely monetary compensation but are
equitable in nature. Courts have considerable discretion in granting property remedies,
especially when the remedies are intended to right a wrong that cannot be resolved merely with
money.
Damages are normally not part of a property rule but are generally considered part of a
remedy that falls under a liability rule.326 However, beyond an injunction, such equitable
remedies as restitution or disgorgement are valid property remedies.327 Restitution is a remedy
that either restores a property right or returns profits made through improper use of another’s
property to the property owner.328 Disgorgement takes the profits the rights-violator made in
using the property and gives the profits to the property owner. These remedies entail
325
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compensation to the property owner for the wrongdoer’s unjust use as a result of the violation.
Alternative remedies can also be granted by the courts if disgorgement and injunctive relief are
not sufficient.
Injunctions, disgorgement, and restitution are generally severe enough deterrents so that a
party will generally attempt to negotiate for use of the property rather than violate the property
right. Thus a property owner will decline to enforce property rights or will even sell property
rights if a bargain is reached.
It is generally perceived that negotiations are preferable to court enforcement. Thus the
perception is that an injunction will allow parties to freely agree or not to agree rather than
having a court imposed license which neither party would normally accept. This position is also
heavily advocated by property rights movement supporters. While an injunction allows the
parties to “freely” come to an agreement, an injunction provides one party with a considerable
amount of leverage in the negotiations. Also, free negotiations without government interference
may be preferred by individual parties; but support for absolute injunction awards ignores some
of the larger patent system considerations.

Remedies Under Liability Rules
Liability rules are designed to create an objective valuation of the patent innovation,
where the state or third party arbitrator determines the value of the patent. In the case of patents,
the element of the state that determines the value is the court.329 A liability rule, unlike a
property rule, accepts infringement, but it is followed by an after-the-fact tribunal proceeding to
determine appropriate compensation for the infringement.330 In this way, the legal system allows
the infringement in exchange for an imposed payment for the offending act.
Under liability rules, a court-imposed penalty creates a form of compulsory license where
the injured party must accept a damage award in exchange for previous infringement. The court
grants compensation or imposes a penalty for using the patented innovation without consent.
329
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The award will usually cover the period of patent use without consent from the time the
infringement was discovered to the time of the court decision. Damages, disgorgement, and
restitution are all remedies for prior use violations.
However, for continued violations, an injunction or potential further intervention by the
courts is the basis for compelling an infringing party into a licensing agreement. The patent
owner can negotiate a licensing agreement, whether an injunction is awarded or not; but
economic analysis indicates that the patent owner’s bargaining power will be lessened without an
injunction. Without an injunction the award by the court becomes the basis for terms in a
licensing agreement and the threat of court costs plus imposition by the court becomes the
bargaining leverage for the patent holder. With an injunction, the threat of forcing the infringer
to stop using, selling, or making the infringing innovation acts as leverage.
Economists have argued that without an injunction, the court damage award becomes the
ceiling or worst case scenario for a licensing agreement. They have also argued that, without an
injunction, patent owners will suffer hardship because they will be undercompensated by
infringers. Without an injunction, patent owners will rely on the threat of further court
proceedings as a means of compelling licensing. Further court proceedings are seen as
inadequate leverage. Economists appear to assume that remedies already granted by a court will
be followed if courts are asked to resolve a subsequent infringement dispute. While precedent is
followed in all three jurisdictions, there is no guarantee that remedies will follow precedent. The
uniqueness of each patent and the fact specific nature of the patented innovation and extent of
infringement will continue to play a role in damage calculations. The uncertain outcome of a
court proceeding is likely to compel most parties to come to a licensing agreement in all but the
most extreme disputes. Courts can also award an ongoing royalty or a compulsory license that
calculates present value of future sales in a lump-sum award or a court can provide other
oversight remedies.331 Courts further have the power to tailor remedies to the harm thus

331

Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., (U.S. Dist. Arizona, 2010) aff'd Bard Peripheral Vascular,
Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 670 F.3d 1171, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 2612 (Fed. Cir., Feb. 10, 2012).

64

allowing plaintiffs to obtain “capitalized future royalties” in circumstances where an injunction
would be inappropriate and obviating the need for ongoing resort to the courts.332
Disgorgement is a remedy available in Canada and England in the form of an accounting
for profits. Restitution is a potential remedy but it is generally not awarded for patent
infringement in any of the three jurisdictions or more properly, the term may have meaning that
goes beyond damages or awards for infringement. However, the restitutionary principle to right
wrongs where a remedy is designed to compensate is part of general damage awards in all three
jurisdictions. Any confusion regarding restitution depends on a general confusion over the
definition of restitution. The definition of restitution may involve compensation for harm, or it
may involve compensation for the infringement of a right, devoid of an injury or even
punishment for infringing a right.333 An account of profits is actually disgorgement. Under an
account of profits, damages are generally not awarded in conjunction with the remedy. Thus,
restitution may actually be broader than an accounting. Furthermore, restitution may actually
cover such remedies as unjust enrichment, which is not currently available as a patent remedy in
the U.K.334 Both disgorgement and restitution are equitable remedies that are viewed as
property remedies, but they are more akin to liability rules. Nonetheless, disgorgement and
restitution, like damages, are remedies imposed by the courts. These remedies are objectively
determined by the courts; they do not rely on an injunction as a lever to strike a subjective
bargain. Because they are imposed on parties rather than bargained, these remedies have
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elements of objective determination. The combination of objective determination with
imposition makes these remedies more akin to liability rules.335
Disgorgement entails the payment of all infringer’s net profits to the patent owner arising
from the infringer’s wrongful use of the patented invention. Restitution is a distinct form of
compensation, particularly because the patent holder may not have been damaged but may still
receive a remedy. Compensation entails putting the injured party into the position the injured
party would have been in but for the infringement. Full compensation may be a policy goal or
even a stated goal but it may not be possible. Restitution, as a remedy, may not completely
compensate because damages suffered by the injured party may involve loss of reputation, loss
of market share, lost profits, and other damages not covered through monetary compensation.
While embodying elements of compensation in all three jurisdictions, the other form of
remedy which falls under the liability rule category is statutory damages. Damages are available
under statute in Canada, England, and the United States in the form of lost profits or a reasonable
royalty. An award of lost profits would be the difference between the patentee’s actual net
profits and the amount the patent owner could potentially have earned but-for the infringement.
A financial award of lost profits can be similar to restitution where the damage suffered by the
injured party is strictly monetary. However, if there are other injuries suffered by the patent
owner, then restitution will likely be much more than lost profits. The other liability rule remedy
is for a royalty award based on an estimate of the value to which the parties would have agreed
but-for the infringement.
It has been argued that a fair approach would entail that a patentee be awarded the greater
of her lost profits or the infringer’s profits attributable to the invention.336 This is a liability
based system because it would return the wronged inventor to the position in which she would
have been but-for the infringement. However, such an approach would necessarily result in an
imposed license but would only compensate for prior infringement.
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Commentators and patent holders alike have been very vocal against situations where the
court imposes a royalty payment to the patent holder. Both parties have argued that patent
owners are undercompensated unless they can negotiate with infringers using an injunction as
leverage. Arguments supporting the undercompensation position will be examined later in this
work.

Patent Remedies
Before continuing the examination of remedies in the light of policy goals of the patent
system, there should be a brief comment on some aspects of court structure and procedures
which distinguish the three jurisdictions. Patent cases in the United States are before nonspecialized federal courts, although there has recently been some experimentation with having
specialized patent judges within each federal district court. The recently passed America Invents
Act aims to move patent disputes out of federal trial courts and to place initial disputes before
Patent Office tribunals. Appeals from the Patent Office tribunals can directly be appealed to the
Federal Circuit Court, a specialized court with limited subject matter jurisdiction that hears all
patent case appeals. Disputes may still end up before federal trial courts but it is the intention of
recent changes to streamline the dispute process through the Patent Office and to lower trial
costs. In England, there are specialized patent courts and appeals are heard before a general
appeals panel which usually includes at least one former patent judge. In Canada, there are
neither specialized patent courts nor specialized courts of appeal, but federal courts are courts of
limited subject jurisdiction, which normally hear patent cases.337 In both Canada and England,
patent cases are solely before a judge, with no jury, increasing some judicial discretion. U.S.
patent cases that go before federal trial courts are juried trials unless the parties agree to do
otherwise, but Patent Office tribunals are not juried. The presence of juries minimizes some of
the discretion which resides with the English and Canadian judiciary. One final nuance of the
court systems are legal fees. In the U.S. each party pays its own legal fees, but the court may
award legal fees in exceptional circumstances. In Canada and England, the loser generally pays
337
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the legal costs but these are subject to limitations by the courts and are usually less than two
thirds of the total legal costs.338 Liability rules, property rules, and equity rules are legal rules
which the courts in all three jurisdictions can and do apply to patent infringement remedies in
order to better balance the goals of the patent system.
Remedies Under Property Rules and Patents

A property right in a patent is a statutorily created right. That right entails a property
right in the patent itself, distinct from the underlying invention and any property rights in the
invention. As already noted, the U.K. patents act is the only statute in the three jurisdictions that
explicitly refers to a patent as property. However, under the statutes in all three jurisdictions
there are sections covering the sale or assignment of patents, and it is within these sections that
there is direct reference to patents as property.339 Although the U.S. and Canadian patents lack a
direct reference that patents entail property rights, sections of their respective patent acts refer to
patents as property. All three statutes indicate that the patent itself and all of the rights that the
patent entails are alienable.340 Throughout each of the statutes, there is additional language
which refers to some of the traditional rights associated with property. A common right directly
stated in each statute in each of the three jurisdictions gives inventors the right to exclude others
from the marketplace for the patented innovation for a period of time. There is also either a
directly stated or implied right to use the patent and the patented invention in the statutes of each
of the three jurisdictions, which combines with the common law and certain natural rights which
exist in property ownership. These rights exist by virtue of patent ownership (and the statutory
and common-law rights this entails) and do not vary if the patent is owned through inventorship
or through purchase.341
U.S., Canadian, and English courts all have the power to grant equitable relief through
injunctions, enforcing property rights. Canadian and English courts not only have the power and
discretion to grant an injunction but also to require infringers to “deliver up” and destroy any
338
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goods in relation to the infringing innovation.342 Injunctions can be granted for an actual or
implied threat to infringe. 343 Delivery-up and destruction are additional equitable remedies that
the courts may apply using their discretionary powers to prevent further infringement.344 This is
where the court either orders the infringer to give the patent holder the infringing goods for the
purpose of destruction or allows the patent holder to supervise the destruction of the offending
goods.
A U.S. court can grant injunctions under any terms it sees as reasonable.345 In his study of
injunctive powers in patent infringement cases, John Golden has indicated that there are no
specific provisions for impounding or destruction of patented goods as in Canada or England.
Injunction remedies have generally been narrow, with full equitable powers reserved for repeat
offenders in contempt of an injunction order.346 Nonetheless, instructions for an injunction are
made to prevent future violations. While delivery and destruction are not generally granted, the
courts have the power to grant such remedies if necessary to prevent future infringement.347
Courts are given the flexibility to make remedies as broad or tailored as necessary.
Until recently, there has been a perception that U.S. courts have not only been quick to
award injunctions but that they have almost ubiquitously awarded them as a remedy for patent
infringement. In the 2006 eBay decision, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the equitable nature of
injunctions and provided a test which courts should use to determine whether an injunction
should be awarded.348 To receive an injunction, a plaintiff must show that: 1) he has suffered
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irreparable injury; 2) remedies available at law (money damages), are inadequate to compensate
for the injury; 3) a remedy at equity is warranted upon considering the balance of hardship
between the plaintiff and the defendant; and 4) the public interest will not be “disserved” by a
permanent injunction. Injunction awards are still common but courts should apply the eBay test
before awarding an injunction.
Canadian courts note the equitable nature of awarding an injunction but are almost
certain to award a permanent injunction upon a finding of infringement. 349 In Canada, s.57(1) of
the Patent Act specifically allows injunctions as a remedy for patent holders. Once a court has
found infringement, there is a presumption that a permanent injunction will be awarded in order
to prevent further infringement. However, in Unilever PLC v. Proctor and Gamble Inc., the trial
court refused to grant a permanent injunction, granting instead a higher royalty rate for the
remainder of the patent term.350 In another intellectual property case, it has been stated that
refusing an injunction upon a finding of infringement is equivalent to creating an unacceptable
compulsory license.351 While this second case is a copyright issue, the dearth of case law on
whether an injunction should be granted would seem to leave the definiteness of an injunction
award open to some interpretation. Both cases were affirmed on appeal but did not go beyond
the Court of Appeal. Based on the Unilever decision, granting an injunction is case specific but
would seem to include an examination of 1) whether the patent is being practiced in Canada, 2) a
balance of hardship upon the parties, 3) whether the plaintiff will be sufficiently compensated.352
Since the case law is limited and the decision outlined in Unilever was specific to the
circumstances, there does not appear to be a clear rule for situations where damages are awarded
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in lieu of an injunction. It would seem that Canadian courts are likely to award an injunction in
the vast majority of circumstances, with potential exceptions in extreme circumstances.
In England, it is also very likely that a permanent injunction will be awarded once
infringement has been found. Under the Patent Act, s.61(1) allows an injunction as a valid
remedy for infringement. However, it is not an automatic grant and courts should examine each
case on its facts to determine whether an injunction should be awarded.353 Thus, while the
general rule is to grant an injunction, the courts are supposed to use their discretion.354 An
injunction is not granted as of right and a court can grant damages in lieu of an injunction.355
However, courts are unlikely to award damages in lieu of an injunction because
[i]t is a working rule that damages can be awarded in lieu of an injunction if:
(1) the injury to the plaintiff's legal rights is small;
(2) and is one which is capable of being estimated in money;
(3) and is one which can be adequately compensated by a small
money payment;
(4) and the case is one in which it would be oppressive to the
defendant to grant an injunction.356
Courts have used this test as a starting point but have amended it according to the circumstances
of the case. In making its decision, a court can take into account the interest of affected third
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parties, such as the public.357 However, it was noted that the 1977 Patent Act has listed several
protections for the public, as well as circumstances where compulsory licenses can be granted
and by whom.358 Even though a test exists, and courts are supposed to use their discretion when
deciding to grant an injunction, courts have overwhelmingly used their discretion to decline to
award damages in lieu of an injunction.359
English courts have rarely found an injunction to be oppressive. While case law is
limited regarding non-practicing entities, an injunction is still likely to be awarded, especially if
there has been a reasonable license offer made by the patent owner. It would be difficult for the
infringer to claim oppression, if an injunction would be awarded, when the infringer refused a
reasonable license offer.360 However, English courts are also willing to consider anticompetitive behavior if the patent holder wants the injunction for strategic reasons.361 This may
limit some strategies used by companies that wield their portfolio like a club while only
practicing a small number of their patented innovations.
In both Canada and England, almost all patent cases that have been decided by the courts
have been between practicing entities. Courts are supposed to use their discretion in awarding
injunctions. By using their discretion, courts could manage situations where a non-practicing
patent holder attempts to use the legal process to drive up royalty payments. An infringer with
an entrenched and commercially successful technology, faced with a potential injunction, would
have to meet the royalty demands of the patent holder or face the consequences of the injunction.
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The court could create a remedy which prevents the infringer from facing extreme hardship but
would still provide the patent holder with adequate compensation. However, given that there are
very few published cases that involve non-practicing entities that make it to a final decision, it is
not certain how courts in Canada and England will react when faced with a non-practicing entity.
It is likely that the case would be extremely fact-specific and the scope of the decision would be
limited to only the parties involved.
Preliminary Injunctions

A preliminary injunction or interlocutory injunction is an available remedy in all three
jurisdictions, but they are rarely awarded. They also tend to be extreme remedies which are
granted because, in their absence, the party suing for infringement will be faced with an
uncompensable harm.
In the United States, preliminary injunctions for patent suits are considered an
extraordinary remedy and are seldom awarded.362 The test to determine whether a preliminary
injunction should be granted is: 1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; 2) irreparable
harm if relief is denied; 3) a balance of hardships in plaintiff’s favour; and 4) public interest is in
favor of the grant.363
In Canada, preliminary injunctions are also rare. The test to determine whether and
injunction should be granted examines: 1) whether there is a serious question to be tried (this
standard entails only a limited review of the merits);364 2) whether the applicant can show it will
suffer irreparable harm; and 3) it requires the court to perform a balancing of hardship between
the parties pending a final decision.365 Furthermore, the party seeking a preliminary injunction is
required to pay a certain amount of money to a trust account or to provide a third party bond in
the event that a preliminary injunction is granted but patent infringement is not found.
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In England, the court in American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd, illustrated a test to
determine whether a court should award an interlocutory injunction.366 The House of Lords has
stated that there must be a seriously arguable case to be tried. If there is a serious case to be
tried, the court should then examine the balance of convenience between the parties. In
examining the balance of convenience, if the plaintiff could adequately be compensated by
monetary damages with a successful finding of infringement, this would be an argument against
awarding an injunction. If the plaintiff could not be compensated by damages, then the analysis
would turn to examining the hardships on the alleged infringer, if the infringer were to win at
trial. Interlocutory injunctions are relatively seldom used or granted.367
The exact analysis conducted by the court is different for each of the three jurisdictions
but there are significant similarities in what courts examine. Irreparable harm and a balance of
hardships are part of the analysis performed by each of the courts. A more significant similarity
is that all three jurisdictions consider this an extreme remedy which will be awarded only if a
plaintiff can satisfy a significant burden.
Injunction Summary

The theory behind injunctive relief is that it encourages licensing negotiations, which
more accurately reflect the market value of the invention than does a monetary remedy granted
by the courts under a liability theory.368 However, it is also not uncommon for companies to use
injunctions as a means of removing competitors, thereby leaving the patent holder with a
monopoly. The liability rule is further reviled by patent owners and property rights supporters
because a monetary award granted by a court for infringement has been likened to a compulsory
license that will generally result in a much lower royalty rate than one negotiated by the parties.
A second theory assumes that an inventor requires injunctive relief as an incentive to try to
recover any investment in the invention.369
However, a patentee may waive the right to enforce an injunction through an agreement
with the infringing party. Remedies associated with tangible property entail injunctive relief and
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normally also disgorgement of profits associated with the violation. However, since patents are
intangible property, these remedies are not always associated with relief for patent infringement.
Disgorging Profits

In Canada and England, the courts can award the infringed party a disgorgement of the
infringer’s profits as a result of improperly using the property. This is known as an account of
profits. 370 The remedy is not available in the U.S. This is not a damage award but an equitable
remedy. Courts in England do not consider an account of profits as a restitutionary remedy,
since the patent holder may have suffered no loss; but it is nonetheless compensation for the
infringer’s violation of the patent holder’s rights.371 In Canada, the remedy may also be
available if the patent holder has suffered no loss, even though there may be a right to the
infringer’s profits as ill-gotten gains.
Disgorging Profits in the U.S.

An accounting of profits is not a remedy available in U.S. courts. The 1946 Patent Act,
removed infringer profits from the available remedies for patent infringement but it was not
certain that the remedy was unavailable until the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation that
Congress intended that disgorgement should not be a valid remedy for utility patents.372 The
Supreme Court also deemed disgorgement to be an expensive process, it was time-consuming
and the calculations were often very complex.373 There is also a perception that the patent
holder would get a windfall under such a method.374 This is especially true if the patent holder
were unable to take commercial advantage of the patent or if the patent owner were taking
advantage in one geographic region but not another. There has also been a question whether
370
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such an award is justifiable from a patent efficiency standpoint. The patent holder would get all
of the net profits from an infringer who may be better equipped to use the patented innovation in
a more efficient manner. When combined with an injunction, this is an extremely powerful
deterrent. If the patent infringer is a competitor, there may be some justification in this remedy.
However, if the infringer is not a competitor this remedy may actually be detrimental to further
innovation and general commercialization of patented innovations.
Disgorging Profits in England

In England an account of profits provides compensation to the patentee by depriving the
infringer of profits improperly made through a breach of patentee’s rights and by giving those
profits to the patentee.375 The theory is based on the reasoning that the infringer’s profits are
really profits that belong to the patentee because the patentee is the only party that could
rightfully use the patent to make profits. The infringer is required to disgorge all profits as a
result of the infringement and not just profits at the time of infringement.376 The payout by the
infringer may be substantial, with a potential maximum total amounting to all of the infringer’s
profits. For complex devices, where the infringing invention is merely a part of the product or
process, damages may be apportioned; but if the invention comprises a large part of the product
or process then profits will likely not be apportioned and the infringer will have to disgorge all
profits associated with the breach.377 To mitigate the severity of this remedy, the infringer may
deduct costs from revenues including: research and development, financing, manufacturing
costs, and distribution costs.378 The burden of proving cost deductions lies with the infringer.
Courts will use accounting principles as a guide for apportionment and for determining revenues
and expenses.379
Justice Pumfrey of the Patents Court stated that the Patent Act 1977, should be
interpreted so that a plaintiff can elect between an account of profits or damages but not both.380
While damage awards may be claimed (as in a case where there is a patent holder and an
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exclusive licensee), only one accounting will be calculated by the courts, and apportioned if
necessary.381 To elect between damages and profits, there must be sufficient disclosure to allow
the patent holder to choose between them.382 This will require disclosure of financial data, but
the court can make estimates if financial data do not provide sufficient information.383
An election for remedy or lost profits is at the discretion of the courts, but the courts
appear to be looking to provide some guidance on how the choice between an account of profits
and damage are made. Recently, Justice Sales stated that the remedy should vary with the
context, where a commercial context would create lesser protection while fiduciary relationship
would entail greater protection.384 The court considered intellectual property rights not quite
akin to a fiduciary duty but still worthy of some care and investigation that would thus require
greater protection under the articulated spectrum.385 Thus if the context required greater
protection, the plaintiff would have greater freedom to choose the remedy.386
English courts have further stated that an account of profits will not apply to innocent
infringers, although s.62 of the Patent Act also limits who is an innocent infringer.387 This
mitigates the harshness of the award, against a certain class of infringers. It also provides some
motivation for parallel innovation by limiting innocent infringement compensation. However,
for this defence the burden lies with the infringer to prove that the invention was, in fact, made
independently and without reference to the patented invention. This must be shown as of the
date the infringement started and that there is no reasonable ground for supposing that a patent
exists.388
Disgorging Profits in Canada

In Canada, once infringement is determined, patentees can elect either an accounting for
profits or for damages as generally alternate remedies.389 An accounting of profits is an
equitable remedy awarded at the discretion of the court, whereas damages are statutory
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remedies.390 A successful plaintiff is entitled to damages while an election exists for plaintiffs to
claim an accounting for profits.391 The discretionary nature of this remedy may result in a
court’s denying an election of an accounting for profits. Failure to work or commercialize the
patented invention is a significant factor in a court’s decision to award the remedy and may lead
to a denial.392 Canadian courts have indicated wariness in granting account of profit awards to
non-practicing entities. However, denying an election for an accounting is not certain even if the
patent holder is a non-practicing entity. There is further debate on the conditions for which
accounting for profits should be granted to a plaintiff. The two extremes of the debate place one
faction supporting the remedy in all cases except where the infringer can show why it should be
denied; a second faction believes that an accounting for profits should be an exceptional remedy,
to be awarded in only the most extreme cases.393 There is little discussion about a middle
solution. However the recent Monsanto v. Schmeiser decision may temper the enthusiasm of
plaintiffs if a possibility exists that there may be no remedy if an account of profits yields no
profits over non-infringing alternatives. Despite the continuing debate on the extent of
circumstances in which the remedy should be awarded, it is still available for patent holders in
Canadian courts.
Courts generally require the patentee to elect either profits or damages after discovery has
been completed but before the trial or the damage trial begins and before the court determines the
size of the awards.394 However, there must be sufficient discovery to allow the plaintiffs to make
an educated determination of damages or profits. The plaintiff has the burden of proving the
defendant’s revenues due to infringement, while the defendant has the burden of proving
legitimate expenses and deductions which may minimize net profits and mitigate the award.395
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While courts require as much information as possible to calculate the damages, estimates may be
used to determine the final profits.396
In calculating expenses, courts attempt to determine which expenses arise because of
infringement and which expenses would exists regardless of infringement.397 Two distinct
expense calculating approaches have been developed by the courts. The “full cost” approach or
“absorption method” considers that all expenses may be deducted from profits.398 The second is
the “differential cost,” or “direct cost”, or “differential profit” method which considers only
expenses which arise due to infringement, expenses which would not have occurred otherwise.399
While the full cost approach tends to agree more with generally accepted accounting principles,
recent cases have considered the differential cost method to be more just.400 In determining the
differential cost method, indirect or fixed costs cannot be deducted from the profits unless they
are directly attributable to the infringing activity.401
The Supreme Court of Canada recently created what appears to be a third method based
on income differential. It entitles the patent owner to those infringer profits which are directly
attributable to the invention minus the profits that the infringer could have made using a noninfringing alternative.402 This approach was articulated in Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser,
which resulted in an award of zero profits. The Court reasoned that the infringer’s profits would
have been the same had he used infringing or non-infringing products. This would seem to be
the currently favored calculation method. There has also been some confusion because the
Supreme Court termed the method used in Monsanto to be the differential cost method. Whether
it replaces the current differential cost calculation is not clear.
Damage Remedies

In all three jurisdictions, lost profits and reasonable royalties are available damage
remedies. Lost profits or reasonable royalty awards for infringement are more akin to a “tort-law
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framework,” even though U.S. courts do not treat patent damages as they do other torts.403
English courts consider a patent infringement to be an economic tort. Canadian courts also take
a “tort-law” approach to remedies. The U.S. Patent Act entitles patentees to recover sufficient
damages to compensate the patent owner, but no less than a reasonable royalty.404 In England
and Canada damages are alternative remedies to an accounting for profits. In both Canada and
England lost profits and reasonable royalties are considered damages, distinct from the equitable
remedy of an accounting for profits. A patent holder can elect between an accounting of profits
or damages. If damages are chosen, the holder can further choose between royalties and lost
profits if the patent holder is exploiting the invention through its own sales of either goods using
or made through using patented invention.405
Since patent laws and systems are statutory creations in Canada, England, and the U.S.,
residual authority to award damages is limited to remedies specified in the statutes. U.S. courts
do not have residual authority to award restitutionary damages; but under statute, courts can
award up to treble damages for willful infringers.406 This is a remedy that has become more
difficult to prove, making willful infringement an exceptional remedy.407 In England remedies
are also limited by statute, and there is no cause of action for unjust enrichment outside of the
Patents Act 1977. 408 Canada’s Patent Act lists remedies, but there does not appear to be a
common law rule against remedies outside the statute. Nonetheless, it is not likely that Canadian
courts will go outside the statute since there are many remedies already available. Punitive
damages are available in Canada but are rarely awarded and only in exceptional situations for
extreme egregious conduct.409
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Damage awards in all three jurisdictions for lost profits or reasonable royalties are not
defined by statute, leaving calculation methods up to the courts in each jurisdiction.410
Determining the value of damages will often entail expert testimony interpreting accounting
principles or industry standards, but courts also have discretion to make estimates, if necessary.
Damages in the United States

In the U.S., courts commonly use a four-factor test, established in Panduit Corp v. Stahlin
Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., to determine whether lost profits should be awarded to the patent owner.
These factors are: 1) demand for the patented product; 2) absence of acceptable non-infringing
substitutes; 3) manufacturing and marketing capability to meet product demand; 4) the amount of
profit the patentee would have made.411 The burden to establish these factors lies with the
patent owner.412 In determining the amount of profit, courts take into account the price at which
the patentee made increased sales as well as the costs associated with increased sales.413
A variant of the Panduit test is the two-supplier market test used where there are only two
competing suppliers in the marketplace.414 This test combines the demand and non-infringing
substitute analysis of Panduit into one factor.415 This variant places the burden on the patent
owner to show 1) that there are two suppliers in the relevant market; 2) that the patentee would
be capable of making the sales taken by the infringer; and 3) that the patentee can show the
profits it would have made from the diverted sales. U.S. courts have further stated that it can be
inferred that the patentee would have made the infringer’s sales or would have charged more had
there been no infringement.416
There does not appear to be a single test for determining lost profits because each case is
fact dependent. In determining lost profits, courts are instructed to avoid speculative
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calculations.417 Some techniques used by courts include: 1) multiplying per unit profits based on
the number of sales lost;418 2) calculating the gross receipts of sales absent infringement; and 3)
finding the difference between gross receipts and the cost of sales.419 It is also quite common for
courts to hire accountants to determine profit calculations.420 However, even though
considerable accounting information may be put before the court, actual damage amounts are
ultimately determined by a jury, rather than by judges.421
U.S. courts use a tort law approach to lost profits, where the patent owner has the burden
of showing that, but for the infringement, the patent owner would have made the sales.422 There
is now a more flexible application of the Panduit test for situations where 1) a partial absence of
non-infringing substitutes exists (factor two) and 2) where infringement has resulted in lost sales
of unpatented products (factor three).423 Recently, courts have replaced apportionment
calculations with a market share approach.424 Courts have determined that substitute products
should no longer be measured on a technological basis but through a consumer demand basis.425
Therefore, either a patented component is the reason for product demand, entitling the patentee
to its entire market value of profits on sales, or a product without the patented component is a
non-infringing substitute and there would be no lost profits attributed to infringement.426
U.S. courts determined that patent infringement remedies may include compensation for
lost sales of non-infringing goods as well. The reasoning is that but-for the lost sales due to
infringement the patent holder would have also sold the non-infringing goods. These cases are:
Paper Converting Machines v. Magna-Graphics; Rite-Hite v. Kelly; and King Instrument v.
Perego. In Paper Converting, the court found that industry standards indicated that every
purchaser would buy an entire line of products and that patentee would have sold patented and
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non-patented products together but-for the infringement. In Rite-Hite the court determined that
the sale of unpatented goods was proximately related to infringed goods, allowing damage
recovery for “reasonable, objectively foreseeable consequences of infringement.” In King it was
determined that a non-practicing entity could collect lost profits due to infringement of its patent,
even though the lost profits were for sales of non-patented products.
Even if lost profits cannot be shown, a patentee can still be awarded no less than a
reasonable royalty in damages.427 To determine a reasonable royalty, courts have relied on the
Georgia Pacific factors and infrequently on the analytical approach.428 The less common
analytical method subtracts the infringer’s rate of return using a non-infringing good from the
return on infringing devices and multiplies this result by the number of infringing goods sold.429
To help with royalty calculations, many courts have adopted the Georgia-Pacific factors
as a means of measuring a reasonable royalty.430 Not all factors will always be applicable and
the list is not exclusive. The factors to be examined include:
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit,
proving or tending to prove an established royalty.
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the
patent in suit.
3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as
restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the
manufactured product may be sold.
4. The licensor's established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent
monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses
under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.
5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as,
whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of
business; or whether they are inventor and promoter.
6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other
products of the licensee; that existing value of the invention to the licensor as
a generator of sales of his non-patented items; and the extent of such
derivative or convoyed sales.
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license.
8. The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its
427
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commercial success; and its current popularity.
9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or
devices, if any, that had been used for working out similar results.
10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial
embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to
those who have used the invention.
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any
evidence probative of the value of that use.
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the
particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the
invention or analogous inventions.
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as
distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process,
business risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer.
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts.
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the
infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both
had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the
amount which a prudent licensee- who desired, as a business proposition, to
obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the
patented invention- would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be
able to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have been
acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to grant a license.
The Georgia Pacific factors are used to determine a royalty based on a hypothetical
willing licensor and licensee at the time of infringement.431 The calculated rate tends to leave
some profit for the infringer because the calculation falls between the “maximum incremental
profit (or cost savings)” expected by the infringer and “the maximum profit the patentee could
have expected to earn from her next-best alternative to licensing the invention.”432 It has been
quite common to assume a 25% royalty rate and then use the Georgia-Pacific factors to adjust
upwards or downwards to determine a final royalty rate.433 Recently the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeal has stated that the 25% rule is too speculative and should not be considered a rule of
thumb.434 Thus it would appear that the 25% rule is no longer applicable for determining
royalties in the U.S. and no longer a problem for those calling for more accurate remedies.
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Damages in the United Kingdom

Patent infringement is considered an economic tort and damages are intended to be
compensatory not punitive, placing the injured party in the same position the party would have
been in had there been no infringement.435 The burden to prove losses lies with the patent
owner, but damages are nonetheless to be liberally assessed against the infringers.436 However,
compensation exists for any losses claimed if the patent owner’s injury was 1) foreseeable, 2)
caused by the wrong, and 3) not contrary to public or social policy.437 Each infringing sale made
by an infringer is considered a wrong; and, for the purposes of damage calculations, it is not
relevant that the infringer could have used a non-infringing product to make sales.438 If precise
figures cannot be determined, the court will still infer damages and assess estimated awards.439
If the patent owner is a manufacturer, the owner can claim compensation for lost profits if
the patent owner would have made the sales.440 Lost profits can include other harm from
infringing sales, such as lost sales, loss of goodwill, losses due to price reduction, or losses due
to parallel imports.441 If the patent owner is not a manufacturer, the compensation will amount to
a royalty payment.442 If the patent owner had licensed the patent, damages are generally
determined to be lost royalty and damages are calculated based on a royalty rate for each
infringing good sold, using the license as a basis for the rate.443 Even if the patent holder is a
manufacturer, the holder must have been able to make the sale in order to claim lost profits.444 If
the holder could not have made the sale, damages will be calculated as a reasonable royalty. The
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reasonable royalty rate is determined by assessing what a potential licensee not on the market
would pay and by ignoring an alternate use of non-infringing substitutes.445
There does not appear to be a fixed standard or specifically defined set of rules which
courts use. Instead there is a fact dependent analysis used by the courts. However, examining
case law, there are certain considerations that courts have taken to determine royalty rates and
lost profits. As an example, in Gerber v. Lectra446 the court took several factors into account to
determine lost profits from patented goods the patent holder would have sold. These included: 1)
Competitive tenders when competing with the infringer; 2) price differential between patent
holder’s product and the infringer’s; 3) technical product differences; 4) marketing approach; 5)
associated or convoyed products, equipment parts, and services; 6) price depression; and 7)
losses due to infringer’s accelerated entry into the market.
A reasonable royalty is determined by assuming that a willing licensor and licensee
would agree to a license.447 As a first source of guidance, courts will see if there are comparable
licenses in the relevant field.448 Courts can then use the “profits available” approach to calculate
royalty terms. This method apportions the infringer’s profits on the sale of infringing goods
between the infringer and the patent holder.449 In General Tire, Lord Wilberforce warned, that
since royalty damage calculations are very case specific and fact dependent, courts should be
wary of transferring the conclusions of one case to another.450 Nonetheless, the general principle
of calculating damages based on determining the number of infringing goods sold and
multiplying this amount by a per-unit royalty is the basis for royalty damages.451 A royalty can
be estimated if there is no existing license or royalty, but courts are to use facts that will help
determine this rate. In an example of factors that were considered by English courts in
determining a royalty, the court in Cabot Safety Corp.'s Patent considered the following: 1) the
commercial value of the invention; 2) comparable licenses; 3) the nature of the invention; and 4)
445
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profits available. These are all extremely fact dependent considerations and will generally rely
on expert testimony.
Damages in Canada

If an accounting for profits is not available or the plaintiff elects for damages, lost profits
and a reasonable royalty are the two methods of determining damages. While damages should be
liberally assessed, they are limited to what a plaintiff may prove.452 Whether damages are
assessed as lost profits or reasonable royalties may depend on the patent holder’s revenue stream.
If a patent holder is primarily a licensor, then infringement remedies will likely come as
royalties, while manufacturers and retailers will likely receive lost sales. 453 Lost profits are
supposed to compensate for sales which would have been made but-for the infringement,
whereas a reasonable royalty is determined by what the infringer would have paid as a royalty
had the two parties entered into a licensing agreement.454 For lost profit damages, the plaintiff
has the burden of showing that it would have been able to make the sale and its lost profits
amount.455 If lost profits cannot be shown, then a reasonable royalty will be awarded; but the
plaintiff still has the burden of showing what a reasonable royalty should be.456 It is clear why a
patent owner would attempt to obtain an accounting for profits because the burden of proof lies
with the plaintiff for damages whereas the greater burden of proof lies with the defendant if an
accounting of profits is elected.457 However, as Monsanto v. Schmeiser illustrates, the choice of
an accounting of profits may result in no award if there is no benefit to the infringing component
versus a non-infringing alternative.
For infringement between the time a patent is published and issued, a patentee is entitled
to reasonable compensation from an infringer and this has been interpreted as a reasonable
royalty by the courts.458 After a patent has issued, sale of patented goods, including springboard
(sales made by the infringer after the expiry of the patent that would not have been made had the
452
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infringer not been infringing the patent prior to expiry and expanding market share) and
convoyed sales (sales of goods sold in conjunction with or as a result of sales of the patented
good but not necessarily covered under the patent), will generally be considered for damage
calculations.459 Springboard and convoyed sale losses can be included in damage calculations as
long as they are foreseeable and not remote.460 Lost profits on sales outside of Canada may be
included but only if those sales flow from infringement in Canada.461 Further lost profit damages
may arise as a result of loss of goodwill or losses due to parallel imports.462
A reasonable royalty is based upon a hypothetical negotiation between a willing licensor
and licensee. 463 However, the royalty rate can be determined either by reference to the
incremental profits before taxes or by determining anticipated profits, where applicable.464
Courts will first need to determine the infringer’s profits before applying any factors to adjust the
rate. Courts may begin with a royalty rate of 25%-33.3%. The royalty rate may be adjusted by
reference to thirteen non-exclusive factors which were outlined in Allied Signal v. Du Pont.
These factors are:
1. Transfer of technology: If there is none then the rate should be reduced.
2. Differences in the practice of the invention: If the infringer brings its own
technology in the practice of the invention the royalty should be reduced.
3. Non-exclusive license: Lack of license exclusivity and lack of total control
over the market would reduce the royalty rate.
4. Territorial limitations would reduce the royalty rate.
5. Term of the license: a license for a limited term as opposed to the full patent
term would reduce the royalty rate.
6. Competitive technology: The availability of competing technologies would
reduce the royalty rate.
7. Competition between licensor and licensee: If they are competing entities that
would increase the royalty rate.
8. Demand for the product: increased demand for the innovation would increase
the royalty rate.
9. Risk: a low risk for lowered future sales would tend to increase the royalty
rate.
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10. Novelty of invention: Increased novelty would increase the rate whereas lower
novelty would reduce the royalty rate.
11. Compensation for research and development costs: Higher costs would
increase the rate while lower costs would reduce the royalty rate.
12. Displacement of business: A royalty rate will tend to be higher if it results in
increased revenues to the licensee.
13. Capacity to meet market demand: The royalty rate will be reduced if the
patentee does not have the capacity to produce enough of the product to
satisfy the market.465
While Allied Signal is a significant case when it comes to determining damages, damage
assessment is very fact specific, leaving considerable discretion with judges. This test is also
intended to act as a guideline and not as an absolute set of rules to be followed.

Property/Liability Rule Considerations

Summary of Damage Awards and the Liability Rules

Attempts to balance costs and benefits should be considered by courts in light of
increased international patent system harmonization.466 In awarding remedies, courts should
take the purpose of the patent laws and the system into account. Whether property or liability
rules apply, or whether some hybrid application is used, courts should maintain the purpose of
the patent system in coming to their decisions. This is not the same as having courts apply
policy but is concerned with applying laws in a manner that applies evenly to all stake-holders.
This should not be an issue for courts since legislative intent is regularly used in U.S. courts to
interpret statutes.467 While use of legislative intent may be less common in Canada, laws are still
meant to be interpreted with purposive intent, ”ascertained through an analysis”
465
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of statutory purpose or the purpose of the right granted.468 Canadian courts will use legislative
intent to interpret laws.469 Within the past twenty years, English courts have begun to examine
legislative intent in certain situations and a purposive approach to interpreting laws has become
common when resolving an ambiguity or interpreting laws implementing European Community
laws.470 Indications are that courts in each of the three jurisdictions are not only capable but
competent to make decisions where the purpose of the statute must be taken into account.
In each of the three jurisdictions, damage awards consist of lost profits or reasonable
royalties. Lost profits calculations in all three jurisdictions require that the patent holder be able
to show that the holder would have made the profits being claimed but for the infringement. The
plaintiff would have to have the manufacturing capability to make the goods sold by the infringer
and the capability of selling those goods. Essentially, the plaintiff would have to also be a
manufacturer and likely a competitor of the infringer. Therefore, lost profits is likely not a
remedy available to non-practicing entities. It is far more likely that a reasonable royalty will be
calculated by the courts to determine damages for such entities.471 It should be noted that in the
U.S., King Instrument is likely an outlier case, but it is nonetheless a precedent for patent owners
that do not practice the patented invention but have other competing products. It has perhaps
been reduced to a very specific set of circumstances, and has not been followed in a subsequent
decision. Nonetheless, King Instruments may still be a valid foothold for lost profits awards for
certain business models of non-practicing entities. When determining a reasonable royalty,
“reasonableness” is a very context dependent term. The complexity in determining what is
reasonable is exemplified in the Georgia-Pacific factors used in U.S. royalty analysis and the
Allied Signal analysis in Canada. The factors used in both jurisdictions give the courts
instructions and guidance but there is still considerable leeway in determining which factors
apply and which are more significant.
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A liability rule has similarities to the tort law “cause-in-fact” standard; applying concepts
of but-for and proximate cause. 472 This particular analysis in patent law is often part of the
analysis in Canada and England, but not in the U.S. In Canada and England the system seeks to
make inventors no worse off and infringers no better off due to the patent infringement.
However, judicial discretion may result in potentially punitive damages and may result in an
award of costs. This could create a windfall rather than just compensation, but the “reward” may
actually make the inventor no worse off, when interest, time, and costs are taken into account.
The courts in either country perform their remedy analysis by determining whether the patent
owner would have made sales and not lost profits, but-for the infringement. However, Canada
and England expand on the “but-for” analysis by including injunctive relief and an accounting
for profits as a means of making the patent owner whole. Yet, both jurisdictions note that it is
possible that solely monetary compensation may make a party whole without requiring an
injunction. Damage awards in a liability based system are based on a tort theory, providing
monetary compensation to restore the patentee to the position the patentee would have occupied
but-for infringer’s wrongful acts.473
By contrast, granting an injunction forces the parties to negotiate. Negotiations after
courts find for the patentee potentially create unequal bargaining power lying in favor of the
patent holder. An agreement may or may not arise out of negotiations, and the consequences for
the infringer are complete cessation of infringing activities with patent inventory seizure or
destruction. Nonetheless, negotiation is the preferred solution in a free-market economy because
this allows the parties in dispute to define their own agreement rather than having the court, as an
entity of the state, impose a remedy.474 The negotiation may end in an unfair result because of
the leverage held by the patentee with the right to exclude; but general social policy in Canada,
England, and the U.S. is against awarding the equivalent of compulsory licenses. Unfair results
are both valid and acceptable in a market system.
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Courts in each of the three jurisdictions are most likely to award damages as
compensation for infringement taking place up to the end of the trial, as well as an injunction
preventing the infringer from continued activity. These damages may include lost profits or
reasonable royalties in all three jurisdictions, or the infringer’s profits in Canada and England.
Another reason to consider pure liability rules rather than property rules is because the
patent may be more akin to a contract between the patentee and the government rather than an
actual property right. A patent is a legislatively created right whereby an inventor is granted a
patent from the government if the inventor meets the required criteria. In exchange for meeting
the patenting criteria, the inventor is awarded a right to exclude others. Infringers would be
interfering with the contract right and would be liable for compensation arising from that
interference. Thus damage remedies can easily be associated with a breach of contract, allowing
liability rules to be applied to patents. While scholars such as Vaver have stated that the view of
patents as contracts with the state do nothing to further legal analysis, this view does not seem to
go away.475 In fact, despite views to the contrary, U.K. and Canadian courts nonetheless appear
to still perceive patents as a contract with the state.476
In the U.S. there are calls by a few academics, notably Blair & Cotter, to bring back
disgorgement as a remedy.477 There are several reasons why this may actually be feasible.
Given the complexity involved in economic calculations for both reasonable royalties and lost
profits, the disgorgement calculation is not significantly more complicated. Extensive discovery
rules should allow patentees to obtain the necessary profit information from infringers. Since the
King case, it has been shown that there may be a need for damage awards that are not as
extensive as lost profits but are more generous than those available through a reasonable royalty.
Disgorgement is also seen as less like a compulsory license. However, while disgorgement may
work as a remedy for past infringement, a court would still have to either impose an injunction,
or award some form of continuing license, if the infringer wishes to continue using the patented
invention.478 Blair and Cotter indicate that disgorgement may be an alternative to a compulsory
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licensing issued by the court, but it would only be viable if the potential remedy would be
onerous enough so as to encourage a licensing agreement between the parties. The authors also
indicate that disgorgement has its limitations and is not onerous enough without further
remedies.

While there is some support in the U.S. to return disgorgement, it seems that Canada

and England are making it more difficult for a patent holder to receive disgorgement, despite the
popularity of the remedy with plaintiffs. Unfair results, windfalls, a lack of burden on plaintiffs
and a heavy burden on defendants all factor into attempts to limit access to this remedy. If patent
infringement is to be treated as a remedy to make whole rather than a penalty or punishment for
infringers, this should be a major consideration in any policy shift to allow disgorgement as a
remedy.
While patents are considered property, property remedies would normally be expected to
be applied. However, patents are very different from tangible property because of their
intangible nature. Patent remedies are not strictly property remedies since they also involve
damages, which is normally a liability remedy. Liability elements are part of the available
remedies for infringement allowing compensation for the harm suffered by patent holders, while
tempering some of the harshness of injunctions ( and where allowed, an accounting) and
providing courts some flexibility on how to best compensate injured parties without harming the
system or patent beneficiaries. Liability rules also provide some protection for patent owners
where the infringer can easily design around the patented innovation, making injunctions
powerless. A patent holder will be able to receive some compensation for infringement, even if
that compensation may not be as high as the patent holder had anticipated. Through the
implementation of a hybrid remedy system, a patent infringer will be required to provide some
compensation for infringement but courts may still allow the infringement to continue if deemed
beneficial to society. In many situations the patent holder does not have a manufacturing or
competitive reason to demand an injunction but realizes that an injunction can be used as
leverage in any royalty negotiation. This leads to a debate whether an injunction is justified in
all situations. Without an injunction, it is likely that a court will impose a significant royalty
payment on the infringer. This leads to the question of whether a patent holder should be entitled
to enforce a property right, in the form of an injunction, to obtain as much money as possible in
all situations.
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Chapter Three
What is a Troll?
Since a patent owner will not always be able to practice the invention, the limited right to
make and use includes the right not to make or not to use the patented invention. In combining
the right not to use with the right to exclude, a patent owner can prevent others from using the
patented invention despite not practicing the invention himself. There is no “working”
requirement in Canada, the U.S., or England.479 Thus, in all three jurisdictions an entity can
obtain a patent and enforce the right to exclude against an infringer even though the entity does
nothing other than retain ownership of the patent. Any entity that holds a patent but does not put
it into practice is a non-practicing entity. However, it is a particular segment of non-practicing
entities, pejoratively labeled as “patent trolls,” that have achieved the enmity of manufacturers,
legislators, scholars and many lawyers.
Trolls have been more of a concern in the U.S., but there is evidence that the trolling
business model has achieved some success in Europe, as well as in Canada.480 This concern may
amount to no more than intellectual curiosity in smaller economies, but the success of the
business model in the U.S. and its potential for success in Europe have raised questions about the
ability of current patent systems to operate effectively. This is the case especially because the
new business models operate outside the traditional models which were envisioned when the
patent systems were created. Despite the negative publicity received by trolls, there is also a
segment of manufacturers, legislators, scholars and lawyers that hail the rise of patent trolls as a
boon to the effective working of the patent system.481 However, both supporters and detractors
have had difficulty in identifying who, exactly, is a troll. Even if identified as a troll, it is not
clear whether such entities are detrimental to the system. It is difficult to draw a line marking
where trolling behavior begins and where legitimate behavior ends. This makes distinguishing
479

However, Canada and England have statutorily allowed a very narrow ability to grant compulsory licenses,
usually for abuse or where the patent invention is not being used but demand is high and negotiations with the
patent owner have failed to lead to a license. The standard is generally very high and companies rarely use this
procedure as an alternative to licensing. See Canadian Patent Act, ss.21.01-21.2 and ss. 65-71 and U.K. Patents Act
1977, ss. 48, 48A, & 48B.
480
See Fischer & Henkel, Supra note 22; See Federal Court of Canada Docket: T-1661-07, DataTreasury Corp. v.
Royal Bank of Canada ET AL. and Federal Court of Canada Docket: T-1472-07, The Toronto Dominion Bank and
Others v. DataTreasury Corp.; See also See Wi-Lan Technologies Corp. v. D-Link Systems Inc., 2006 FC 1484.
481
James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in
an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 205–06 (2006).

94

trolling behavior from “legitimate” non-practicing behavior problematic. Part of the problem
exists because patent owners, academics, and businesses, are not in agreement as to whether
trolls are actually a benefit or a detriment. Some see no reason to discuss trolls, as long as those
entities are operating within the legal confines of the patent system and merely enforcing valid
property rights. A further problem is that “trolls” often have “legitimate” patent uses while
“legitimate” businesses often exhibit trolling behavior; trolls may actually practice patents that
they hold while businesses will find ways to make money from patents that they do not practice.
The perception of legitimate behavior has also been extremely subjective and even malleable,
depending on who is affected and how.
Trolls have been defined as: “individuals or firms that seek to generate profits mainly or
exclusively from licensing or selling their (often simplistic) patented technology to a
manufacturing firm that, at the point in time when fees are claimed, already infringes on the
[troll’s] patent and is therefore under particular pressure to reach an agreement with the
[troll]”482; or entities who engage “in inefficient, socially wasteful patent transactions”;483 or
entities involved in transactions that negatively impact the patent system. These definitions do
little or nothing to clarify matters. They merely take the segment of non-practicing patent
holders attempting to enforce their patents and label these entities and their practices in unclear,
subjective, and derogatory terms. Often these labels are applied with ideological motives and
usually by an entity that is being sued for patent infringement. 484 Large manufacturers often use
these labels when small, non-practicing entities attempt to enforce their patents against large
entities.485 It does not help that terms like” efficient”, “wasteful”, or “negative impact” are
extremely subjective terms over which differences of opinion arise. These definitions could just
as easily describe IBM as they could Intellectual Ventures because they describe strategic
behavior exhibited by every company which uses the threat of a suit to extract royalty payments.
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However, a patent owner has a legal right to demand royalties from any infringer and can
attempt to exclude anyone from further infringement. Thus despite any negative connotations
regarding “trolling” practices, their practices are within the legal rights of patent ownership.
Trolls are often viewed as patent speculators who exploit and coerce the system. The
general objection to trolls is that they actively purchase patents with the intent to enforce the
patents against current and potential infringers in order to obtain licensing royalties or a larger
payout through litigation. It is not their enforcement of the patent that is troubling but their
motivation for acquiring the patent and the impact on parties who are the targets of troll patent
enforcement. Patent trolls have no interest in actually using or commercializing the underlying
invention or ensuring that the innovation is commercialized. Their interest is to obtain royalties
from alleged infringers who appear to be using the invention. The major distinguishing feature
between a troll and other non-practicing entities is that trolls will wait to purchase a patent or
will keep a purchased patent shaded from public scrutiny until another entity has infringed upon
the patent before attempting to enforce its patent rights. There is no interest in purchasing the
patent in order to use the underlying technology and there is little interest in attempts to license a
patent before it is actually infringed. The infringer will often be a company that has developed
the invention independently of the original inventor or a company unaware that its use is
infringing an existing patent. Fischer and Henkel summarize trolling behavior characteristics: 1)
trolls use surprise in an effort to catch infringers unaware that they are infringing and 2) trolls
have no interest in the underlying invention but only in the patent rights associated with the
invention.486 These characteristics distinguish trolls from other non-practicing entities, such as
pure research firms or licensing firms that seek to find licensors before any infringement is
detected.487
In Canada and England a patent application is made public within eighteen months of
application filing, regardless of whether it is filed solely within the country or if it is intended for
multiple jurisdictions. If a patent applicant has filed in the U.S. with the intent to file in another
jurisdiction, that application will be published within eighteen months, acting as notification for
any would-be infringers. This creates notice for potential infringers and eliminates most surprise
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filings. However an exception within U.S. patent law may still allow for surprise. A patent
applicant can delay publication until the patent has issued, but only in circumstances where the
patent applicant is filing only within the U.S. and no other jurisdiction.
Surprise is likely to occur because of the often unclear boundaries of a patent. Unlike
real property or personal property, the actual boundaries of an intellectual property can be murky
territory. The difficulty infringers have in identifying boundaries is illustrated by the fact that, in
the U.S., willful infringement has been found to have occurred in very few cases.488 Independent
parties can easily differ on the extent of patent boundary. In all three jurisdictions the patent
boundaries are open to interpretation and are not definitively determined until a patent dispute
reaches the courts. This can potentially force parties into protracted litigation in order to
determine disputed boundaries.489 Additionally, each of the three jurisdictions has a different
method of determining the extent of the boundaries.490 Confusion may exist within a
jurisdiction, but there is even more uncertainty when trying to market a product in multiple
jurisdictions. Thus, a party may infringe on a patented innovation without being aware that a
patent exists.
Another difficulty in identifying trolls is the development of new business models,
especially ones concerned with the property rights that come with the patent but not the
underlying innovation. These business models include firms which are strict research and
development firms that license their patented inventions and outsource manufacturing. There are
also firms which purchase patents solely for licensing purposes. Licensing companies may also
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include standards organizations and patent pools.491 Non-practicing behavior would also
encompass portions of the common practices of cross-licensing and in-licensing. Furthermore,
many companies employ defensive patenting as a means of extending existing patent rights,
preventing competitors from creating competing products, or merely defending against suits.492
Furthermore, trolling behavior could also encompasses not only failed licensors who later may
enforce patent rights once the invention is infringed, but also entities that actively purchase
patents in order to enforce them.493
Yet another business model includes market makers or middlemen. These entities
purchase patents with the intent of reselling them or licensing them to other entities that can
better use them, or with the intent of merely creating auction platforms. Such non-practicing
entities will naturally seek to profit on these transactions. These transactions may even involve a
form of arbitrage, where the purchaser buys from an inventor at a lower price, and, by virtue of
its position as a market maker, will resell the patent to a buyer at a much higher price. Such
practices help provide “liquidity” by connecting buyers and sellers and they help provide a
“clearing” function for patents.494 In providing liquidity and clearing functions, these companies
help facilitate the buying, selling, and licensing of patents by bringing buyers and sellers together
or by merely helping to market and commercialize patents. Without these services, the small
entity inventor would have a more difficult time finding buyers or licensees.
The line between middlemen and patent enforcers is not a clear one. In some cases, these
entities will not only be resellers but also licensors looking to sell to parties who are already
engaged in making goods or providing services that infringe the patent. Infringement may occur
either due to lack of knowledge that a patent exists, or it may be intentional. In either case, some
of these middlemen are adept at finding infringers from whom royalty payments can be claimed.
An alternative tactic is to purchase a patent that has the potential to be infringed in the future. In
either situation a middleman moves from being a reseller to a patent rights enforcer. The
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middleman no longer acts as a technology access facilitator but rather as a licensor and patent
enforcers. Commercializing patented technology is not part of the business model. Yet it is not
easy to definitively say whether even these middlemen, as final licensors, are trolls.
Nonetheless these demands for after-the-fact licenses are considered inefficient and a
socially wasteful practice when a patent owner does not seek to find new licensors or purchasers
for the patent or patented invention but rather seeks royalties from a patent sale to an already
practicing entity. These owners do not seek out new users or uses for the patent nor is there an
attempt to commercialize the patented innovation. They contribute nothing new to society.
Thus, like the Fischer and Henkel definition, one of the key characteristic of these entities is that
they seek to purchase patents that are already infringed or likely to be infringed. The key is that
innovation use or patent resale to someone who can use it, is not usually part of the business
activity. They typically seek patent enforcement for royalties.
In their research, Fischer and Henkel lump middlemen or patent enforcers into the troll
category but admit that they may also have a positive effect on the patent system. Attempts to
enforce patents may be quite expensive, and small entities and individual inventors may lack the
financial resources to pursue legal action against a large entity infringer. Patent trolls may have
the financial resources and the legal expertise necessary to enforce their patents. Thus by either
selling the patent to the troll or agreeing to a contingency fee arrangement, “trolls” force large
corporations to respect the rights of small or financially constrained inventors.495
A further problem with identifying trolls is that it is assumed that manufacturers do not
engage in trolling behavior. It is also assumed that the troll will be a small company that seeks to
unfairly force deep-pocketed companies into licensing agreements. The image of trolls has been
painted by the companies affected by them. However, both large and small manufacturing firms
will often employ licenses to reach markets or products they normally do not deal with and
manufacturers of all sizes commonly use their patent portfolios and the threat of litigation to
force licenses upon other firms by collecting their share of what is perceived to be wrongfully
obtained revenues.496 Since manufacturers accumulate patents covering products and processes
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which they may not actually be practicing, these manufacturers may be non-practicing entities in
some situations.
Despite the difficulties in determining who exactly is a patent troll, or who exhibits
trolling behavior, vocal opponents will generally consider trolls to be entities 1) that purchase
patents solely for the property rights and not the underlying invention; 2) that use a form of
arbitrage by leveraging information, financial expertise, and legal expertise to obtain patents that
are already being infringed or are likely to be infringed; and 3) that have a business model that
involves purchasing or licensing patents for the purpose of obtaining royalties and litigation
damages.
Mark Lemley has pointed out that universities are research and development institutions
active in the transfer of technology to entities that can commercialize the patented invention. It
appears, however, that U.S. universities have started to favor short term licensing revenues over
legitimate technology transfer.497 This caused frustration in industry and has created a
perception that some universities have become rent-seekers rather than innovators.498 Recently,
universities have been accused of acting like trolls. Universities help fund research but they tend
to act as middlemen in transactions between researchers and actual patent users. However,
schools may seek out infringers much in the way that alleged trolls do. There have been
indications that universities have started filing paper patents in an attempt to obtain greater
licensing revenues, thereby increasing rent-seeking accusations against them. Paper patents are
patents obtained by an inventor with no intention of putting that patent into commercial use.
While universities, like many manufacturers, may exhibit some behavior which may be
considered troll-like, it is difficult to discern whether an entity that actually conducts
considerable research and attempts to find methods of commercializing inventions can be called
a troll.
Even companies that are considered patent trolls cannot easily have their practices
defined as detrimental to society, nor are their practices merely the purchase of patents to enforce
and sue. Acacia Research Corporation, Rates Technology Inc., and Ronald Katz Technology
Licensing Inc. have been involved in over five hundred lawsuits between them in the U.S but
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each company claims to conduct considerable research. Intellectual Ventures denies being a
patent troll and claims to be a research facility that provides beneficial services, especially for
small inventors. There are no numbers for troll involvement in England, but RIM v. Inpro
Licensing was a failed attempt by an alleged patent troll to obtain licensing revenues. 499 This
case indicates that the patent troll business model has potential for success in England.500 In
Canada, Mosaid Inc. and Wi-Lan Technologies conduct some research, but they have also been
called patent trolls for their operations in the U.S. In Canada, Wi-Lan appears to be the only one
of the two involved in a patent infringement suit.501 U.S. research and patent holding company
DataTreasury recently settled its suit in Canada against several major banks.502 This may
indicate that patent trolls may be finding business opportunities in Canada. Actual infringement
suits in Canada and England have not appeared before the courts, but private settlements outside
the courts may be happening. Since agreements are private, court cases would help to illuminate
whether trolling practices have managed to gain traction in either jurisdiction.
Among manufacturers who license, cross-licensors, research entities with aggressive
patent portfolio management departments, middlemen, and pure research facilities, the line
between trolling and non-trolling behavior has become very blurred. This creates a very fuzzy
way of defining what it means to practice a patented invention.

Motivation to Patent, Trolls, Other Non-Practicing Entities
As stated earlier, the purpose of a patent system is to encourage innovation,
commercialization of the innovation, and follow-on inventions for the benefit of society. The
current systems in Canada, the U.K. and the U.S. offer protection for the inventor through a
limited property grant. However, it should not offer so much protection that follow-on
innovation, commercialization, and public access are curtailed. Thus a patent system becomes a
balance between protections for inventors and the freedoms of invention users.
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The grant of a monopoly and the subsequent right to exclude others from making, using,
selling, or importing a patented invention or products made using the patented invention are
considered to be the motivation for an inventor to invent. By providing incentive in the grant of
a limited monopoly, the belief is that an inventor will be motivated to patent the innovation and
will use the right to exclude to commercialize the invention. That is not to say that there will be
no invention without the property rights offered in a patent. It says only that innovators are
being encouraged to invent and to make public their inventions in exchange for the right.
However, just because a patent owner has a right to exclude, the owner may not want to or may
not be able to commercialize the invention. A person may seek a patent for reasons completely
unrelated to commercializing the invention. A recent study by Stuart J.H. Graham and Ted
Sichelman indicates that there are at least ten reasons entrepreneurs choose to patent.
Manufacturing the invention or using a process is only one reason. Other reasons include:
licensing, defensive strategies, cross-licensing, financing and acquisition, bullying competitors
and pre-empting market entry, and blocking competitors.503
These are all common reasons but some clarification and explanation for each term is
necessary. Licensing usually involves a mutual agreement or contract between parties where the
patent owner agrees to allow the other party certain patent rights in exchange for consideration
(generally royalty). A defensive patenting strategy can be implemented in several different
ways. This strategy includes obtaining a patent so as to control the area around an existing
product with the purpose of extending the patent monopoly; or controlling that area around
patents in order to prevent similar products from being created by competitors; or merely owning
patents in areas of art where they can be used against a competitor should the competitor decide
to use its own patents to sue for infringement. Cross-licensing is the grant of a license where
parties agree to allow each other access to all of the patents they own, usually with some
payment going to the company with more patents to make up any deficiency in patent numbers.
Financing is always important for a company, particularly for startup companies. Financial
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institutions are more likely to give loans to companies that own patents because the patents are
viewed as an asset which can be used as collateral. Patents also tend to give legitimacy to the
technology being developed by the company, something investors like. Bullying involves
obtaining patents, usually weak ones, in an effort to be a nuisance to competitors and increase
costs. A blocking patent is similar to a bullying or a defensive patent, but it is generally a strong
patent that is obtained to prevent a competitor from using its own invention without paying a
license to the owner of the blocking patent.
It appears that motivation for obtaining a patent, in several situations, actually aims to
prevent practice rather than encouraging it. Several other inventors seek to extract a payment
from already practicing entities or entities that independently develop the patented invention.
There are practices that seek payments from companies to actually increase costs and avoid
lawsuits. There are further practices which are designed to actually suppress innovation so that
existing products can remain on the marketplace.
Richard Posner and William Landes question whether the patent is necessary in order to
encourage innovation.504 They indicate that the protection, while valid in cases where it is cheap
and easy to copy an existing innovation, will not be as needed in industries where the innovation
is complex and copying is both difficult and expensive. Furthermore, strategic reasons have
possibly eclipsed innovation as the major motivator to patent applications.505
Stuart Graham, Robert Merges, Pam Samuelson, and Ted Sichelman used data from the
2008 Berkeley Patent Survey to conclude that patents actually created a weak incentive to
innovate.506 This conclusion seems to disprove years of economic assumptions about patents.
They find overall incentive to patent is relatively weak, and this applies not just to companies
that do not patent but to those that patent as well.507 However, the incentive will also depend on
the industry.508
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The major motivator to patent is more to prevent copying than for financial reasons.509
Entrepreneurs are likely to license a product but it is often so that they can avoid a lawsuit.510
Nonetheless, patents also play a role in helping startups find angel investors and venture
capitalists.511 The number of patents for startups has greatly increased while the traditional
incentive motivator seems low.512 Incentives to patent include securing investment, increasing
chances of achieving an IPO, using patents as strategic negotiating tools, and defending against
suits by others.513
The cost of prosecuting and enforcing patents is a barrier for entrepreneurs and was not
considered an incentive to patent.514 This was actually a reason that entrepreneurs opted against
patenting. 515 Patenting was also considered detrimental because of the desire to keep any
disclosure secret and because patents provided weak protection, especially if other forms of
protection might be available. 516
Thus it may be helpful to look at some of the problems existing in separating “legitimate”
from “illegitimate” patent behavior and transactions. It may also help to look at some of the
standard strategic practices used by patent owners in light of the “legitimate” versus
“illegitimate” debate over patent use.
Amy Landers indicates that the patent system has several goals, some of which are
diminished or ignored through current policies. While the current approach has created an
incentive to innovate, it has been less effective at encouraging commercialization. She notes that
the motivation to innovate is strongly supported by current laws and policies but that the
commercialization incentive is small compared to the relatively risk free incentive to license and
trade in patents. The recent increase in patent liquidity is a direct result of strong property rights
and an acceptance of anti-competitive behavior in patent accumulation. The result has been an
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increase in offensive and defensive strategic behaviour that involves patent trade and litigation
rather than commercialization.
Practicing a Patent: What Is It and Why It Is Not Always Viable

Determining whether an innovation is being practiced is significant because a patent right
entitles the holder to prevent others from making, selling, importing, or using the patented
invention with the goal of commercializing either the innovation or a by-product of the
innovation. Through an examination of what gets excluded in the patent right, it can be inferred
that all these actions by an infringer are “practice.” Licensing is not really using an innovation
since the licensor is merely providing conditions where the licensee may potentially gain some
rights in the patent or patented innovation. But once the licensee practices the patent, then that
can be considered use, and the licensor’s royalty demands can be justified in exchange for
enabling another to make commercial use of the invention. However, there are a significant
number of licensing situations where the innovation will ultimately not be used other than as
leverage in another transaction, leverage to prevent certain behavior, or leverage for more
money. These situations are not necessarily encouraging product commercialization, follow-on
innovation, or public benefit.
Practicing the patented innovation entails making a product which is either the underlying
innovation or involves use of that innovation with the goal of either commercializing the product
or for use in research with potential commercial uses.517 If the underlying innovation of the
patent is a process, practice will involve use of the process to make a good or as part of research
for some commercial purpose. There is, however, a very grey area where patent practice is not
clear. The questions is relatively simple when the underlying innovation is a physical product or
process but becomes less clear when it is something less tangible like an algorithm or business
method. Also, patent commercialization is more difficult to determine since the patent is treated
as property that can be traded, licensed, and used as collateral in financing. While trading
patents involves a commercial transaction, in many instances the underlying innovation is
insignificant except as a basis for enforcement against others. The power of a patent lies in the
517

There are varying levels of research and commercial use between the three jurisdictions. The U.S. seems largely
intolerant of any research related to a commercial activity. Canada and the U.K. allow some research for
commercial purposes. In the pharmaceutical industry, Canadian courts are regularly hosting legal battles between
generic and research-based (Rx) pharmaceutical companies. See Astrazeneca Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 2013 FCA
77 (CanLII), Apotex Inc. v. Canada (Health), 2012 FCA 322 (CanLII).

105

breadth of the description of the underlying innovation, but practice still involves the underlying
innovation and not just patent trades or licensing without innovation use.
Of all the reasons to patent, only making, using, selling, leasing, or any commercial
activity that involves use of the patented innovation or process can be considered actual
“practice” of the patented invention. Making and using a patent invention will generally
translate into manufacturing the patented invention, or using the invention as part of a
manufacturing process. It will also cover the importation of patented items, if there is a
commercial purpose. The term practice generally involves some use which leads to innovation
commercialization. All uses which do not lead to commercialization may fall under the category
of strategic use.
Practice also entails conducting research using the patented product or process with the
goal of developing a commercial application for a subsequent outcome product. It may not rise
to the level of “practice” if the research is done strictly out of curiosity since that may be outside
the proximate scope of use with commercial intent but it may nonetheless lead to follow-on
innovation at a future time. If the research involves a commercial context it may be considered
practice for the purposes of compensation to the patent holder. The level of research amounting
to practice varies in the three jurisdictions being examined. In Canada and England some
research is allowed even if a commercial purpose may be the end result.518 The U.S. has a much
stricter rule which limits patent invention use to research that is done for curiosity and where no
commercialization is intended. Thus in the U.S., a researcher will most likely have to obtain a
patent or licence before commencing research, but in Canada and England, the researcher may or
may not have to obtain a license. In the U.K. and Canada, whether a license is necessary will
largely depend on the industry, the nature of the research, the commercial aspects of the research,
potential competition, where the research is conducted, and other factors. Generally, there is a
greater tolerance of patent infringement in Canada and the U.K. when research is involved.
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After this brief explanation of practice, it should be noted that it may not always be
possible to put the patent into practice. Even if a patent owner wants to use the invention, other
obstacles must still be overcome. Using a patent for manufacturing, commercialization, or
further research and development (R&D) may be possible for many patentees; but each of these
functions requires a source of funding. Small companies and sole inventors may lack the money
and resources to put a patented invention into practice or to develop the invention further.
Financing may also be unavailable to such patent owners. Patents may also fail to be practiced
because there may not be a market for the patented invention, or there may be no demand for it,
or the inventor may be unable to develop a marketable embodiment, or the innovation may not
be viable within the patentee’s area of business expertise. There is a myriad of reasons why an
invention may not be practiced. Even the largest companies with significant resources may not
be able to put all their patents into practice, forcing these companies to choose another means of
recuperating the cost of time and expense required to make the patented invention.
Even if there is demand for an innovation, there may be a lack of commercial value in
making it. A patented invention may also be less viable than the holder’s other technologies.
Further use of the patented innovation or commercializing the invention may not be desired
because the new invention would compete with patentee’s existing products.519 Supply, demand,
scarce resources, personal preference, existing products, cost effectiveness, potential profits, and
many other factors can play a role in whether a patent holder will choose to commercialize an
innovation.
If a holder cannot practice the innovation an alternate means of commercialization is by
issuing a license. Licensing may enable an inventor to recover the costs of making an invention
plus some profits. A patent holder may issue a license to another party who may be better suited
to using the patented invention. Economic theory indicates that a party will license the patented
invention to a party that is capable of more efficient use. A patent holder that is also a
manufacturer may also issue a license to another entity looking to use the innovation. It is
possible, but not likely, that the manufacturer will license to a competitor; but it is likely that a
company will license to a non-competitor if the opportunity arises. Additionally, the patent
holder may issue a license to another manufacturer operating in a geographic region the patent
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holder would normally not access. In this manner, the patent holder is compensated for creating
the invention while the licensee obtains compensation for the cost of the license through
commercializing the underlying invention or by using the patented invention to develop and
commercialize other innovations. However, for practice to take place, the licensee must actually
make or use or attempt to make or use the patented invention.
Certain licensing practices also raise the question of what exactly is meant by
“practicing” a patented invention. It is hard to understand how a patent can be considered to be
“in use” if the licensee is content to sit on the patented invention, even if consideration is paid for
the license. Determining whether an entity is practicing its patented invention may lead to some
confusion. As an example, once the patent holder licenses the invention to a non-competing
manufacturer or to a manufacturer operating in a region where the patent holder would normally
not operate, the patent holder may become a non-practicing entity even if the patent holder is
actually using the innovation in its own region or its own industry. A patent holder who
manufactures and sells in Canada but licenses the invention to a manufacturer in the U.S. and
does not directly sell or manufacture in the U.S. is a non-practicing entity in the U.S. The same
would apply if the patent holder used the invention in making mobile phones but the licensee
used the patented invention to make lap top computers. In both examples, a manufacturer has
become a non-practicing entity. Nonetheless, in both cases, while the patent holder is a licensor
and not directly putting the innovation into practice, it is ultimately being practiced by the
licensee.
Not all licensing attempts are made just to recover costs or to seek licensing revenues.
The proliferation of patent applications is encouraging strategic behavior. This is behavior
where commercialization and direct licensing revenues are secondary to protection,
inconveniencing competitors, and other strategic goals. For example, cross-licensing may not
always result in practice. There are also entities that purchase patents solely for the purpose of
licensing to others or for the purposes of litigation. Both practices may involve using a patented
innovation but both strategies may want the property rights associated with the patent rather than
a desire to use the underlying innovation.
All the other reasons to patent generally do not involve putting a patented innovation into
practice. These other reasons are strategic in nature and may sometimes be contrary to the goals
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of the patent system. Often patent owners obtain a patent for the purpose of preventing others
from using the invention rather than actually using the invention themselves. Since there is no
requirement that a patent holder or even a licensee actually use a patented invention, some
actions may have a dampening effect on innovation.
Market Inefficiency and Non-Practice

It has been assumed that a patent system is necessary to help encourage innovation, to
help disseminate information, and to bring innovation to the marketplace for consumption.
Without the protections offered by the current system it may also be assumed that copyists will
prevail by taking advantage of the labors of innovators. The assumption further continues that,
without protection inventors will be less likely to publish materials and innovation will become
secretive. It is the lack of protection for innovation in the free market that has led to the creation
of a patent system. However, in trying to correct a free-market failure other inefficiencies have
come to light in the current system. There are gaps in the system where strong protection is
encouraging new and unforeseen business models which may actually discourage innovation and
subsequent commercialization. Creative people have used these inefficiency gaps to create
successful business models that do not necessarily focus on innovating for commercial purposes.
In a system where a limited monopoly is incentive to invent, system inefficiency exists
because firms that conceive and practice an invention without obtaining a patent do not need the
patent as incentive. Clearly the incentive was not the limited monopoly granted by the patent.
This would also indicate that the patent should not have been granted because of the easy
duplication of an invention.520 A market system inefficiency also exists because firms that
independently reinvent a patented invention show that it may be easier to reinvent an invention
than to find the patent.521 Just because a patent exists, it does not mean that an infringer would
have been aware of the infringement even after a diligent search. This indicates a problem where
independent researchers may not be able to determine a patent’s boundaries.
Because the boundaries are often unclear, it is difficult to determine whether a new
device or process is actually infringing an existing patent. Determining the boundaries and
potential infringement will increase the cost of research due to the administrative task of
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performing patent searches. These unclear boundaries may end up increasing research costs
because companies, large and small, will be forced to expend resources to conduct in-depth
patent searches. Infringement which may not be present upon initial review of a patent may end
up having a latent impact at a later time.
Boundaries are further blurred because of marking requirements for some innovations but
not for others.522 The lack of marking requirements may be the result of impracticability, as in
processes, methods, or bio-chemical innovations, and it results in uneven notification
requirements and hidden dangers for the unwary. It is often assumed that researchers are aware
of technological innovations in their field, but they are also forced to be aware of all patents in
their field and even those that may indirectly touch on their field. While patents searches may
provide beneficial information for researchers, constant searches to determine whether current
research is infringing take away from time and resources devoted to the innovation process due
to bureaucratic compliance requirements to ensure non-infringement.
An entity which owns property but does not exploit the property through use may try to
exploit it by renting the property to others. It is known as rent-seeking when renting the
property, rather than using it, is the property owner’s strategy. More broadly speaking, rentseeking is where a person tries to increase existing wealth but does nothing to create it, or more
directly, when an entity seeks economic gain from society but does nothing to benefit society.523
Rent-seeking may be a potential inefficiency in the patent system. The patent owner does not
himself make, use, or sell the invention but actively seeks to collects payments (rent) from others
who do use and exploit the invention. It is not that rent-seeking of itself is “bad” but there has
been an increase in patent trade for rent rights and this may become a problem for innovation
when a company obtains and purchases patents solely to collect payments from existing
practitioners. This can be an impediment to innovation and subsequent commercialization
particularly where the infringer independently developed the patented technology or a segment
of the technology.
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There are companies that have taken advantage of the strong property rights associated
with patents. Since patents can be bought and sold, these entities have acted as middlemen in
transactions. They create a marketplace for patents by buying and selling patents. However,
these middlemen also enforce the patents that they hold in between purchases and sales. Often,
these “middlemen” may only purchase a patent for the right to enforce and not with an intent to
sell. In the patent world, rent demands are backed up with litigation threats. There is nothing
wrong with this business model per se, but these entities have created a niche that was not
foreseen when the patent laws were developed. These are patent traders and enforcers rather
than inventors and innovators.
On one hand, some of these entities may create a valid market for patents, increasing
their liquidity by connecting buyers and sellers. This is a beneficial niche which did not exist
before. It creates a notification platform for patent sellers, and it creates notice to buyers of
patents available for sale. These markets allow small inventors to receive compensation for their
patented innovation while providing larger companies with a way to find and connect with
smaller inventors. This process may actually aid in commercializing innovation and can play a
beneficial role for the public.
On the other hand, there are middlemen who do not create a market for buyers. They are
patent holding companies or licensing companies, deriving their revenue from royalty collection
rather than from creating liquidity. It is unclear whether - and to what extent - they have a
positive or negative impact on the patent system. It is also clear that many of these companies,
regardless of what name is given to them, are using the threat of legal action to obtain these
royalties. The property rights associated with the patent are the goal of these companies, while
the underlying innovation is only significant insofar as someone is infringing it. However, many
businesses have taken notice of these companies and labeled them as patent trolls.
Still other companies who have long criticized trolls for their behavior have “spun-off”
their patent portfolios to subsidiary companies or to special purpose entities. Others have created
joint ventures or partnerships with other companies to purchase and enforce patents. In the spinoff model, the spin-offs have given the parent company a non-exclusive license and have enabled
them to act as patent licensing and enforcing companies. In the latter situations companies have
created specialized ventures with other companies to obtain patents, to license these patents to
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the parent companies, and to enforce the patents against competitors or others not part of the
venture.
Trolls: Good or Bad?

Robert Merges indicates that the most threatening non-practicing entity is one that not
only seeks to exact royalty payments, but also use the threat of litigation and potential injunction
awards as leverage to demand exorbitant sums which may be out of proportion with the patented
invention’s worth.524 However, demands for these royalties are only possible if the troll
purchases a patent which has already been infringed and the infringer is either unaware that it is
infringing or has done so intentionally. An alleged infringer will likely pay the royalty if there is
a chance that it actually infringed the patent and the potential cost of litigation and remedy
awards will be more than the royalty payments.
Under this business model, the actual underlying invention is of no concern to the troll. It
has no desire to actually make or use the patented invention but purchases a patent solely for the
property rights in the patent. These rights are significant because they allow the holder to
enforce those rights against an infringer. The innovation upon which the patent is based is only
significant if there is another entity using it or using a similar innovation. In these licensing
transactions, the patent is not being used to create further innovations; nor is it being used to
commercialize the underlying innovation. No one is being encouraged to license the patented
innovation in order to further research or to produce new products or to make products more
efficiently. The underlying innovation is only relevant insofar as it is used as a basis for
enforcement, and the patent’s only purpose is to obtain rent.
It is believed that trolls are responsible for an increase in rent-seeking since they have
created markets and exchanges that encourage this behavior.525 The transactions in question not
only do not contribute to the innovation process, but they may actually impede innovation
through the rent-seeking behavior. A whole business model has been created around an
instrument which can force users to make payments in exchange for nothing other than owning
the instrument. Thus an accused infringer is either forced to incur the expense of litigation or to
pay the demanded royalties. An alleged infringer may also be forced to find a non-infringing
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alternative, or attempt to design around the patented innovation. This will add cost to the
infringer, which will ultimately be passed to the consumer through higher priced goods.
Since a purpose in creating a patent regime is to foster innovation, Robert Merges has put
forward that transactions solely for the purpose of getting rent or acts which use the threat of
litigation would seem contrary to this goal and more akin to blackmail. A party uses resources to
get information; and, in exchange for suppressing that information, receives a payment from
another party. Thus blackmail is considered a wasteful economic transaction. The net result is
that society is poorer for it, since information is suppressed through a financial transaction. Just
as blackmail has a negative impact on society, trolling provides no benefit to the patent
system.526 However, unlike blackmail, the threat is not to suppress information for payment.
The threat is to the continued use of an invention. In exchange for royalty payments, the
infringer can continue to use the patented invention.
A patent holder further has a right to exclude others from using the invention, and patent
owners can seek damages from infringers whether they are practicing the invention or not.
Patent owners can demand royalty payments, and they can even seek an injunction while
refusing to license a patent. This even entails not allowing anyone to use the patented invention
throughout the life of the patent.527 Since each of the three jurisdictions recognizes that patents
can be bought and sold, why should the patent holder not profit by selling his patent rights to
another? Patent ownership rights are transferable to subsequent owners, and the right to exclude
is one of those rights. While trolls appear to be within their legal rights, this behavior may
actually be worse than blackmail because the threat is not to prevent dissemination of
information of dubious value but to prevent useful products and information from being on the
market unless royalty fees are met. The potential injunction can deny the public and other
significant stakeholders access to innovations that may already be on the market as well as to
potential new innovations.
While the government in all three jurisdictions under examination can limit patent rights,
limiting acts are the exception and not the norm. In Canada and the U.K. the statutes indicate
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that a compulsory license may be granted if patent rights are abused. However, for abuse to
exist, demand for the patented innovation must exist, no one can currently be practicing it, and
the party wishing to use the innovation must have attempted negotiations to get a license. The
patent owner cannot refuse outright to license, and royalty demands cannot be outrageous.
While the threshold may not seem particularly high, this is a rarely used remedy in both
countries.
It is further believed that innovation will be impeded because companies will be wary
about venturing into new technologies for fear of facing litigation. Companies will face
increased patent search costs to determine whether any newly created technology will infringe on
an existing patent. As it is, the median cost of formal validity and infringement opinions is
$15,000.00 in the U.S.528 When complex devices, involving multiple patents, require a search
the cost to perform a search can be extreme. Even if a search is conducted and a company deems
it is not infringing, the potential lack of clear boundaries may still result in an infringement
claim. Unclear boundaries require greater cost to accurately determine their extent. Even if
resources are expended to perform a thorough search, the patent boundaries may be interpreted
incorrectly and parties will often differ.
Despite some negative impact on the patent system, it can also be argued that middlemen
and trolls have also benefitted many inventors. These entities actually create markets for patent
trade and licensing. These markets make it easier for parties to trade patents by matching buyers
and sellers. It allows the innovator to focus on his area of expertise while allowing the
middlemen to engage in the act of buying, selling, licensing, and even suing.529
It can also be argued that trolls create a beneficial service for small inventors because
they enable patent enforcement by entities lacking resources to find infringers and lacking
resources to enforce patents. Finally, society may benefit because infringers will be forced to be
creative and flexible in trying to avoid paying ongoing royalties to patent holders. Rather than
paying a royalty once infringement is discovered, an infringer can also design a work-around or
find a non-infringing alternative. This may actually increase innovation by forcing the infringer
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to come up with other inventive solutions. This may not be the most tenable benefit, but an
extremely flexible and responsive company may be able to achieve this. However, many
companies will likely not have the resources or the ability to alter designs of products that are in
mid-production.
Another issue when looking at the impact of non-practicing entities is that there are no
clear figures to calculate the number of suits filed by these entities. Estimates in the U.S.
indicate that non-practicing entities are responsible for between 2% and 17% of all patent
infringement suits but a recent government study in the U.S. indicated that patent monetizing
entities were responsible for as much as 20% of all suits.530 This is a large disparity in the
numbers, indicating that trolls may have some impact; but it may also indicate that the danger
posed by trolls is greatly exaggerated. The numbers are likely smaller in Canada and England.
Factors in this assumption include their respective market sizes, the smaller number of patents
issued, and the general profit potential of royalty awards versus cost of litigation.531 However,
any assumptions about troll pervasiveness are unclear and lack empirical support.
Nonetheless, concern over the negative impacts of the patent troll business model may
have brought to light issues greater than the direct impact of trolls themselves. There has been a
larger increase in the interest in property rights of patents than in the inventions which spawn the
patents. This interest has led to questions of whether the patent system is actually achieving the
goals which it was designed to address and of what can be done, if anything, to alleviate any
shortcomings in the goals or purpose of the patent system.

Other Non-practicing Transactions Compared to Troll Behavior
It has already been shown that manufacturing and licensing are just two of many
reasons to obtain a patent. There are also many sub-categories within the scope of “licensing”
which are actively used by companies to for both strategic and profit oriented reasons. While
licensing is a commonly believed to be a form of patent practice, there actually appears to be a
fine line between licensing practices that tend to commercialize innovations and those that are
merely created for strategic purposes. For example, it may be hard to consider an invention as
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being “practiced” if there is a cross-licensing agreement where the entities may or may not be
using any of the patent inventions in the other party’s portfolio. There are still other patent
transactions that are common but are not “practice.” These transactions are considered to be
legitimate and there has been very little commentary on their impact on the patent system. There
has been no outcry over their inefficiency or the need to protect companies from such waste.
Many of these transactions have also been ignored because they are commonly used as
motivators for patent application filings. Nonetheless, while applications may be increasing,
there are serious questions about whether these transactions are truly helping innovation.
There are still other business decisions that involve patents but not the practice or
attempted practice of the patented invention. Some include both offensive and defensive tactics
either to protect existing products or to prevent competitors from invading the patent owner’s
territory. It is also not uncommon for a company with a large patent portfolio to wield its
portfolio as a club against startups and competitors by threatening to sue startups and companies
with weaker portfolios for infringement if they do not pay a royalty to continue operations.532
Many companies operate aggressive licensing departments that seek to obtain patents for the
slightest innovation in an attempt to use their patent portfolios to obtain as much licensing
revenue as possible. It has also become a practice that some large practicing entities have
started to use non-practicing entities to enforce their patents against infringers but to avoid public
backlash from the enforcement.533 Such companies are generally very large companies which
innovate, but it is questionable whether their tactics can be considered “practicing” their patents;
these patents are not really used except for licensing or litigation leverage. Some of these
companies will not use their patents but will just accumulate patents covering loopholes in
existing patents or loopholes in competitor patents. This results in a stockpile of paper patents.
The innovations coming out of such practices are often relatively weak, while nevertheless
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allowing the patent owners to wield the full power of patent exclusion and the threat of
litigation.534 Discussing patent office standards for obviousness and novelty are beyond the
scope of this work but low standards encourage application filing to gain property rights over
unclaimed patent territory, rather than for actual innovation. It has also become a trend for
companies to band together in an effort to create a partner company to seek out and buy patents
which may be potential patent troll targets. The parent companies would receive a license from
the subsidiary under extremely favorable terms.
Obtaining patents for defensive purposes raises the question whether defensive measures
are actual practice. It also raises questions over whether infringement is easy to identify and
whether rudimentary searches are sufficient to discover patents which may be infringed. This
may also indicate that determining the boundaries is more difficult than merely conducting a
scan of available patents which may require specialized skills. Another issue concerns
companies that are buying patents primarily out of fear of being sued. The chance of
infringement may be remote, but a triable issue may still arise before the courts and lead to
protracted litigation for strategic reasons or a nuisance settlement.
Some companies with large patent portfolios, such as IBM, have embraced the idea of
creating a special purpose entity (SPE) to whom the patent portfolio is sold. The SPE would
grant a non-exclusive license on all of the company’s patents, allowing full use, but would
pursue an aggressive licensing and enforcement strategy. Investors finance the SPE, which uses
the money to pay for the patent portfolio. In this manner, the company obtains a large payment
for its patents while investors are generally compensated through portfolio royalties. There is
great similarity between this practice and that of a patent troll.
The recent U.S. GAO report on patent litigation noted that many operating companies
(practicing entities) partner with non-practicing entities for enforcement purposes or they have
subsidiaries that perform litigation on behalf of the operating company.535
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To obtain full value from a patent some licensing may be involved.536 Attempts to
receive royalties may be difficult for most practicing entities. Competing entities will generally
have patents that cover their own and competitors’ products making some infringement likely.
Companies often come to an amicable agreement because, without it, competitors may get into
battles over multiple patent infringement claims. Another complication exists because the
attempted licensor may be in an existing business relationship with the potential licensee.537 A
true patent troll is not likely vulnerable to either counter-suit.538 The SPE, like the troll, would
likely remain immune, but the company that originally sold the portfolio to the SPE may be
vulnerable to retribution suits from competing company SPEs.
A common way around a licensing impasse between competitors is a cross-licensing
agreement. This is a form of license where two companies agree to exchange patent portfolios
(or a portion of their portfolios). The company with fewer patents pays royalties to the company
with more patents. These agreements often allow the company holding more patents to demand
royalties from the competition.539 Cross-licensing has a further purpose as a protective measure
to ward off countersuits by these same competitors.
The economic efficiency of cross-licensing is questionable; and, despite the general lack
of concern over this practice, its positive effect on innovation in the patent system is less than
clear. Since not all patents in the agreement will be practiced, the threat of litigation will
nonetheless force the company with fewer patents to pay a royalty to the company with more
patents. This does not necessarily encourage inventiveness. It does encourage companies to
accumulate patents for every small innovation or variation no matter how trivial. This also
encourages companies to find holes in their competitor’s patent portfolios to strengthen
bargaining positions for cross-licensing, rather than for putting an invention into practice. Weak
obviousness standards, particularly in the U.S., and the fact that almost “anything under the sun
that is made by man” is patentable further contribute to this situation.540 In Canada and England
the obviousness and subject matter standards seem to be loosening as well. Canada currently
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recognizes business method patents and software patents.541 While England officially follows
E.U. patent standards denying business methods and software patents, there is a push to allow
these types of subject matter. In England, whether a business method or software patent is
granted often depends on claim construction.542
A further issue with cross-licensing is that the parties exchange portfolios, finances, or
other resources without necessarily practicing a patent which is part of the exchange. The
accumulation of patents forces another party to pay for patents they may not be infringing. It
also forces a party to pay for a patent which neither party to the cross-licensing agreement may
ever use. Thus there is an exchange of money for potential use of a patent, not for actual use.
This is akin to paying for a potential trespass or potential liability prevention – almost like a kind
of insurance. Cross-licensing has not been questioned because parties to a cross-licensing
agreement find it cheaper to just agree to the license rather than face litigation over potentially
hundreds of patents in a cross-licensor’s patent portfolio. Perhaps such royalty payments can be
favorably compared to a type of insurance or as nuisance avoidance due to the exclusionary
property right granted in a patent. The practice has helped spur patent accumulation but it is not
clear whether these transactions actually encourage innovation or whether cross-licensing
benefits the patent system. The practice has resulted in the proliferation of both paper patents
and practiced patents. This has been described as the “nuclear option” of the patent world.
Since a single patent suit can be very expensive, the prospect of battling over several or several
hundred patents is something no company is willing to accept. Since cross-licensing is a practice
used by companies to avoid litigation, changes to remedies will have little impact on crosslicensing practices. Furthermore, cross licensing will occur regardless of the obviousness
standard or the strength of patents. A tougher obviousness standard may limit the number of
patents accumulated by companies, but it will not limit the practice of cross-licensing.
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Despite some of the inefficiencies existing in cross-licensing, there are some benefits. In
a market economy, cross-licensing is a market solution where parties agree to a transaction
between themselves and without legislative intervention. Companies prefer this solution because
agreement terms are generally secret and offer agreement structure flexibility. The transaction
costs of making a cross licensing agreement are clearly seen as being cheaper than litigation, and
without the uncertainty of anticipating a court decision. Another benefit to cross-licensing is that
a company will have access to a competitor’s patents which it would not have had otherwise.
This may encourage research and development into areas that a company had not considered
prior to receiving access to a competitor’s patents. Transaction costs are also lowered because
negotiations are not for each individual patent but merely for access to the accumulated total of
patents. A final benefit is that companies are encouraged to publicize innovations through
patenting in order to maintain a competitive balance with other companies in the industry. Thus
a company is encouraged to publish even the most insignificant innovation in an attempt to
accumulate patents.
A cross licensing agreement can be considered a market remedy rather than a legal
remedy. As has been seen, while it may not necessarily be the most efficient method of
encouraging the goals of the patent system, it does provide benefits for patent holders, follow-on
innovators, investors, and even consumers. Innovators are encouraged to publish their
innovations, no matter how meager, and decisions are made by the innovators themselves rather
than through government and judicial intervention. However, these benefits may not necessarily
result in a net benefit when compared with the detrimental aspects of cross-licensing practice.
Defensive patents and pre-emptive patents may also have more questionable net
contributions to the goals of the patent system. Yet these reasons to patent are also considered
acceptable patent uses by both patent applicants and even many commentators. They are useful
methods that a manufacturer can employ to protect itself from competitors. The defensive patent
is normally not intended for practice but only as a shield to protect against competing
manufacturers. Most often the defensive patents will not be used except as a means of
countersuing a competitor who decides to assert its own patent exclusion right.
Pre-emptive patenting is a defensive situation wherein a company decides to patent an
invention, which it may or may not be using, merely to prevent its competitor from either using
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the innovation or acquiring a patent on the innovation. Pre-emptive patenting can take another
form, where an inventor with a patented invention, patents a subsequent invention in an attempt
to extend the monopoly on the first invention.543 The invention covered by the second patent is
suppressed rather than commercialized, in an effort to thwart competition against the first
invention.
A blocking patent is an offensive form of patenting which Posner and Landes believe
results in a net social cost. A blocking patent comes into being when a competitor obtains a
patent on an improvement to the existing technology, but the existing technology is in a patent
owned by the technology producer. The original patent owner and improver are both unable to
use the improvement. The original owner is blocked because the improver owns the patent on
the new innovation. However, the improver is unable to use the new innovation because he
cannot use the original patented invention. Landes and Posner believe that the negotiation costs
are often lower than the potential royalty benefits that could be obtained by developing
improvements. 544 This would indicate that there is a financial incentive to adopt a strategy to try
to obtain a blocking patent against competitors, whenever possible. The blocking patent merely
increases the cost of competitor improvements, because a royalty must be paid to the improver.
The potential royalty also encourages non-use by the improver. However, this is accepted as
perfectly valid strategic behavior which encourages negotiations between parties. Since
negotiations are a market solution, it is one preferred by many companies and commentators
despite a net social detriment.545
There is really nothing in the patent laws that will prevent the practice of pre-emptive
patenting or of blocking patents. Both practices use the right to exclude to gain a competitive
advantage. Patent accumulation is encouraged in all three jurisdictions.546 This is a form of non543
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practice which has a net social detriment because new innovations are not being practiced and
old ones are continued beyond patentable period. Competition is also being prevented because
the patentee is not making the new innovation nor is the newer patent being licensed to another
willing to practice the innovation. Anyone looking to practice the innovation will be limited as
to any improvements and will have to obtain a license from the innovator to use the
improvements. The original patent owner will have a significantly superior market position and
will be able to obtain royalty payments with significantly less effort and solely through the
mistakes or oversights of initial patent owners.
There are also some positive aspects to pre-emptive patenting as well. Pre-emptive
patenting may not actually encourage innovation but it still encourages the inventor to make
public the invention details. In a system that denies injunctions unless the innovation is
practiced, it is believed that the patent owner would be more likely to suppress the new
innovation rather than allowing another to bring a competing product to market. There is also a
question about the extent to which society would benefit if a manufacturer were forced to market
two similar and competing products just to maintain a patent right. However, none of these
reasons to patent appear to work towards actively putting innovations into practice. Rents,
extending original innovation terms, and competition harassment raise the price of final products
without necessarily providing anything new for consumers or follow-on innovators.
Patent bullying may be another tactic used by manufacturers. The purpose may be to
increase costs for competitors, to gain competitor technology, or to push someone out of the
market.547 This is most effective when the party obtains a weak patent and uses the threat of
litigation as leverage in its negotiations to obtain a nuisance settlement. Again, this tactic does
not increase innovation, except where the “patent bully” gains access to a competitor’s
technology. However, the licensing fees will raise the cost of production by increasing costs or
pushing a competitor out of the market. This makes the consumer poorer, while doing nothing to
encourage innovation. Because patents are obtained to inconvenience competitors and to gain
royalties, this practice differs little from trolling practices.
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Clearly, “trolls” are not alone in perpetrating wasteful and inefficient transactions.
Defensive patents, pre-empting patents, bullying competitors, and cross-licensing are all reasons
for patenting that involve patented rights but not the underlying invention. The common
characteristic among these transactions is that the rights are significant while the underlying
technology may be utterly insignificant to the party obtaining a patent.
Given the variety of business practices involving patent transactions, it has become
increasingly difficult to distinguish “legitimate” from “illegitimate” practices. However, none of
the transactions are illegal.548 Using the term “troll” further obfuscates legitimate discussion
about the patent system since it immediately assumes that entities labeled trolls are involved in
“illegitimate” patent use while other uses are legitimate. All the transactions described are
actually legitimate, but the question is whether they actually meet the goals of the patent system.
Competition laws may also find these transactions acceptable but delving into that area is beyond
the scope of this work. 549 Even if competition laws become part of the analysis, an accused
infringer must go to court to resolve these issues and may face a preliminary injunction until
these issues can be resolved. These are all practices that use the threat of litigation to force
royalty payments. For all but cross-licensing, remedy decisions may encourage or discourage
recourse to the courts. Thus preoccupation with the impact of trolls on the patent system may
actually be somewhat moot.
Since it is not easy to identify the “evil troll”, it is still worth examining the powers that
courts have when awarding patent infringement remedies. Analyzing remedies will allow insight
into whether courts have difficulty reaching reasonable decisions when dealing with nonpracticing entities. Remedy analysis can also reveal whether any distinguishing characteristics
of such decisions are justifiable under the goals of a patent system.
Why Trolls Succeed in the Current Systems – Strong Propertization?

Fischer and Henkel concluded that: 1) patents obtained by trolls are generally broad and
have a high likelihood of being infringed; 2) the patents are generally part of “thickets” and have
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a high substitution cost; and 3) the patents tend to be of higher quality than those of practicing
entities, leading to a higher probability that patent validity will be upheld by a court.550
Patent trolls are active buyers and sellers of patents, purchasing or in-licensing patents in
an effort to obtain revenues through reselling the patent or through licensing agreements.551
These transactions are only helped by a system that encourages strong property rights and a
system that separates rights in the patent from rights in the invention. Trolls purchase patents
solely for their exclusion rights and not for the underlying technology. They then use the patent
in transactions to sell or license patent rights to an entity already using the patented technology.
These patent-only transactions are a key part of the business model used by trolls.552 However,
there is nothing illegal about transactions that are concerned with patent rights as opposed to the
underlying innovation. Buying, selling, and licensing patents and the rights to use the underlying
technology are perfectly legitimate actions. Wi-Lan, Mosaid, Inpro, and Intellectual Ventures all
conduct some form of research and development. These are all perceived patent trolls but they
are not merely buyers, sellers, and licensors of patents. However, buying, selling, licensing, and
litigation are a significant portion of business for each of these companies.
There has been a general belief that patent trolls purchase patents of dubious quality;
however, Henkel and Fischer conducted a study that determined that this was not the case.553
Three business strategies or combinations of strategies indicate that trolls are more likely to
pursue higher quality patents. The first strategy is an injunction-based strategy. Only the
injunctive strategy can successfully induce an infringer to settle based on a low-quality patent.
The threat of an injunction could result in an immediate impact on the infringer while invalidity
550
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proceedings to overturn the patent could take years. Thus the threat of an injunction may result in
a nuisance settlement. The second strategy is a damage-based strategy. A damage-based
strategy requires a higher quality patent since the troll is going after a monetary award from a
court, and invalidity proceedings are generally part of litigation. Not only will a troll have to
show that there is infringement, but it will also have to overcome an invalidity defense by the
infringer before being able to collect monetary damages. The third strategy is a cost-switching
strategy. A troll uses a cost-switching strategy because it would be too costly for the infringer to
switch to a non-infringing strategy. This strategy requires a high quality patent so that it is either
apparent that the infringer’s product or process is part of the patented innovation, or that the
patent is strong enough to overcome an invalidity proceeding. The latter two strategies take
time, and higher quality patents are required to overcome an invalidity proceeding in order to
obtain a monetary remedy.
Henkel’s and Fischer’s study has flaws due to a relatively small sampling of patent trolls
that fall under their definition. If trolls were always purchasing high quality patents, there would
be less of a debate against trolls. Plaintiffs, armed only with a patent and little other assets make
reprisals and countersuits difficult. Furthermore, they ignore the cost-benefit analysis that many
companies perform on whether to pay a royalty or litigate. They do not take into account the
impact of litigation costs versus royalty demands which has led many companies to pay the
royalty demand rather than litigate.
A recent report published by the U.S. Government Accountability Office on patent
litigation indicates that patents of dubious quality are in fact the source of much litigation.554
Patents with overbroad claims and unclear boundaries are the source of most disputes, whether
involving non-practicing entities or not. While the report minimizes the impact of non-practicing
entities, it also notes that a consistent twenty percent of all litigation in the United States is the
product of non-practicing entities.555
Other commentators have held that patent trolls tend to focus on software, electronics,
and other high-tech devices because of the complexity of the devices and because the devices are
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composed of parts covered by several patents. 556 In the U.S., forty-six percent of all patent
lawsuits involved software.557 Mobile phone devices may be covered by several hundred
patents, with smartphones involving between 50,000 and 250,000 patented technologies.558 This
is also an area of prolific patenting because of high competition, changing consumer tastes,
changing consumer usage, and rapidly changing technology. Trolls have much less of an impact
in areas outside of electronics. Nonetheless, it is within these areas that trolls seem to thrive.
Business methods are yet another area where trolls seem to be thriving.559 This area has
been controversial but also appears to be ripe for litigation, usually because of the dubious
subject matter to which patents are being awarded. Nonetheless, Canada and the U.S. allow
these types of patents.
Furthermore, a review of companies with troll-like behavior indicates that trolls tend to
purchase patents from smaller firms and not from large, practicing firms.560 Trolls also tend to
purchase older patents 1) with more forward citations, 2) with few family members, 3) that are
related to complex and crowded technology fields, 4) with many claims, and 5) with more nonpatent literature references.561 These factors make it less likely that such patents will be found
invalid. Patents are also selected if they have a high probability of being infringed focusing on
high quality (legally defensible) patents in dense technology fields.562 These patents will
generally have underlying innovations with high substitution costs.563 These findings indicate
that trolls search for more obscure patents that cover innovations that have not been successfully
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marketed, but which cover areas where existing technologies are likely to infringe the patent.
Trolls operate in areas where the cost of coming up with an alternative is prohibitive.
Trolls have an advantage over practicing entities when it comes to identifying and
purchasing patents.564 Patent trolls hire people with the expertise to identify suitable patents and
to extract value from patents.565 The business model also involves a willingness to have courts
settle disputes. By contrast, practicing firms are generally in the business of using the patented
invention and will extract value through the patents by practicing the invention, by preventing
imitation, cross-licensing, or potentially by licensing the innovation.566 Companies will
generally try to avoid settling disputes in court. Even if some of the research they conduct is not
traditional, they have a significant expertise in researching patents.
Yet another advantage that trolls have over manufacturing entities is that patent trolls are
immune to a countersuit.567 This is because a non-practicing entity that is awarded an injunction
against a manufacturer can prevent the manufacturer from making the invention while a
countersuit by the manufacturer will have no effect because the non-practicing entity does not
make anything.
Patent trolls would seem to have developed a sustainable business model. Trolls provide
smaller companies with a willing buyer, something that the seller may normally not have. Trolls
are also willing to enforce their patent rights. Strong property rights encourage trolls to use the
threat of an injunction or litigation, especially since high substitution costs provide leverage over
potential infringers.568 Finally, trolls have created a business model which uses technical
expertise to pursue patents that are likely to be infringed, and they use legal expertise to drive
litigation.
Trolls can be difficult to identify. Information on actual trolls tends to be limited because
of several factors. Most companies are very quiet and few are public companies. Rarely do
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infringement suits proceed to trial.569 Even if a trial commences, patent trials often end when
infringement is found and the parties negotiate their own licensing agreement. Many patent
cases end up being settled between the parties and do not reach final judgment.570 Settlements are
not part of the public record, and this limits understanding of how the system works in
practice.571
Another significant issue, when assessing the viability of a patent troll business model, is
the existence of a “working requirement.” In Canada, the U.S., and the U.K there is no
requirement to use the patent. Even if such a requirement existed, it is often quite difficult to tell
whether a patent is actually being “used.” A company may be conducting research with a patent
invention. It is also not easy to decide on the number of produced products which would
constitute manufacturing.
Abuse laws in Canada and England exist but they are applicable in very narrow
circumstances and come with very stringent criteria. To take advantage of these abuse laws,
applicants must make significant attempts to negotiate a license and no non-infringing
alternatives can exist. Finally, consumer demand must exist for a product that is being prevented
from being used in the marketplace.
Despite the lack of a use requirement, patent holders are still entitled to some
compensation under current laws when they do not use their patented innovation. Nonetheless,
non-practicing entities will likely not have recourse to an accounting for profits in Canada and
the U.K., and the non-practicing-entities will not have recourse to lost profits in any of the three
jurisdictions. Furthermore, while injunctions are commonly awarded, they are still equitable
remedies in all three jurisdictions and can be awarded at the discretion of the courts.
It has been shown that the patent troll business model will likely continue to be
successful. The business model will continue because 1) determining patent boundaries is
complicated, making it difficult for inventors to determine whether a new product will infringe;
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2) there are an ever increasing number of patent application filings; 3) not all countries have
made legal changes to curb trolls; 4) laws requiring patent practice may easily be circumvented
by creating nominal production facilities; and 5) the switch-cost based strategy is not affected by
any of the current legal changes.572 Other reasons that trolls have found success is that
technology is rapidly changing; thus, small innovations to existing technology become
patentable. This creates a low barrier to competition entry but has also led to patent thickets.
The electronics field has many small companies competing for an advantage or for a niche in the
marketplace. Business methods and software patents could increase trolling behavior. The
barriers to entry in these fields are relatively low, allowing individuals and small investors to
enter the marketplace. Electronics, business methods, and software sectors have relatively low
barriers to entry, making these areas popular for trolling. By contrast, the chemical,
pharmaceutical, and biotech fields have high barriers to entry because of high research and
development costs and heavy regulation. Thus certain technological areas are more amenable to
trolling than others.
The trolling business model has been so successful that large technology companies such
as IBM, Microsoft, Apple, and others have started to develop aggressive patent purchasing and
enforcement strategies to compete with trolls for technology, while at the same time developing
defensive strategies to mitigate the success of trolling against them. IBM has become a
forerunner in adopting trolling practices into its business strategy. Recently, IBM established an
SPE to which it sold its patent portfolio. In the transaction, IBM maintains a non-exclusive
license to all patents it sells to the SPE, while the SPE pays regular royalties from the patent
portfolio. The SPE completely focuses on licensing and litigation while IBM maintains its core
business. Other companies such as Apple, Research in Motion, EMC, Ericsson, Sony, and
Microsoft have purchased Nortel’s patent portfolio and licenses from bankruptcy court in a
consortium called Rockstar. Rockstar has now become an enforcement company, searching for
infringers or potential infringers.573
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Patents, Non-Practicing Entities and Property Rules
While increased innovation is the goal of the patent system and propertization is believed
to create a significant incentive for inventors to innovate, it is not quite clear whether the
incentive helps achieve the system’s goal. Under the current patent systems in Canada, England,
and the U.S., there appears to be great motivation to patent but less motivation to commercialize
the innovation. Stronger patent rights have encouraged patent applications and resulted in a
steady increase in patents issued. While innovations are still coming out of these patents, and
some of these innovations are being marketed, not all patents can successfully be put into
practice. The combination of patent volumes and limited resources has also created other
business niches and an increase in strategic behavior. Patent applicants have numerous
motivations for filing a patent. While protecting a practiced innovation may be one reason to
patent, there are a number of other common motivators that merely increase costs through
royalty demands and the threat of litigation. A robust marketplace for patent transactions has
evolved as has the litigation market. The patent transaction marketplace indicates that there is
significant trade in patents and portfolio licensing, but there is no clear indication that these
increased patent transactions are actually leading to increased practice or innovation application.
Furthermore, the incentive offered by a patent may be working to increase paper patents and
royalty revenues rather than actual innovation. Patent accumulation rather than innovation
acquisition has become common and appears to be a side effect of patenting incentives.
Accumulation is also a by-product of the view that patents are valuable assets. This view
has led companies to create strategies where patents become used to generate regular revenue
streams. With some non-practicing entities, investor demand for returns has helped fuel
litigation.574
With the increase in patenting motivators, patent use or practice becomes a concern as
other revenue generating strategies are employed by patent owners. Resource limitations are one
reason why patent holders may not choose to market their patented innovations. However,
strategic reasons are also a consideration as to why technological innovations may not be
entering the marketplace. Active attempts to recover research and development dollars have
created a niche for patent trolls. These attempts have also caused companies with large research
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and development expenditures to create intellectual property departments that aggressively seek
royalty revenues. Some companies have learned from patent trolls, spinning-off their intellectual
property portfolios into aggressive enforcement and licensing companies.
Both trolls and enforcement and licensing companies have discovered that litigation
threats can be used to obtain royalties, regardless of whether there is actual infringement or not.
Their goal is to resell patents or obtain licensing royalties. It is not to practice the innovation.
Their interest in a patent is solely for its exclusion rights which may generate royalties. Trolls
and enforcement licensing companies are not interested in the underlying technology. These
companies rarely engage in transactions involving technology transfer. The property right to
exclude creates an incentive in transactions involving the patent itself, not ones concerned with
the underlying innovation. Furthermore, the right to exclude creates greater incentive to enforce
the patent than it does to make or use the patented innovation. This behavior challenges the
belief that increased patent rights improve market functions for technology and calls into
question the wisdom of strengthening property rights.575
Current market theory assumes that a patent and the underlying technology are tied
together, so that a benefit for sellers, buyers, and society exists as the technology is transferred to
the more efficient user.576 Trolls, however, create a market for patents but not for the underlying
technology.577 Their business profitability relies on rents or reselling the patent, with no use for
the underlying technology. Cross-licensing is another transaction which may involve both the
patent and innovation but often involves only the patent, not the underlying technology.
There is a separation between the patent as a thing and the underlying innovation as a
thing. This presents a problem because a patent creates a property right, but the underlying
invention can be created independently of patent ownership. The two are not necessarily tied
together, and a property right can exist in both the patent and the invention. Owning a patent
will not prevent another from independently coming up with the innovation. It is also possible
for patent owners to have no knowledge of the underlying technology or who practices it.578
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This last point further illustrates the indifference to innovation that comes with some forms of
patent ownership.
A troll’s interest in a patent is to obtain royalty payments. In many cases, trolls seek
these payments from companies that were aware of the patented innovation; but, due to patent
enforcement costs, the patentee sold the patent to trolls for enforcement. These situations tend to
get resolved through negotiations. There are also many situations where royalty payments are
being demanded from parties who developed an innovation independently of the patent and were
unaware that a patent existed. The innovation user has developed it independently of having a
patent or a patent’s incentives. This may result in a court battle. A third situation in which trolls
purchase patents occurs because the patents cover technologies similar to existing technologies.
In this third case, determining non-infringement will require a long, protracted court case, and
alleged infringers are likely to pay a nuisance royalty rather than await the uncertainty of a court
decision. These latter two situations are the ones that seem to fly in the face of the goals of the
patent system. Without adding any kind of new innovation to the marketplace, both tactics
generate revenue for the patent holder, while increasing costs for the technology user and the
ultimate consumer.
The right to exclude can be wielded with considerable power. With complex
technologies, a purchaser that obtains a patent for a relatively minor part can threaten the already
producing technological manufacturer with an injunction unless the manufacturer agrees to pay a
substantial royalty.579 People who argue that trolls are performing a genuine market-making
function by acting as middlemen to transactions between sellers and buyers ignore the impact of
these transactions. These middlemen do not perform their own research and development, nor do
they add to the existing innovative pool. They merely increase the volume of litigation. Some
have likened trolling behavior to a form of blackmail, an act with no social virtue or benefit.580
However, in all fairness to that assessment, alleged trolls do provide a means by which inventors
and innovators, who put in the time and labor to develop the innovation, can collect royalties
from entities that use their patented innovations. In particular, these entities may help small
companies and sole inventors against infringement from large companies.
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Cross-licensors do not really care whether or not a patent is being infringed. They
exchange money solely based on patent numbers. There is no indication that either party to the
agreement is actually infringing the other’s patents. Money is exchanged as a form of mutual
insurance and to prevent a legal battle that may cover hundreds of patents. A cross-license
appeals to businesses because it is a privately negotiated settlement. This solution also prevents
even greater resources from being devoted to legal battles. Nonetheless, despite its appeal to
businesses, a cross-license creates a situation where money is being spent for technology that has
already been created, or for technology that will not be used, or for paper patents. Many
businesses are willing to enter into cross-licensing agreements, but these agreements do not
necessarily increase innovation.
Strategic filing should also be more of a concern. While strategic tactics generate
revenue for patent holders through royalty demands, these patents tend to stifle innovation or, at
the very least, increase competitor costs. Despite being legal, these strategies do not increase
innovation nor do they help market an innovation. In the battle against trolls, these strategies
have largely been ignored as being an impediment to innovation. Increasingly strong property
rules have led to an increased effectiveness of the exclusion powers of patents.
Growth of patenting and propertization has increased rent-seeking behavior. The right to
exclude is used as a threat to motivate alleged infringers into signing licensing agreements.
While rent-seeking is not necessarily bad, rent-seeking combined with transactions that diminish
and suppress innovation seems to have a negative impact on society and goes contrary to the
goals of a patent system. 581
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Chapter Four
As a result of the outcry over patent trolls, there has been much analysis, particularly
economic analysis, to either support or condemn the practice. Economic analysis has also been
applied to determine potential consequences of remedies in this field. A significant portion only
focuses on the incentive aspects: whether or not a particular damage remedy will provide
sufficient incentive to encourage inventors to innovate and make their innovations public.
Another portion of the analysis focuses on compensation. One group of researchers attempts to
determine the optimal compensation an inventor should have while other researchers take an
ideological propertization approach to compensation. Both seem to make the assumption that
patent protection exists to encourage innovation without looking at the greater question of why
and for whom? Neither view seems to take into account the impact on the greater patent system,
including follow-on inventors and the general public. There appears to be very little examination
of who the beneficiaries are under any remedy analysis. There is also very limited analysis of
how remedies encourage innovation marketing. Whether greater protection actually leads to
greater innovation is questionable. Furthermore, greater innovation does not necessarily entail
greater commercialization or public benefit.
There are many reasons for an inventor to obtain a patent. If the purpose of patent
protection is solely to encourage innovation, then the current system appears to offer some
incentive in all three jurisdictions. However, if the goal is to encourage innovation marketing,
then patent remedies may not be sufficient and the debate among U.S. scholars between property
and liability rules is too narrow. Remedies are merely the final stage in a patent infringement
dispute, and other factors may be playing a role in limiting effectiveness of the current system to
encourage innovation and commercialization.
Outside the United States, the approach to patent trolls has been more measured.
Commentators, such as David Vaver, have not been nearly as alarmed as U.S. commentators
have been in regards to non-practicing entities. The injunction is a standard remedy in both
Canada and England, and there is no reason why a court is unable to examine the situation
without ignoring the impact on parties beyond the ones directly in dispute. There has also been a
reluctance to embrace an economic analysis of patent remedies. This section will examine some
of the most prominent commentators who used law and economics theory to support a particular
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remedy approach and will indicate some of the limitations of their analysis. Much attention has
been devoted to remedy analysis, but there are other areas of patent systems which may need
further examination to encourage them to better meet their goals.582
Lemley and Shapiro take the approach that current remedy systems amount to a “holdup”
that unfairly burdens infringers, particularly when alleged patent trolls and non-practicing
entities are the patent owners. They believe that not only are royalties awarded by the courts too
high, but that an injunction should be denied for the entire class of non-practicing entities. Sidak
and Golden disagree with the “holdup” view and believe that an injunction is an essential part of
the remedy in order for inventors to receive the appropriate value for their innovative
contributions. Without the incentive of an injunction, innovation will decline and inventors will
attempt to keep their creations secret. Robert Merges also indicates a preference for injunction
awards especially in a situation where, like the eBay decision, courts have the responsibility of
analyzing a situation and tailoring the award to fit the harm. He believes that legislators should
stay out of the patent debate and let the courts create appropriate remedies.
Economic analysis often fails because it is not used to look at the purpose of a patent
system, beyond the incentive to innovate. A true economic analysis should examine the impact
on each of the parties or stakeholders in a system. That is, it should look beyond the benefits or
detriments suffered merely by patentee and infringer. The general public or consumers are often
neglected parties in a patent system analysis, as are follow-on inventors who build on existing
inventions. Trolls and troll-like practices focus on the patents themselves, divorced from the
underlying innovation. There should also be some examination as to why an approach that
works for physical property should be applied to intangible property. When absolute property
rights are discussed, confusion over patent boundaries is often ignored. Boundary confusion is
common and it is often used to extract royalties from independent inventors. An additional
aspect of remedies is the means of redress. In order for a party to obtain a remedy a patent
owner must use the courts. This may seem obvious but the process entails costs and procedures,
which are part of the remedy analysis. Finally, several patent strategies raise the cost of
manufacturing and research because they involve paper patents and litigation. The current policy
to encourage patent applications may help to encourage some innovation but it has also come
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with a significant number of paper patent applications, not patent innovation commercialization.
This is common in electronics. Paper patents are part of a strategy used to extend the monopoly
of existing products by capturing the surrounding area and preventing others from using
innovations that fall into that intellectual territory. Paper patents are not put into practice. These
strategies are often ignored in economic analysis that focuses on trolls; but this too creates great
inefficiency. Cost and increased litigation arise as a consequence of such strategies. Also, such
strategies entail anti-competitive behavior. While, anti-competition laws are beyond the scope of
this work, the exclusion rights created by a patent may often limit competition.
A significant assumption that law and economics analysts seem to make is that a patent
owner intends to commercialize the patented invention. Economists concede the deadweight
costs due to a monopoly, but the cost of using a patent merely to exclude is often ignored as part
of the economic analysis.583 Purposeful non-use is perfectly valid in the U.S. Non-use is also
valid in Canada and England, however, a patent misuse process exists to prevent abuses. Even if
patent misuse is pursued, the requirements are relatively narrow and may frustrate pursuers
rather than encourage patent use. Actually using a patented innovation is not so simple and use
requirements or minimal thresholds can lead to remedy complications. It is also very common
not to use the innovation but to pursue only licensing opportunities. Thus it seems that patent
non-use and rent collection should also be considered as part of the economic analysis.
The law and economics approach to patent remedy analysis may provide some interesting
insight for patent policy development. However, examining patent remedies with an eye towards
justifying legal approaches through the lens of economics creates a distorted view that highlights
certain elements but ignores others. If one is to develop an economic analysis of patent
remedies, then analysts should include all factors and not resort to short-cuts that ignore many
significant elements. Commentators should also indicate which factors could not be quantified
or which factors were ignored for economic analysis when presenting their final findings.
Finally, given all of the analysis based on economics, the theoretical approaches used by many
analysts require support from empirical data.
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The eBay v. MercExchange Decision
One of the cases that caused an outrage over automatic injunctions upon finding
infringement was the highly publicized Research in Motion (RIM) v. NTP case.584 The
settlement was made under the threat of an injunction which would have shut down the entire
Blackberry e-mail network in the U.S., crippling not only corporate messaging but also some
government communications. Ultimately, RIM paid over six hundred million dollars to clear all
claims by NTP.
Following closely on the heels of the RIM decision, was eBay v. MercExchange. The
eBay decision stemmed from another situation where a non-practicing entity, MercExchange,
was suing eBay, a practicing entity, for infringement. It is well known that eBay is the largest
online auction site and a sizeable company. An injunction against eBay would have potentially
shut down the website, affecting millions of users. The trial court refused to issue an injunction,
while the appeals court said that injunctions were the standard remedy upon a finding of
infringement. The Federal Circuit Court issued an injunction order, leading eBay to appeal. The
Supreme Court agreed that an injunction is a standard remedy but reaffirmed that it is an
equitable remedy which requires some analysis by trial courts before being granted. Upon
remand to the trial court, an injunction was not granted and only damages were awarded to
MercExchange.
The Supreme Court’s decision in eBay v. MercExchange had a significant impact on the
debate as to whether patents deserve an absolute property right. 585 In recent times, U.S. courts
have generally granted injunctions as a remedy for patent infringement, without considering the
implications of the decision. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has generally supported an
absolute property rights view. However, in the eBay decision, the Supreme Court pointed trial
courts away from precedents leaning towards an absolute property right and back to a
discretionary standard based on the rules of equity. Patents are still considered property, but
eBay is significant because the court reaffirms that while an injunction is an appropriate property
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remedy, such a remedy is nonetheless an equitable remedy. The eBay opinion stated that courts
should use a four factor test to determine whether a permanent injunction is warranted. While
the eBay factors have been mentioned earlier, it bears repeating here. To receive an injunction, a
plaintiff must show that: 1) it has suffered irreparable injury; 2) remedies available at law
(money damages), are inadequate to compensate for the injury; 3) considering the balance of
hardship between the plaintiff and the defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and 4) the
public interest will not be “disserved” by a permanent injunction. Since a permanent injunction
is an equitable remedy such awards are made at the discretion of the court.586 Through the
concurring opinions of Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, the court indicated that there is a
preference for awarding permanent injunction but that the right to exclude does not necessarily
dictate that the remedy will follow that right. Justice Roberts indicated that, for the purpose of
decision consistency, courts should follow precedent; and, since patents are property, an
injunction should still be the norm. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion supports a
presumption against granting permanent injunctions to non-practicing entities, because even if a
dispute involved property, a property remedy will not always be appropriate. Justice Kennedy
indicated that patent trolls are a sufficiently large problem in the United States that they
warranted exceptional treatment by courts.
Throughout the twentieth century, patents have, for the most part, been treated as if they
were property. Within the last thirty years there has been a dramatic increase in the number of
patent filings in the U.S., Canada, and in England (this includes both direct filing through the
United Kingdom’s Patent office and filings through the European Patent Office which come into
force due to the United Kingdom being a contracting party to the European Patent Convention).
When patent systems were originally developed the patent subject matter consisted of machines
and processes to build machines. More recently, there has been an increase in filings within new
subject matter categories such as software, business method, bio-chemicals, and genes.587 With
the increase in patentable subject matter, a patent owner’s compensation for infringement may
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come in the form of money damages; but a property remedy in the form of an injunction is still
considered the norm.
The concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy indicates that patent trolls were a significant
factor in his decision to recommend equitable considerations when awarding damages. The
increase in patent applications and patent awards has led to a trade in the patents themselves,
rather than the inventions underlying the patent. Furthermore, there has been an increase in
transactions involving patents where the purpose of the transaction is to get licensing income or
to obtain licensing income through a lawsuit. This has led to the legitimate question as to
whether an injunction should always be awarded upon finding infringement. There is a further
question regarding incentives that exist to encourage patent applications.
The eBay v. MercExchange (eBay) decision caused concerns around the patent world
because an injunction is a standard remedy in most countries. As has been seen, Canada and
England have denied injunctions only in the most exceptional situations. While the legal
precedents in both jurisdictions are firmly entrenched and there is a competent judiciary capable
of understanding patent lawsuits, there was still a fear that, because of market demands and
growing patent transactions, the courts would adopt a more flexible approach to damages in lieu
of an injunction. However, initial fears about diminished property rights and injunction denials
have not come to fruition.
The fallout from this case has been considerable debate about whether injunctions should
be awarded when the patent holder was a non-practicing entity. One side provided economic
analysis to show that non-practicing entities would be overcompensated relative to their
contribution if an injunction were granted. The other side provided economic data to show that
injunctions rarely overcompensate patent holders and denying injunctions to non-practicing
entities would create a slippery slope towards compulsory licenses and working-requirements for
patents. There has been much discussion on the impact remedies can have towards evolving
non-practice business activities.

Liability Calculations and the Pros and Cons of a Liability Rule System
A question raised by many commentators is whether a liability based system is superior
to a property based system, especially if non-practice is an issue. If liability rules are to be
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effective, they must result in calculable awards by the courts, they must adequately compensate,
and they must create a disincentive for infringement while creating an incentive for inventors. In
a pure liability system, the right to exclude would not be applicable. Instead, the patent owner
would be financially compensated for the infringement but the infringer could continue using the
innovation. However, this completely eliminates the property right preventing others from using
the patented invention or the right not to use the invention at all. This gives companies with
great resources an enormous advantage over smaller companies with limited resources. Well
funded companies could just infringe if they had the means to pay. The injunction could no
longer be used as leverage in negotiations. Also, small companies would have to chase large
companies through the courts to receive compensation, making legal costs the biggest
impediment to recovery for patent owners and those same costs as the largest source of leverage
in negotiations. The leverage would only be powerful if profits from using the patented
innovation were smaller than the potential legal costs or if those costs would sufficiently impact
the infringer’s use or profits if legal fees were required.
Liability based systems also seem to ignore the difficulty in making a party whole in
certain situations. It may not be possible to make a party whole when the economic fallout
includes loss of market share, loss of goodwill, falling stock prices and financial losses related to
the stock price, loss of convoyed sales, or even bankruptcy. There are also other innumerable
financial issues which may arise when a company is unable to sell a patented invention because
an infringer is stealing sales. Even with a financial infusion that could compensate for
infringement losses, a company may never recover because of other business factors. This also
raises the question of whether a liability rule may end up destroying two companies. The loss of
sales due to infringement or loss of profits due to pricing may be so great that a patent-owning
company may not be able to recover even with a damage award. It is also possible that the
damage award be so great that the infringer may not be able to survive paying damages. These
issues are far more significant for competing practicing entities and are not really an issue for
NPEs.
Blair and Cotter examined three types of infringement behavior in an attempt to
accurately model infringement damages and determine whether courts could competently and
accurately apply disgorgement calculations in the event of infringement. These examples are
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briefly covered below. Blair and Cotter show how infringement affects the profits of both the
patent owner and the infringer. While their examples all reflect the impact of infringement on
practicing entities and not non-practicing entities, these examples are nonetheless significant
because they show how patent owners are affected by infringement. Their examples also show
how disgorgement can actually undercompensate in certain situations.
The first behavior is known as Cournot behavior, where the patent owner and infringer
compete as a result of an increased quantity of patented goods on the market.588 Short-term
losses are the result of price erosion due to the increase in goods on the market, while over time
losses result because of lost sales and price erosion.
The second type of infringement behavior is known as Bertrand Behavior, where patentee
and infringer compete on price.589 A lower price set by an infringer will result in lost sales by the
patent holder. Over time, the holder will be forced to lower price in order to compete and will
lose both sales and profits due to lower pricing.
Both these types of behavior result in lower profits than could be obtained if the patent
owner were the sole patent user.
Finally, Chamberlain behavior is a situation in which the parties do not compete but split
sales between them.590 This results lost sales for the patent holder.
These three models indicate that damages are calculable and that differences between
actual profits and profits “but-for” the infringement can be determined.591 Calculations may be
complicated, but courts in all three jurisdictions are capable of calculating damages based on
these models. In all three jurisdictions, losses due to price erosion are understood to be part of
lost profit damage calculations. Courts are competent to determine damages due to price erosion,
entitling the patentee to receive damages from sales it would have made at its original selling
price but-for the infringement.592 Courts in all three jurisdictions are capable of handling burden
shifting issues, such as price erosion losses. The burden rests with the patentee, who must prove
588

Blair & Cotter, Supra note 4, at 52.
Blair & Cotter, Supra note 4, at 57.
590
Id. at 57.
591
Id. at 58-9.
592
Grenier, Supra, note 390, at 17-11
589

141

that losses were due to price reductions because of competition from the infringer and no other
factors.593
These three models also indicate that profit disgorgement will only effectively
compensate a practicing patent owner if the infringement fits the Chamberlain model. A lost
profit analysis or a reasonable royalty would be better suited to monetarily compensate the patent
holder. Assuming there are no other considerations in selecting a remedy, the competing entity
might better seek a lost-profits remedy which would more closely approach its actual losses.
This would also meet the liability rule goal of compensation and would make the infringed party
whole again by awarding the profits lost to infringement.
Blair and Cotter indicate that an idealized reasonable royalty calculation would lead to a
license agreement where 1) a patentee would not agree to a royalty less than the potential profits
the inventor could make manufacturing the invention himself; and 2) the infringer would agree to
a royalty that was no more than potential profits from using a non-infringing alternative.594 This
calculation assumes that the patent owner is either a practicing entity or one contemplating
practicing the innovation. If a patentee can earn higher profits manufacturing the invention, then
the patentee would not grant a license and this would result in a lost profits calculation, or a
disgorgement calculation outside the U.S. Under this reasoning, an NPE would not agree to a
royalty less than the profits that could be made licensing the patent to others. However, this
would also require that a minimum royalty increase profits over, or in addition to, existing
licensing royalties. The calculation assumes that the profit motivation is the reason for obtaining
a patent. However, as has been shown, there are a number of reasons to patent and a number of
reasons which could increase royalty demands or lead to outright denials of licenses.
As has been shown through the three models, the lost profits remedy will more accurately
compensate the patent holder in most situations whereas disgorgement will likely
undercompensate. However, if lost profits and disgorgement cannot be calculated, a reasonable
royalty calculation still exists to serve as a deterrent.595 In Canada - despite the shortfall shown
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in two of the three models - strategic reasons, financial document exposure, and burdens of proof
are the major reasons why a company might consider an accounting of profits. The same reasons
also apply in England. Despite the models shown by Blair and Cotter, there is a perception that
an accounting of profits will actually yield larger returns for the patent owner in both Canada and
England.596
These three models apply to practicing entities. NPEs will suffer none of these losses
because NPEs do not make profits from the sale of patented goods, or from innovations using the
patent good, or from any practice of the patented good or process. Disgorgement will likely
result in a windfall for a patent owner. Reasonable royalties are the method by which NPEs will
receive compensation without unduly burdening the infringer. This is also a method which will
likely allow parties to present the least amount of information to the courts, to infringers, and
potentially to the public. In England infringing an NPE’s patent is treated as an improper
infringer gain which can require disgorgement of lost royalties to the patent owner.
The benefit of relying on a liability rule is that courts can act to more fairly distribute
damages, eliminating the need to remove goods from the marketplace, while still compensating a
licensor. If damage awards are supposed to compensate the infringed party and not necessarily
to punish the infringer, then liability rules remove personal motivation which would be present if
an injunction were granted. It also creates a system where infringement may be tolerated in
exchange for payments. This may amount to the dreaded compulsory license, but it is hard to
argue that this is necessarily unfair since the licensor is primarily seeking monetary
compensation. The difference would be between a court determined sum of money and a
negotiated sum of money. (The amount may actually be more or less than the court award). The
public may benefit because products already available on the market will remain on the market
after court proceedings have concluded. This would not be so in a property system.
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While liability rules cover compensation for patent infringement, a difficulty arises
because there is really nothing to prevent further or continued infringement without an
injunction, other penalties, or oversight. The inventor would not have the option of using an
injunction as leverage in negotiations prior to litigation. Currently, the motivation to come to an
agreement exists because of the double leverage of litigation costs and a potential injunction.
Avoiding the cost of litigation would be a potential reason for an infringer to agree to a
negotiated license but the threat of an injunction would be a missing compulsion. A further
drawback to a liability rule system is that this could encourage inventors to suppress innovations
and not make patent applications until there is marketing evidence of commercial viability.
Also, innovations that would compete with an inventor’s existing products would likely also be
suppressed rather than patented because there would be no way to prevent infringement.
Disgorging Profits - Concerns

Disgorging profits stems from the legal theory that ill-gotten profits attributable to the
infringement are held in trust for the patentee. Ordinarily, this is a remedy associated with
violations of tangible property rights. If intellectual property and tangible property are the same
when it comes to remedies, it would seem to follow that an award of infringer profits should be
given to the patent holder. An award of infringer profits can still be granted to a wronged party
in Canada and England and courts in both jurisdictions feel comfortable making these decisions.
Awarding the infringer’s profits to the patent holder was rejected by U.S. courts.597
Calculation complexity, the time-consuming nature of the award process, the expense of
obtaining valid accounting data for the calculations, and the belief that disgorgement amounted
to a windfall for the patent owner were all considerations. These concerns are still valid and are
factors which regularly raise questions about the validity of profit awards in Canada and
England.
A drawback to allowing an accounting of profits is that estimates are legally acceptable in
determining profits and adequate compensation based on those profits. This not only creates a
great uncertainty for parties in a dispute but can lead to awards that will overcompensate or
undercompensate parties. From a practical standpoint, an accounting can end up being a gamble
for the parties. A patent owner that elects for an accounting of profits may end up with nothing;
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or the owner may end up with all of the infringer’s profits; or he may even end up with an award
in between the actual profits and no profits. Furthermore, Blair and Cotter have shown that
under-compensation is often likely when infringer profits are the award.
Some of the concerns about improper calculations and estimates may be allayed due to
the existence of specialized courts in the United Kingdom. England’s patent courts are capable
of handling complex disputes. Such courts have some familiarity with accounting principles and
have the capability of dealing with complex financial records. Also, because these trial courts
have such specific jurisdiction, judges in these courts devote all their energy to patent
infringement issues.
While Canada does not have such specialized courts, patent disputes are most often
handled by federal trial courts with limited subject matter jurisdiction.598 Federal courts
regularly handle patent disputes and are thus capable of managing complex technological and
financial information presented to the courts. Furthermore, Canadian patent trials are usually
bifurcated into infringement disputes and damage disputes. If the parties do not come to an
agreement after infringement is resolved, damage awards fall to a tribunal dedicated to analyzing
damages. In theory, an experienced patent arbiter decides infringement damage awards or
disgorgement. The presence of specialized tribunals designed to assess the financial information
of the parties should work towards allaying some of the fears that the calculations will be wildly
speculative.
A further concern about disgorging profits is the potential for disproportionate damage
awards where NPEs are concerned. Given how uncertain patent boundaries are, even a diligent
party may fail to notice that the party’s actions may infringe on an existing patent. The potential
exists for an entity which sits on its patent to reap all of an infringer’s profits. Requiring an
infringer to disgorge all profits creates a very severe penalty for the infringer and will likely
increase the cost of a patent search before commencing any future technological endeavors.
Canadian courts have indicated wariness about granting an accounting of profits to NPEs.
In extreme cases an NPE may be able to make a compelling argument to receive all of an
infringer’s profits. Offsetting some of the concerns is that Canadian courts have made choosing
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an accounting of profits potentially risky because of the decision in Schmeiser v. Monsanto.
Courts can limit the remedy through a comparison of profits made using the patented product to
potential profits made using a non-infringing alternative. Thus even if an NPE is allowed to
choose an accounting of profits, its potential award may depend on the presence of noninfringing alternatives. It should also be remembered that an accounting of profits is an equitable
remedy, leaving courts with discretion over whether to grant the award.
In England, there appears to be no official limitation to awarding an account for profits to
an NPE. However, since it, too, is an equitable remedy, courts have discretion as to whether to
allow a patent holder to elect it. Furthermore, an accounting of profits is considered an extreme
remedy599, but an award of a reasonable royalty may still flow from an account of profits through
a loss of royalty rather than a loss of profits.
Because an account of profits is an equitable remedy, the various equity maxims should
apply. However, in Canada, a court recently stated that since an election for an accounting of
profits is statutorily available, the maxims of equity need not apply to the court’s discretion on
whether to allow a party to elect.600 This leaves a great deal of power in the hands of the judges
to decide whether or not to agree to an election for an accounting. Nonetheless, it is still
considered an equitable remedy and equitable results are part of the court’s discretion.
There are several arguments which fall on either side of the accounting of profit
argument. An absolute property view awards the infringer’s profits under a theory that gains
made illegally by using the property of another are really the rightful profits of the infringed
party. The absolute property view would seem to allow this award even for NPEs. Courts
consider non-practice when deciding whether to allow a patent owner to claim infringer profits.
But unlike lost profits, there is no need to show that the patent owner could have made the
infringer’s profits but for the infringement. An absolute property argument would allow
infringer profits to be collected by a non-practicing patent owner, since these profits were illgotten gains from improper property use.
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While an accounting of profits may not cover losses by a practicing entity, an NPE will
suffer no actual losses from diminished sales or price lowering, as described by Blair and Cotter.
The non-practicing entity will only have royalty losses as a result of these sales. Since current
patent policy in Canada, England, and the U.S. is to compensate and not to punish, this would
make disgorgement an unduly harsh remedy and a windfall for licensing companies or patent
trolls, since these entities are looking for royalty payments. This remedy would be even more
extreme if an infringer developed the invention independently of the patent and then faced a
claim for disgorgement by an NPE.
A final concern about disgorgement is apportionment. When a patented item is a small
part of the infringer’s innovation, determining what part of profits are the result of the infringing
item is a complex process. Estimates are common, and commentators seeking accurate or exact
calculations will have issues with calculation assumptions and methods.
Issues with Royalty Calculations

The willing licensor/licensee assumption or hypothetical negotiation and the 25% rule
pose problems for determining an accurate royalty rate. The first issue is that a valid patent
exists to determine this rate, whereas a real negotiation would assume uncertain patent validity
and infringement.601 The second issue is that courts, to determine the royalty rate, may end up
using or being influenced by events that occur after infringement, thereby removing further
uncertainty which would exist in a real negotiation.602 Both issues would seem to inflate the
royalty rate beyond an actual negotiated royalty. Removing uncertainty would also appear to
favor the patent owner, since patent uncertainty is expected as part of any licensing agreement.
While a reasonable royalty may leave the infringed party no worse off than before the
infringement, infringers still face a significant penalty because of litigation costs and the general
coupling of an injunction with a royalty payment for infringement.603 The injunction becomes a
greater factor when the injunction is wielded by an NPE to obtain royalties that are likely in
excess of those awarded by the court.
In the U.S. each party pays its own court costs and lawyer’s fees. However, an inflated
royalty may actually off-set some of the expense of enforcing a patent. If a royalty is actually
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inflated because uncertainty is eliminated, infringers in Canadian or English courts may face a
significant burden, since the loser pays most or all of the costs (although in practice, this will
likely be significantly less than the total legal costs).604
A third issue with the reasonable royalty calculation is that a willing licensor and licensee
may not actually reach an agreement, making the royalty calculation a substitute for lost profits
of an NPE.605 All three jurisdictions assume that the parties would willingly come to an
agreement at the time of infringement.
A final issue is determining royalty rates when the patented innovation is merely a part of
a product versus royalty rates when the patented innovation is the reason for market demand. In
the former situation apportionment is used to determine the royalty rates while in the latter
situation, an entire market calculation is used to determine rates.606 Apportionment can become
very complicated when the patented component is but a small part of the complete product and is
not necessarily a significant factor in driving market demand.
Despite the fact that royalty calculations are neither easily calculable nor necessarily an
accurate reflection of a non-adjudicated negotiation, they meet the legal requirement that the
royalty be reasonable and that the royalty attempts to compensate rather than punish. The
attempt is what is significant and a perfect remedy is not necessary. The lack of perfection in
these calculations is still within the legal goals of the remedies and part of the three approaches
taken by the courts towards compensation.

Strong Property Rights
There are reasons why the current system maintains property remedies when dealing with
patents. A significant reason is that they can be a good solution to a problem and should not be
discounted. Strong property rights, and thus injunctions, encourage private solutions through
negotiations between the parties rather than public solutions created by the courts or
governments. All three jurisdictions under examination support free-market systems. Such
systems encourage negotiations between disputing parties and discourage government
intervention. There is clearly a place for property remedies.
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In a system where the patent owner and infringer are competitors, the patent system goals
of increased innovation and public access to the innovation would still be maintained. If the
patent owner and the infringer are competing entities, an injunction may be suited to allow the
patent owner to prevent competition in its effort to market the innovation to the public. Any
compensation that would come in the form of disgorgement would be justified since these would
be the profits made using the property of the patent owner, and would, thus, be profits which
should belong to the patent owner. Disgorgement is a relatively large penalty and is intended to
make the infringer wary of infringing on the technologies of its competitors. In both Canada and
the U.K. disgorgement is not considered part of the damages remedy. Despite the unavailability
of disgorgement as a remedy in the U.S., injunctions are often awarded in conjunction with
damages in all three jurisdictions. However, if the focus of property remedies remains on the
injunction, since it is common to all three jurisdictions, the remedy will not remove the
innovative product from the marketplace. Even if the infringer is prevented from using the
patent innovation, the patent owner will still practice the innovation and produce goods for the
marketplace (although the patent holder may be less efficient or less able to produce in the
volumes demanded).
An injunction award may actually increase public access because an infringer will be
willing to negotiate to still be allowed to use the patented innovation; and the patent owner, for
additional profits, may allow use of the innovation. Lemley and Shapiro have illustrated how
detrimental market absence can be for a company facing an injunction.607 The infringer can
negotiate to maintain market share that it has already established or it can negotiate alternate uses
which the patent owner may allow for a royalty payment.
There is one school of thought that believes that without a right to injunctive relief, a
patent will be worth considerably less. Robert Merges has stated that because of the loss of
value, the incentive to invent would not only be diminished but might disappear.608 Using
injunctive relief as a bargaining chip in negotiations may sometimes lead to overcompensation
when compared to the actual worth of the patents; but court-imposed, money damage systems
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will likely undercompensate inventors, thereby removing the incentive to innovate.609 This
reasoning only focuses on the patent goal of encouraging innovation. Furthermore, a slippery
slope argument does not lend itself to a moderate solution but encourages a solution embracing
one of the extreme situations proposed. The patent is also but one incentive to innovate. Prior to
patent protection, people were still innovating and it is likely that alternative innovation
strategies will also arise if an injunction disappears.
From a cost/benefit standpoint, Landes and Posner indicate that it is not clear whether
patent protection in fact creates a net benefit. They recognize that there are economic factors
which require some form of protection. While they provide reasons that support creating
property rights in inventions, they also indicate that propertization creates significant social
costs.610 Economic dead-weight is one significant social cost. A second cost is the arbitrariness
of the patent markup, especially for a successful product. A patentee’s monopoly markup is
influenced by the degree of patent protection but has no bearing on the actual fixed costs
incurred in making the invention. Potentially, a patentee will be able to charge higher prices,
relative to marginal cost, resulting in profits that will be significantly higher than the costs
incurred in making the invention. This will likely be the case for a particularly successful
innovation. Property rights will restrict access to the patented invention more than is actually
necessary to create incentives. Landes and Posner also point out that such circumstances will
create an incentive towards rent-seeking behavior because of the windfalls arising out of over
protection and monopolistic behavior. 611 They also believe there is a disincentive to
commercialize the patented innovation and a greater incentive to license.612
The rise of patent trolls or other non-practicing entities is a direct result of the incentive
created by strong property rules. Amy Landers uses the term “liquid patent” for patents that are
being treated as assets. Liquid patents are patents that are being traded as commodities, not
agreements which provide protections as a reward for innovation and the subsequent
commercialization of the innovation. The statutes in all three jurisdictions will allow a nonpracticing entity, just like a practicing entity, to seek an injunction. These strong property rights
609
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encourage innovation; but patent accumulation, rather than commercializing innovations, has
been the result of these policies. A focus on innovation has increased the number of patent
applications and patents granted, but there is less of an incentive to market innovations.613
Through an injunction grant, a non-practicing entity may exercise the right to exclude a patent
infringer from practicing the innovation. The injunction creates an incentive to obtain a patent
but it does not necessarily provide an incentive to take on the risk of marketing the innovation. It
is cheaper and potentially more profitable to wait for someone to infringe the patent. The social
cost in this situation could be as high as removing the innovation from the marketplace.
However, while a non-practicing entity will attempt to seek as high a rent as possible, it is not
likely that it will demand rent that is so high as to have the infringer shut down production.
Severin De Wit points out that patents are actually illiquid assets since they are not easily
tradable and inventors generally have to discover markets for these assets.614 It is for this reason
that trolls and other NPEs become important. Such companies actually create markets in their
search for patents which can be used in their business model. However, NPEs are not the only
bodies which create markets. While patents are not easily tradable, there is an increase in patent
auctions, at least in the U.S.615 Furthermore, while patents may not be easily tradable, their trade
has increased, particularly for the rights that come with patents rather than for the underlying
innovations.
While property protection plays a role in fostering progress and invention, over-strong
protection could stunt innovation which is dependent on the cumulative nature of knowledge.616
Since exclusion power belongs to the patent holder, a broad application of this power can be
used to prevent patented technologies from being commercialized. These strong rights might
also prevent optimal use of IP resources because of the high transaction costs in obtaining
licenses.617 In Coase’s transaction theorem, if the transaction costs are zero, property rights
allocations will eventually be transferred “to their highest-value use through private bargains.”618
However, if transaction costs are greater than zero, the costs may prevent property from being
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transferred for its highest price and greatest use. Transaction costs can involve elements such as
negotiation time and effort, contract costs, appraisals, and boundary surveys. These costs can
often be very high and will result in less efficient or non-existent property transfer and use. If the
purchaser finds property that may be ideal for her purposes, transactions costs may be so high
that the purchaser will seek less ideal property or not purchase any property at all.
Coase’s theorem was initially applied to physical property but it can be applied to patent
transactions where it is certain that either a patent right exists or does not exist. However,
applying the theorem to intellectual property rights creates a problem because of a patent’s
intangible nature. It is the intangible nature of patents which makes infringement detection
difficult because infringement, boundaries, and patent validity are often unclear or in dispute.
The value of prior patented creations on a current invention and the uncertainty over whether an
independently created invention infringes a previous one are further issues. Patent valuation is
also complicated as patented works can be cumulative and even interdependent. Neither
strategic behavior nor the use of blocking patents is part of the Coasian consideration. All these
complications indicate high transaction costs which will prevent efficient transactions.619
The Calabresi/Melamed model expanded on Coase’s theorem and may apply to patents.
The Calabresi/Melamed model advocates property rules as a default. However, if there are many
parties involved in a property transaction or the transaction is particularly complicated, raising
transaction costs, a liability rule may be better suited. Initially, a property rule would seem to
apply to patents because there are two parties to a transaction, transaction costs affect the two
parties, and courts have a difficult time properly determining the value of the patented invention
because of the complexity of the patented invention and specific market conditions.620
Furthermore, the property rule allows individual parties to negotiate in coming to a deal. The
parties are the most knowledgeable about their property and they can structure a deal that is best
suited to the two parties. However, transaction costs are not necessarily clear and there are often
situations where multiple parties are involved in patent transactions (non-exclusive licensing,
industry pools, and patents related to standards). Even in negotiations between two parties,
patent licensing can be complicated, often tying in to other patents held by the parties or other
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goods being sold. The transaction cost is increased if parties disagree on the extent of patent
boundaries or whether there is infringement. Disputes that involve the courts greatly increase the
transaction costs. When these transaction costs become high, it may be better to adopt a liability
rule. However, once the patent validity, boundaries, and infringement are made clear, the
transaction costs have been spent and further negotiations should theoretically be simple enough
to entail a property rule. Common opinion holds that the parties to a patent transaction are best
suited to accurately value the technology while courts are not well suited to determine the value
of complex, intellectual property transactions.621 This would indicate that courts should always
grant an injunction and then let the parties negotiate a settlement. However, if transaction costs
are taken into account because of unclear boundaries, validity, and infringement disputes, it
would seem to indicate that a liability rule is better suited than a property rule. Thus, the
Melamed/Calabresi rule seems to indicate that property rules should apply if the parties do not
have to resort to the courts to determine boundaries, infringement, and validity; but a liability
transaction may be better if the courts have to get involved. The economic analysis becomes
even more complicated when multiple parties are involves in disputes, leading to the conclusion
that perhaps a liability rule would be better suited and property rules should only apply in limited
situations.
There is a strong belief that the presence of strong property rights will actually facilitate
patent transactions rather than preventing them because private parties will force institutional
changes to lower transaction costs.622 Others argue that the pervasive transaction costs should
lead to a use of liability rules and even of compulsory licenses.623 Robert Merges has argued that
the current presence of high transaction costs in the emerging technological industry should not
be changed through government intervention but should be allowed, for the time being, to
resolve high transaction costs through private transactions.624 Strong property rules should
continue even in the face of high transaction costs because these property rules have led private
contractors to establish private liability rules through creation of patent pools. High tech
companies have had some moderate success in creating successful patent pools. Standards
organizations have also started creating patent pools in an effort to create a standard and to
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provide user companies with access to patents for a reasonable royalty. It is generally believed
that statutory liability rules enforced by courts lack the flexibility of private institutions and
institutional agreements, such as patent pools. This reasoning applies to all 3 jurisdictions, given
the power of the courts.
There is some merit in applying property rules to intellectual property. An injunction
award or the threat of an injunction encourages disputing parties to negotiate a solution rather
than have a court decide for them. A result is that those parties with the most information and
the most understanding of the issues being negotiated can custom tailor a solution to their needs.
A court imposed solution may be fair, but it may also favor one of the parties, or it may alienate
both parties. The uncertainty about transaction costs related to patents also indicates that liability
rules may be necessary to clear disagreements. There is further concern that a property rule,
particularly the threat of enforcing an injunction, can provide the patent holder with a great deal
of bargaining power. A non-practicing entity could end up with a windfall settlement from the
infringer. This is especially true for a patented component that is but a small part of a complex
device.

Compensation, the Holdup, Royalty Stacking and Non-Practicing Entities – The
Economic Debate
There is a school of thought led by Lemley and Shapiro that claims that injunctive relief
leads to a holdup and overcompensation. A patent holdup occurs when a patentee uses an
injunction award or the threat of injunction to gain exorbitant royalties, well in excess of the
value of the invention, from an infringer who is heavily invested in the use of the patented
technology.625 It is a form of blackmail that results in an economically inefficient transaction. If
a court awards an injunction upon finding infringement and patent validity, the patentee’s
bargaining position is extremely strong. The patentee can approach negotiations with the
infringer knowing that, if negotiations between them fail, the infringer must stop using the
patented innovation.626 Thus the infringer will have little choice but to agree to the royalty
demands of the patentee unless the infringer decides to leave the market to redesign the product
or the process to avoid infringement or decides to wait until the patent term expires. For an
infringer heavily invested in using the patented technology, the prospect of having to stop using
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it is costly.627 Thus the infringer will likely pay more than the actual value of the patent in order
to keep using the innovation.
Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro developed a benchmark for licensing royalties to
determine whether post injunction negotiations and court awards are excessive compared to prelitigation negotiations. U.S. law deems that a reasonable royalty should be the minimum damage
award and that damages should be based on a hypothetical negotiation by a willing licensor and
licensee at the time of infringement.628 Their benchmark royalty rate is an attempt to take into
account the patent infringement and validity uncertainty that a hypothetical licensor and licensee
face in coming to a royalty agreement. They found that negotiations prior to litigation
incorporate outcome uncertainty as part of the patent’s valuation, resulting in a rate proportional
to the patent strength. Since patent validity and infringement prior to litigation are uncertain,
royalties would be considerably lower than those negotiated with a clearly determined patent
validity and infringement outcome.
When the infringer gambles on winning in court without redesign and loses, the infringer
faces costs for redesign, plus lost sales due to market absence or the cost of meeting the patent
owner’s post-verdict royalty demands. Lemley and Shapiro calculated that the royalty rate in
this situation will be considerably higher than the benchmark rate. If the infringer chooses to
redesign during litigation, the infringer not only incurs the litigation costs but the redesign costs.
In situations where the patented invention is merely cosmetic or is not a significant sales driver,
all royalty above the benchmark rate can be considered a holdup and makes no economic
contribution.
Lemley and Shapiro have defined royalty stacking as the situation where the components
or manufacturing methods of a company’s single product are covered by several patents, leading
to multiple royalty payments to multiple parties.629 Royalty payments to multiple licensors cut
into the licensee’s profit margins and have a trickle-down effect in raising the cost of
downstream goods. Royalty stacking may also result in a net social detriment because price
increases for downstream products lower demand as well as output, resulting in larger economic
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deadweight losses.630 Such royalty stacking effects can be seen with electronic devices and
complex technologies that involve many components.
Since reasonable royalty calculations in the U.S. are supposed to be based on
hypothetical negotiations at the time of the infringement, Lemley and Shapiro theorize that a
court’s damage award is higher than the benchmark royalty. They support their theory by noting
that a considerable amount of risk and uncertainty, present in a real negotiation, are not present
when a court actually calculates reasonable royalty damages. Even if a court were to be able to
ignore its validity and infringement finding, the precedential damage findings, expert testimony,
and court calculation capability limitations have skewed royalties upward.631 A fourth factor to
consider is the presence of juries in U.S. patent infringement and damages trials. Juries are
believed to be more likely to award high damage awards rather than a judge or damages expert.
This suggests that court awards are also in excess of the benchmark rate.
Infringement can result from an overt act to use a patented technology or it can result
from completely independent development. Patent infringement is a strict liability wrong,
because knowledge of infringement is not a factor in determining whether there is infringement.
The point in a product’s development timeline is also a significant factor in establishing the
strength of a patentee’s bargaining position. The threat of an injunction early in product
development will have little effect, as the infringer can design around the patented invention.
However, once the product is developed and on sale, the threat of an injunction can be extremely
effective due to the potential cost of production shutdown and the cost of designing around the
patented invention. These circumstances clearly make it more profitable for a patentee to engage
in strategic behavior, waiting until an infringer is already in production before a patentee notifies
the infringer. 632 This creates a holdup situation because of the time and expense invested in
using the allegedly infringing technology. Such practices are commonly used by patent trolls. If
there are multiple patents covering the invention, this will lead to a royalty stacking situation.
This imposes costs on the infringer that are disproportionate to the actual value of the patented
inventions. These increased costs are ultimately borne by consumers.
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The solution proposed by Lemley and Shapiro is to have courts exercise their
discretionary powers to deny injunctive relief for potential trolls in order to prevent a holdup.
Licensing negotiations should be conducted with the threat of a potential grant of a compulsory
license rather than an injunction. This solution has essentially been described in the eBay
decision in Justice Kennedy’s opinion.
The Debate

Scholars such as John M. Golden and J. Gregory Sidak have indicated that the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. was influenced by Lemley and
Shapiro’s holdup rhetoric. Golden and Sidak are very critical of Lemley and Shapiro’s article
and the court decision.
Golden states that as a result of the eBay decision, trial courts have begun to deny
injunctive relief, as a rule, to a class of patent holders. He questions whether the holdup actually
exists and he examines the impact of denying injunctive relief to NPEs who are not trolls.
Golden points out that the vague definition of a patent troll is broad enough to cover small
inventors, universities, start-up firms, research oriented firms, and patent holding companies.633
It is likely that these companies will be treated as patent trolls by the courts.
Golden has stated that there are three conclusions which can be made as part of an actual
bargaining process: 1) uncertainty related to the potential value of court damages, the potential
injunction threat, and potential litigation costs may lead to a settlement substantially larger than
the value of the patented invention’s contribution; 2) uncertainty about damages, court costs,
resource limitation, and “information asymmetries" may result in a settlement for much less than
the value of the patented invention’s contribution; and 3) litigation costs may become a greater
consideration when the chances of showing infringement are low.634
From the perspective of the infringer, if the cost of a license is less than the cost of going
to court and the cost of potential damages and an injunction, the infringer will pay for a
license.635 Since a significant portion of the litigation costs are attributed to discovery in U.S.
litigation proceedings, the probability of a court finding infringement may be less of a factor in
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the infringer’s decision to agree to a license than the discovery costs.636 In essence, it becomes a
nuisance settlement.
Golden is critical of the benchmark calculation because a reasonable royalty is supposed
to be the “floor” for damages in the U.S., while the benchmark derived by Lemley and Shapiro
would amount to a royalty ceiling.637 Furthermore, royalty calculations are highly speculative
and apportioned damage values to match the contribution of the patented invention create further
complications. Courts can use estimates but these may be far removed from the market-value of
the royalty rate.638
Golden also illustrates that Lemley and Shapiro’s economic model has flaws, because
several other factors were not considered, especially ones that would have a downward effect on
negotiated royalty rates. When parties begin the bargaining process information asymmetries
result in risks for both sides. Infringers face the prospect of litigation costs, redesign, damages,
and a potential injunction while patentees face litigation costs, uncertain damage awards,
potential patent invalidity, and potential for an ineffective injunction due to re-design.639
Potential litigation costs become a bigger threat or nuisance for infringers than an injunction if
the patent is weak or easily designed around.640 If the patent is a strong one, the holdup situation
may occur but there are several reasons why the number of holdup situations will be limited.641
The patent holder also faces high litigation costs, and since it is a long process it gives the
infringer time to redesign the product.642 A successful redesign before the end of litigation
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nullifies the threat of an injunction as a bargaining tool.643 It is also likely that infringers will
have a greater information advantage than patentees. 644 Finally, there are other business factors
that can limit the patent holder’s ability to pursue litigation.645 These reasons show that patentee
under-compensation is a likely possibility even with the power of an injunction.646
Golden criticizes Lemley and Shapiro’s benchmark calculation because: 1) their royalty
calculation takes into account bargaining skill, which has no relation to invention worth; 2)
marginal per-unit value is a calculable value nullified by a redesign; 3) patent term length is
neglected; 4) litigation costs are ignored; 5) their assumption that patentees are likely to have
better financial data about infringer redesign costs, infringer customer desires, and profit margin
for the infringing invention; and 6) it ignores the impact of a potential protracted litigation on the
patentee’s willingness to settle. All these factors lead to a benchmark which is likely to
undercompensate holders, making a reasonable royalty award by courts a ceiling rather than as a
floor required by U.S. law.647 Courts often use estimates, making it unlikely that courts can
easily determine an accurate marginal per-unit value, essential in determining the benchmark rate
as a damage award.648
Injunctive relief has historically been a remedy in patent law. Courts, politicians, and
scholars should not be too swift in removing the injunctions as a remedy for patents or in shifting
from a presumption for injunctive relief to a presumption against.649 David Vaver has suggested
that removing the presumption for injunctive relief does not necessarily entail a presumption
against injunctive relief and that courts may possibly make decisions with no presumption at all,
as proposed by eBay. Permanent injunctions can not only prevent patent holders from being
under-compensated but also provide a social benefit by encouraging private settlements between
parties rather than forcing settlements in court.650 A liability based system would actually be
meaningless because without an injunction there would be nothing to compel an infringer to
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negotiate a royalty.651 This would move royalty negotiations to the courts rather than between
the parties. It would also potentially create a downward spiral for royalty values since negotiated
royalties would become rare, leaving a limited basis for comparison and leaving market value of
an award as a cap.652 Golden theorizes that if court awards were greater than market value, the
infringer would stop using the patented invention; if court awards were less than the market
value of the invention infringers would resort to the courts. Market value would act as a cap,
limiting court awards and depressing royalties.653 This theory is largely based on the U.S.
perspective where damage awards are to be no less than a reasonable royalty. In Canada and the
U.K., a market-based royalty may be less of a floor and more of a “median fair-value” but
Golden’s reasoning would still depress this value, theoretically lowing patent value. This view
appears quite alarmist and presumes that courts are so tied down with precedent that they will not
be able to make a case-by-case decision. Furthermore, if damages were created to not just
compensate but also to penalize for “bad behavior” then damages could fill the void from
remedies. The downward spiral proposed by commentators like Golden, presumes that a liability
based system would not be changed to compensate for the lack of an injunction.
If a presumption against awarding injunctions is put in place for only certain patent
holders that would essentially create a “working requirement” for patent owners if they want to
receive injunctive relief. This creates a discriminatory environment that essentially allows courts
to award compulsory licenses.654 Patent holders who directly compete with the infringer or
holders who exclusively licensed their inventions to the infringer’s competitor would get the
benefit of injunctive relief, while a holder who did neither would have to accept a compulsory
license.655 However, the statutes in each jurisdiction do not necessarily require courts to treat all
patent holders equally. In light of Lemley and Shapiro’s suggestion that negotiations with NPEs
should take place under the threat of a compulsory license rather than an injunction,
commentators argue that there would be no incentive for infringer to bargain in good faith.656
However, the cost of litigation, as well as the protracted nature of a patent trial and the patent
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uncertainty that trial creates, may actually be a sufficient threat to compel negotiations. It may
also be possible to award additional damages or to even award punitive damages for infringers
who do not bargain in good faith.
Golden believes that the concern over combating patent trolls and other NPEs may be
overblown.657 While it is a concern that NPEs might obtain high royalties, many firms hold
patent portfolios and can often create private settlements through the threat of countersuit against
noncompeting entities.658 Small research and development firms would also suffer if there were
presumptions against injunctions since a common business practice is to license patented
inventions until sufficient funds can be accumulated to start production or to use the patents as
leverage to enter a market.659 The lack of an injunction as leverage may force R&D firms to use
the courts to determine royalties and face the downward spiral of royalties. Large companies,
who are the targets of trolls, are established companies capable of fending for themselves.660
Large companies likely do not need the protection that a presumption against royalties might
grant them.
Lemley and Shapiro countered criticism from John Golden by noting that their
benchmark calculation may not be applicable in all situations, but nonetheless several studies
show that patentees are overcompensated when a holdup occurs.661 Holdups are most likely to
occur between a non-practicing patent owner and an infringing practicing firm. Furthermore,
they point out that overcompensation is particularly high in situations where a firm
independently develops an invention without knowing it was patented, resulting in a skewed
social contribution by the patentee.662
In a further criticism of Lemley’s and Shapiro’s views on the holdup, J. Gregory Sidak
points out that even if from an economic standpoint overcompensation is undesirable, the U.S.
Supreme Court accepts that holdups occur and that a monopolist can charge as high a price as the
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monopolist wants.663 Courts have noted the powerful impact of an injunction on negotiations
and the potential for a holdup. However, empirical studies show that holdups and royalty
stacking are less of a problem in practice.664 While holdup potential may be more severe for
weak patents, it is odd to argue that valid patents are subject to overcharge, since there is no
requirement for a patentee to charge only a reasonable royalty.665 U.S. courts are only required
to award no less than a reasonable royalty but patent owners can ask for whatever price they
choose. It is rare that a non-practicing entity will be able actually get any price demanded.
Market factors will compel an infringer to stop negotiations and seek alternatives if the patent
holder demands too high a price, with such a situation benefitting neither party. Even if
negotiations take place under an injunction, the royalty may be higher than fair market value but
a rational patent holder will ideally seek compensation that will be high enough so that the
infringer can continue production and yet pay.
Sidak argues that performing a real option analysis of infringement indicates that weaker
patent protection will lower investment into further research and development and limit
innovation.666 The patent holder has a real option (the right to do something but not necessarily
the obligation) once the patentee has sunk costs into an uncertain technology; while this option is
also conferred on the infringer freely in the absence of injunctions.667 Thus infringers have the
advantages of copying a patented invention without the burden of sunk costs of research and
development.668 If an inventor cannot recover sunk costs, this will increase the risk for investors,
making investment more costly for patentees and limiting research and development.669
The option indicates the infringer and the patentee have an incentive to wait and see
whether further investment in the patented technology is desirable.670 There is an advantage if
the cost of production and marketing is delayed until the technology can be determined to have
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commercial acceptance. Also, by not being first into the marketplace the potential exists to take
advantage of mistakes made by first marketers.
Sidak further criticizes the Lemley and Shapiro model because it only examines factors
that inflate royalties but ignores strong deflationary factors.671 The model not only has
inflationary flaws but actually indicates a downward bias in its benchmark for reasonable
royalties.672 Part of the downward bias results from not recognizing the patent holder’s sunk
costs in developing the invention, and by not recognizing the holder’s incentive for potential
future investment.673
Under the real option analysis of patents, Sidak estimated that an investment return
should be above 200% of the sunk costs in order to recover those costs. 674 Investing in any
patent creates uncertainty about whether or not there will be an adequate investment return or
any return at all.675 By delaying production investment the patentee and infringer can test the
market.676 Infringement limits investment returns to recover sunk costs and limits incentive for
further investment into R&D.677 Also, even if an invention will be successful, a patent holder
will make less of a return commercially developing the technology than an infringer because the
infringer does not have sunk costs.678
Sidak concludes that the holdup has no effect in many cases because many patents have
little or no commercial value.679 These patents would likely have little holdup value as well.
However, these patented inventions were still the product of research and development and were
not valueless when developed.680 The Lemley and Shapiro model ignores the real option risk in
their calculation, focusing on the strength of the patent and its probability of success in court.681
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Despite the extensive debate between various academics over whether a holdup exists, all
parties appear to have been somewhat vindicated by the recent GAO report on patent litigation.
The report actually showed that awards given the NPE’s were actually higher than the awards
given to practicing entities.682 While the report concluded that the awards were higher, it did not
indicate that the awards were disproportionate or excessive.

Litigation Cost
Golden indicates that cost may be a greater factor in settlement rather than the threat of
an injunction. Whether it is a greater reason for settlement is debatable, however comparing
litigation costs versus the cost of remedy payments is a consideration. While cost is not a direct
factor in the remedy, the costs must be borne in order to reach a remedy in all three jurisdictions.
Litigation costs are a significant issue for all entities in the United Kingdom, as the total
cost of litigation is comparable to U.S. costs.683 In Canada, litigation is still an expensive
endeavour.684 However, unlike the U.S. where each party pays its own costs, litigation costs are
generally awarded to the winning side in Canada and England. This may not help with the initial
litigation costs but a party with a strong chance of success can look forward to compensation for
having to resolve issues through the courts. Cost apportionment is a general rule in Canadian
and English courts but discretion to award costs resides with the courts and is not guaranteed.685
If litigation costs are significant, strengthening or weakening a court’s power to grant equitable
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remedies will do nothing to curb alleged holdup situations.686 Golden argues that litigation costs
may be more influential at driving infringers to settle in the case of weak patents, but an
injunction is likely to be more effective when strong patents are involved.687 Litigation may be
the largest potential cost for infringers and patentees alike, since litigation costs in the U.S. may
run several million dollars for the average patent case and are comparably high in Canada and
England.688 Litigation cost awards may not be nearly as helpful in the presence of a willing
patent troll since both sides of a dispute will still have to pay their lawyers during the trial; and,
only when a final decision has been rendered, will a party be compensated. Small companies
and sole inventors still face high trial costs and may even face a double payout of legal fees for
an unfavorable decision. Thus the threat of litigation rather than the threat of an injunction may
initially be a bigger source of leverage.
High litigation costs are more likely to encourage settlements between parties while
lower costs are likely to encourage litigation.689 However, higher costs are likely to limit access
to the courts when the patent owner is a small entity with limited resources, while lower costs
will increase access. Policy-makers face a balancing issue between allowing access to the courts
and preventing excessive litigation. High costs create a market for patent sales to parties willing
and able to sue. Tempering the effects of limited court access due to high litigation costs is a
benefit that patent trolls give to small companies and sole inventors. In the U.S., the recent GAO
report indicates that non-practicing entities have helped small inventors and even Universities
cover the upfront cost of expensive litigation.690 Access to courts also encourages inventors to
seek patents because they can see merits in the protections afforded by a patent. Patent trolls
actually provide a benefit because they create a market for infringed or likely-to-be-infringed
patents.
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In the U.K. the existence of the Patent County Courts and a small-claims track within the
Patent County Court have attempted to alleviate some of the access to justice burdens.691 These
courts have simplified procedures but they also have limitations on the monetary size of damages
(although there is leeway when it comes to complete remedies). These courts may help the small
inventor with small damages, but it will not help small inventors with potentially large damages.
Nonetheless, a similar “small claims” edition of patent courts or streamlined procedures with
capped damages within a regular court may be a potential solution to reduce litigation costs in
Canada and the U.S. for many inventors. While these courts may provide access, they may also
create more litigation due to lowered costs and may increase nuisance suits.
High litigation costs can create a nuisance settlement situation, one in which a settlement
is paid to make the issue disappear rather than to resolve infringement through the courts. This is
something that not only trolls have taken advantage of. It is also something that large companies
with aggressive patent portfolio management divisions have used. Sir Robin Jacob has opined
that contingency fee suits which remove litigation costs from patent owners may be a significant
driver for patent litigation and troll-like behavior.692 Often, the suit will involve a patent that
may not actually be infringed or that may only be marginally infringed. The availability of
nuisance settlements encourages patent accumulation, but innovation encouragement is highly
questionable. The nuisance threat neither promotes innovation nor does it promote innovation
commercialization, but it does create an incentive for small companies and sole inventors to
patent and enforce their patents.
A patent infringement suit will generally involve a claim that there is infringement along
with an invalidity defense. Only if the patent is deemed valid and infringed will the court
proceed to determine a remedy. Validity and infringement determination can be a protracted and
costly affair.
There are multiple issues involved when examining litigation costs. Access to the courts
must be balanced against increasing use of the courts to settle disputes. Another consideration is
that companies with large resources are using their financial or legal expertise as a form of
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blackmail to force other companies into settlements. Lowering legal costs may remove threats
from alleged trolls, but even reasonable costs can escalate when a company with an aggressive
portfolio management division threatens a smaller company with infringing several hundred
patents.
Nuisance settlements may actually aid small inventors by creating a market for their
patents. A small inventor may not be able to commercialize his patented innovation, but he may
be able to recover any research and development costs and even profits if he sells to someone
capable of making infringement claims against alleged infringers. It is the high cost of fighting a
patent infringement claim that makes nuisance suits potentially profitable. Alleged infringers are
willing to settle to avoid litigation costs. However, while this tactic may benefit small inventors,
it is also used by both IBM and Intellectual Ventures.

Economic Considerations for Damages and Remedies
Scholars who apply an economic analysis to patent systems fall within an ideological
spectrum. On one end of the spectrum are the pure property rights supporters; on the other end
are the liability rule supporters. The property rights movement naturally advocates a system
where strong property rights are applied to intellectual property. Adherents believe strong
property rights are better suited to a free-market system and to personal liberty ideals, because
they encourage parties in an infringement dispute to negotiate between themselves in order to
come to an agreement. When an injunction is granted, the parties are forced to decide on the
value of property through negotiations and not through outside intervention. Pure liability rules
actually allow infringement but will compensate the infringed party based on an objective
standard enforced by an outside regulatory or judicial party. Advocates of liability rules argue
that economic considerations support returning the patentee to the position she would have
occupied but-for the infringement because it achieves the goals of the patent system by
promoting invention and increasing disclosure while still allowing competition and consumer
benefits through lower costs.693
Current property rights supporters lean towards protecting the inventor while liability
rules supporters tend to lean towards compensating inventors while also limiting harm to
infringers. Property advocates believe that a liability based system will lead to compulsory
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licenses which will undercompensate patent owners, discourage future R&D investment, and
lead to less innovation. Liability rule supporters indicate that property rules are also inadequate
because they may overcompensate patent owners while potentially choking follow-on innovation
and stifling R&D investment. Both groups have economic models that mention follow-on
innovation and R&D investment, but their models are only marginally supported by empirical
data.694 How much patents encourage innovation is questionable, but the data, nonetheless,
indicates that startups use patents to gain investors. Actual impact on follow-on inventors and
the public are not really considered or are a distant, secondary concern in theoretical models.
Both property and liability rules assume that an entitlement to the fruits of an innovation exists in
the patent grant as part of the incentive.
In both the property and the liability arguments, the stated main goal of the patent system
is assumed to be innovation. However, innovation is just one goal and the debate often ignores
other goals. The debate between the two extremes also focuses on how the patent owner and
infringer will behave but ignores or minimizes the significance of other stakeholders. The
question being asked during these debates is whether a patent owner will be more likely to invest
in the innovative process if there are strong or if there are weak property rights. The underlying
thinking is that society will benefit if the innovator is convinced to increase investment in the
innovative process and to make public, through patenting, the results of the innovation
investment. The other stated goals of the patent system are either not part of the consideration or
are only peripherally considered. Social benefits seem to be assumed merely by the increased
innovation and publication of inventions. However, social benefits are rarely a direct
consideration in economic analysis and often that analysis does not extend to commercialization,
non-practice entities beyond trolls, strategic behavior, job creation, consumer benefits, or the
impact of increased patent liquidity.
Innovation is not an end in itself but is a step towards commercialization. It cannot be
assumed that incentives to innovate will ultimately lead to commercialization. This is especially
true since there has been an increase in strategic behavior, patent-only transactions, and rentseeking. It is not that these transactions are necessarily bad or detrimental to the patent system,
but there has been a proliferation of such transactions which use the property rights of a patent
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but fail to commercialize the underlying innovation or fail to encourage follow-on innovation.
This requires analysis that looks beyond the patent owner and the infringer only.
Another concern within the property/liability debate is the patent troll. Some believe that
the patent troll is actually beneficial to the system while others try to show that trolls will destroy
the patent system. Analysts fail to recognize that there are separate categories of patent owners
and the debate seems to conflate all owners into one group while keeping trolls as a separate
group. Small, medium, and large companies that put their patents into practice each have
different motivations to patent. Trolls, licensing companies, and portfolio management
companies also have different motivations to patent. Finally, the particular industry in which the
patent owner is involved will also affect inventor behavior. Of course, there may be categories
of patent owners other than the ones noted above. In addition there may also be an overlap
between the categories, as well as no explicit dividing line between the categories. As has been
shown, the patent owners in each category can also be NPEs or even trolls. Patent enforcement
ability will also affect the approach an entity takes to manage its patent holdings. These
categories make economic considerations more complicated, and there are significant differences
that merit consideration when remedies are examined under the goals of the patent system.
When the categories and patenting motivations are considered, many assumptions made
in determining economic validity to support a particular remedy rule seem flawed. Strategic
considerations further complicate economic analysis, making absolute remedy determination
difficult and even undesirable based on the reasons for creating a patent system. Judicial
flexibility may be desirable in tailoring remedies to compensate for the harm, while still
maintaining patent system goals.
Recent concerns about NPEs have raised questions about the property/liability
ideological divide and its impact on the goals of the patent system. As has been indicated by
Landers, there is also the issue of liquid patents, patents traded for their property rights but not
for the underlying innovation. Economic analysis of remedies and patent enforcement by NPEs
has raised concerns that inventors who do not commercialize their patented inventions yet still
enforce their patents may be detrimental to the patent system. Scholars in the U.S. note the lack
of a working requirement but there is tension between the patent system goal of encouraging
commercialization and the right to dispose of property as the owner sees fit. While there is a
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loophole in Canadian and U.K. law which creates a limited working requirement, there have
been considerable complaints in both countries about access by companies trying to take
advantage of this section of patent law. The tension between property rights and patent system
goals seems to exist in all three jurisdictions. Nonetheless, commercialization has clearly
become something that U.S. courts are willing to consider when granting a remedy.
NPEs also raise questions about the appropriate compensation an innocent infringement
should pay. While the NPE may have been first to patent the innovation, the innovation clearly
did not aid the innocent infringer and resulted in duplicated effort. Such results call into question
the innovative nature of the patent, the motivation provided by the patent, and the benefits
patenting provides for follow-on inventors. This is an economic waste which calls into question
the notice provided by the patent grant and any litigation to resolve the dispute. General
consensus seems to indicate that research is not necessarily wasted even if there is duplication.
However, from an economic standpoint, there is waste because two inventors have expended
resources towards the same goal but only one has reaped the benefits, while the other has
expended resources for no gain. Economic waste may be a consideration that should be in the
purview of lawmakers rather than courts, but it illustrates some of the economic inefficiencies
that exist in an absolute property system. While it is likely that an innocent infringer or
independent developer will have their work considered by the court when remedies are
determined, the U.K. has actually codified compensation limitations due to innocent
infringement.
Examining economic efficiency is admirable but it cannot offer insight unless all
stakeholders and system goals are considered. Unfortunately, not all inventors are the same.
Access to patents, patent protection, the courts, and remedies are not the same for all inventors.
Furthermore, strategic use of patents that skew economic models is assumed to happen
infrequently, and some models ignore it. Despite commercialization being a stated goal, there is
a reluctance to encourage working requirements because it is assumed that anyone willing to use
the patented innovation will pay reasonable consideration to gain access, while a property owner
will best understand how to use his property. Nonetheless, a combined system of property and
liability rules, as exists right now, along with judicial flexibility, are better suited to allow courts
to maintain the goals of the patent system – encouraging innovation by creating an incentive,
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limiting strategic behavior through limiting exclusion powers, and encouraging
commercialization by granting damages in lieu of injunctions when non-practicing entities are
involved. The current system may be far from perfect but removing tools from the judicial
remedy arsenal only serves to limit the flexibility courts have in resolving extremely factdependent disputes. Patent disputes rarely fall into a one-size-fits-all resolution.
There is also the issue of litigation costs which is a factor (along with an ultimate
injunction), in encouraging alleged infringers to agree to patent-owner licensing demands. Given
the high litigation costs in all three jurisdictions, especially when viewed in relation to potential
awards in each jurisdiction, this should also factor into the debate on remedy systems. Litigation
is a necessary step in order to receive the ultimate remedy in an infringement situation. High
costs are what encourage predatory practices by aggressive portfolio management firms.
Within patent law, there are many supporters who lean to one side or the other but few
who preach an absolute property or liability approach. There appears to be recognition that
patents are different from other property and require different treatment. However, there is also
recognition that current liability elements of patent remedies may not only lead to unfair,
inadequate, and potentially inaccurate results but also may create great difficulties for the courts.
To that end, there has been considerable analysis to find more accurate remedies that reflect real
damages or real harm rather than approximations currently in use. Complete accuracy is not
really necessary, although its lack poses difficulties to the courts. The laws in all three
jurisdictions call for reasonable royalties, or for mere royalty payments, and not completely,
objectively determined, exact royalties.
The current system of property rights combined with remedies, including damages,
injunctions, and profits, has been in place in all three jurisdictions for a long time. All three have
employed a combination of property and liability remedies. All three jurisdictions are market
economies with a strong sense of property rights. The next section will detail the remedies in all
three jurisdictions but with an eye towards all stakeholders. Some of the limitations of remedy
analysis will also be discussed in the next section, followed by a proposal of potential systemic
changes to better address some of the issues within the current system. Addressing these issues
is an attempt to find ways to encourage commercialization.

171

Commentary and Critique
While Lemley and Shapiro should be applauded for their efforts to establish a benchmark
and to quantify the impact that trolling behavior has on the patent system, their theory has
significant flaws as pointed out by both Golden and Sidak. Lemley and Shapiro highlighted the
effect a presumption towards awarding injunctions can have on the patent system, especially
when non-practicing entities are the patent owners. They focused heavily on practicing and
competing entities to show how infringers are affected by injunction remedies, but they included
information on non-practicing entities as well. As Golden points out, they failed to distinguish
between different types of NPEs when calling for damages in lieu of an injunction for all nonpracticing entities. Nonetheless, Golden and Sidak call for approaches that presume an
injunction award, even if the patent owner is a non-practicing entity, again without examining
distinctions. In their stated positions, there are a several flawed assumptions which seems to
make their models and critiques valid; but they are so only within their limited scope and
because they ignore externalities to their assumptions.
Each of these commentators looks at the patent system as having the purpose of
encouraging innovation. While this is true, this is just one of many reasons why a country
establishes a patent system. In creating their economic models they failed to examine other
purposes behind establishing a patent system. There is also an assumption by Sidak and Golden
that a patent owner, motivated to innovate by a potential patent grant, will market the innovation
after obtaining a patent, secure in the knowledge that the right to exclude will prevent others
from practicing the innovation.
The patent system is also established to protect interested parties. Each of these
commentators examines only relations between the patent owner and the infringer. They ignore
follow-on inventors, investors and the public. Additional studies have shown that, even among
patent owners, there are a plethora of reasons for obtaining a patent, of which motivation to
innovate is one of the lesser reasons.
Some of the economic models used to gauge the effectiveness of remedies will be
examined in this section. All models currently have limitations. To ensure accuracy, any
economic model should apply many more factors than are currently used. In this section,
remedies which have been shown to exist in the three jurisdictions will be revisited. This will be
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followed by an examination of the impact of these remedies on the interested parties when a
patent owner is an NPE. The examination will also look at factors in the remedy process that
will encourage or discourage settlement.
Patent owners are an extremely varied group. An owner can be an individual operating
out of his garage or a corporation the size of Apple.695 A patent owner is not necessarily the
inventor of the underlying innovation. The owner may be using the underlying innovation or the
owner may be accumulating patents for licensing or other purposes. There are also universities
and R&D companies that do not actually make or commercialize the underlying innovation but
merely sell or license the patent to others. There are companies that practice some of their
patents but accumulate other patents as part of their offensive or defensive strategies to gain
further revenue. Companies, like IBM, which have created subsidiary companies to manage
their patent portfolios. Some of these groups may actually be trolls. Yet there are still other
motivations for obtaining a patent that do not involve practicing the innovation. These groups
were mentioned in chapter III and - other than companies that actually practice the innovation in
a particular geographic region - they are non-practicing entities.
Each of these groups has the right to enforce the patent against an infringer. However,
the motivation to enforce may vary. Practicing entities either have put in the time and effort to
develop the innovation or have paid to purchase a license or the patent. These entities have also
invested in commercializing the innovation. The successful practicing entity actually achieves
all of the goals of the patent system. They publish information about their innovation, allowing
follow-on inventors to examine the innovation. They make something that benefits or is desired
by consumers.696 Since consumers are willing to buy and the company continues to produce
goods, it is presumed that the company is making a profit. The profit is compensating the owner
for the expended resources and generating a reward for the innovation. Investors are also
presumably sharing in the profits generated as compensation for their investment. The higher
costs for the duration of the patent may have a social detriment, but it is part of the price of
maintaining a patent system. On the whole, this system encourages innovation and brings the
695

Apple is currently worth approximately $600 billion USD, http://www.google.com/finance?q=aapl (September
1, 2012).
696
Benefitting consumers is intended to mean that there is consumer demand for the innovation or subsequent
product and consumers are willing to purchase it.

173

innovation into the marketplace. Practicing companies are likely to enforce their patents against
competitors, but this will also depend on how aggressive its patent management department is.
Licensing starts the process in which the patent is treated as property and may be separate
from the underlying innovation. Licensors who allow another to practice the innovation in
exchange for royalty payments may be working to meet the goals of the patent system. For the
time and effort expended in creating the innovation the licensor receives compensation through
either a royalty or sale. The practicing entity that purchased the right to make or use the
innovation is presumably making a profit from selling goods to consumers. Consumers are also
benefitting because they are interested in purchasing the good from the maker. Licensing entities
will usually enforce their patents to pursue royalties and not necessarily to prevent others from
practicing their innovations.
In the above two cases, infringement is actually detrimental to the patent owner and any
potential licensees. The economics of how infringement affects patent owners has been
documented and losses are quantifiable and compensable through lost profits or an account of
profits. There is a greyer area where a patent owner is trying to commercialize an innovation but
is unable to do so because of infringement. Damage quantification in the form of lost profits or
an account of profits becomes more complicated depending on the stage of commercialization.
The lost profits suffered during the initial commercialization attempts will be small but as the
patent owner becomes better able to produce and sell goods and services that use the innovation,
the lost profits will increase. An account of profits has generally been unavailable to nonpracticing entities. Nonetheless, it is a desirable and substantial remedy. Whether a patentee
will be able to convince a court of a sufficient degree of innovation practice, to qualify for the
remedy, will likely be fact determinative. Thus it is possible that a court will grant lost profits
based on the ill-gotten gains theory; but, depending on a company’s progress towards
commercialization, a reasonable royalty and an injunction may be awarded instead.
The problem lies in situations where the patent owner is non-practicing. While the laws
in each of the three jurisdictions provide for compensation upon infringement, the question of
whether the remedy is to compensate for the wrong should be asked by the court before
proceeding with the remedy. Proportion is a hallmark of the commonwealth remedy system and
compensation is a motivation of the remedy system in all three jurisdictions. Despite the
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availability of multiple remedies in each patent system, courts should be examining proportion
when a non-practicing entity is involved. Compensation is, after all, a stated policy in each
jurisdiction. A further consideration is the impact granting an injunction has on the other
interested parties versus granting an alternative remedy in lieu of an injunction.
An injunction would remove the infringing good or process from the marketplace. It is
likely that an infringer would agree to a license before the good is removed from the
marketplace, but that is only if the negotiated royalty makes using the infringing good feasible.
It may be hard to argue that this is a holdup, especially since a valid patent is being infringed; but
this reasoning merely looks at the patent owner and infringer. If the patent owner and the
infringer are the only ones considered, an injunction would be the most effective remedy. But
the patent system has other stakeholders. Even if one argues that other stakeholders have
implicitly agreed through the laws to award property rights to patent owners, each of the three
systems has limits on those rights. These rights are limited either directly through the statutes or
indirectly through the courts. An absolute right to an injunction in all circumstances is
questionable given the limited nature of the patent right.
If one examines patent disputes through the Calabresi/Melamed economic model, the
transaction costs may be enormous. However, in applying their method, transactions costs must
be defined. If transaction costs include the legal costs of defining boundaries, validity, and
infringement, it will be extremely high. Such high costs entail a liability remedy. However, if
the transaction costs are calculated once the court decides the dispute, they will be relatively
small. If transaction costs do not include the cost of litigation then a property remedy will
clearly be more suitable.
Removing the innovation from the marketplace will have a negative impact on
consumers. Even if the innovation remains in the marketplace, consumers will have to pay
increased prices for the good or service, regardless of whether a royalty is negotiated in the face
of an injunction or in lieu of an injunction. It is assumed that a royalty rate negotiated with an
injunction looming will be greater than one granted by a court. However, despite the fears of
Golden and Sidak, a reasonable royalty does not mean a negligible royalty. A downward royalty
spiral is far from certain. The dearth of non-practicing entities receiving a final decision,
including damages, in English and Canadian courts indicates that parties are far more willing to
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negotiate a royalty than to let the courts decide their royalty rate. This behavior is also evident in
the U.S. where there have been court decisions involving non-practicing entities. There are very
few relative to the total number of infringement suits. Canadian courts have also shown a
willingness to grant a royalty premium when awarding a royalty in lieu of an injunction, even in
the case where one company was a non-practicing entity.697 In England, the dearth of cases
would indicate that parties are agreeing to a royalty outside the courts or courts are granting
injunctions. There is also no indication that court-awarded royalties involving non-practicing
entities in the U.S. have been lower than what could have been achieved through negotiations.
It is clear in cases like eBay v. MercExchange or RIM v. NTP, that a patent owner would
have received a greater royalty payment with a looming injunction than through pre-decision
negotiations or possibly even through court awards; but these are exceptional situations where a
very large company would face complete business shutdown. A holdup may not be the case if
smaller companies are involved or a complete business shutdown is not imminent. However,
these two U.S. court decisions also show that court discretion can play a significant role in
deciding whether to grant an injunction, especially if other interests are involved. In RIM v.
NTP, the impact on consumers did nothing to sway the judge’s injunction decision. In eBay v.
MercExchange, the court, however, took into account the enormous potential impact a complete
business shutdown would have on consumers. In both cases, the patent owner was looking to
maximize royalty payments. Neither case was a moral issue over subject matter or a desire to
compete.
The issue comes down to whether a patent owner should be entitled to a court-decided
award that may amount to a lot of money or to an award that is for a negotiated sum of money.
The court should ask the question of whether an injunction is justified, especially given that the
patent owner is generally looking for monetary compensation. As stated, the negotiated award
for more money is far from certain. An argument could be made that a patent owner should
receive every possible cent of compensation for his innovation. But this argument becomes less
compelling when consumers will be greatly affected or when a patent is purchased with the
intent of squeezing every penny of royalty payments from an unwitting infringer. Arguments for
compensating patent owners for the expense of innovation or research to purchase a patent to the
697

Unilever v. Proctor & Gamble, [1993] F.C.J. No. 117.

176

full value of the patent ignore the fact that development costs have little or no bearing on the full
value of a patent. Furthermore, when the goals of the patent system are considered, will such
compensation encourage innovation or commercialization? As was pointed out by Landers,
Landes, and Posner, a system that encourages injunctions provides encouragement to innovation
but not necessarily the incentive to commercialize. Should a patent owner prevent an
independent inventor from using an innovation merely because the owner holds a patent?
The difficulties faced by an inventor in creating an innovation which can be patented
were documented earlier, as were difficulties in commercializing the innovation. The protection
granted by a patent was intended as a means of compensation and even of reward for R&D
efforts. The purpose of a patent system is to encourage innovation by providing a limited
monopoly. However, the Berkeley Study has shown that there are several other reasons why
someone would seek a patent. Furthermore, the study found that the incentive to innovate and
commercialize was found to actually be quite small. This is not encouraging when
commercialization is a stated goal of the patent system. This also considerably blunts the
arguments of Golden and Sidak who claim that innovation will be decimated unless patent
owners are granted an injunction.
The Berkeley Study was made in the U.S. with the U.S. patentee in mind, but the reasons
for making a patent application are likely to apply as well in Canada and the U.K. Furthermore,
the strategic aspect of patent use is likely to increase because firms with patents in multiple
jurisdictions have a greater number of fora for litigation.698 There has actually been a decrease in
the number patent applications and grants in the U.K. Patent Office but that is likely because of
the increase in applications through the European Patent office and the increased integration of
the European patent market.699 That has not necessarily decreased enforcement or court activity
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in England because of the nature of the European market.700 In Canada, there has been a steady
increase in both patent applications and grants.701 Both the U.K. and Canadian patent Office
applications and grants are few compared to patent application and grants in the U.S Patent and
Trademark Office.702 The general increase in patents issued in Canada and the potential ability
for a patentee to sue U.K. companies in U.K. court for infringement in other E.U. jurisdictions
(assuming there is no validity dispute) make Canada and England potentially susceptible to
strategic behavior. Other reasons to seek a patent, as indicated by the study, would also seem to
apply in Canada and the U.K. The scale may be smaller than in the U.S. but each of the reasons
are likely to remain valid in Canada and the U.K. Alleged trolls have already tested the courts.
Since neither jurisdiction has yet accumulated a significant number of final decisions
involving non-practicing entities, it is still difficult to examine how courts would manage the
remedy. It is likely that both courts would grant a reasonable royalty for damages, but it is not
clear that an injunction would be denied by either court. Both jurisdictions have indicated that
there is a presumption to award one. There is a clear judicial analysis which must be performed
when deciding on an injunction, and there is a clear burden shifting between each step. In
England, the test can be adjusted by the court based on the facts; but there are no clear examples
that would involve trolls or troll-like behavior. Canadian courts have a less clear test to follow,
but they have a lot of flexibility when it comes to awarding an injunction. Unilever v. Proctor &
Gamble involved two competitors; but, for the purposes of that particular case, Unilever was a
non-practicing entity. Unilever’s move was clearly strategic; and, while the court granted
damages in lieu of an injunction, they also highlighted the exceptional circumstances that led to
the decision. The court was quite clear that, without the exceptional circumstances, they would
have granted an injunction.
Economic analysis of patent remedies brings some insights but there are severe flaws in
models proposed by several scholars. Whether the economic analysis includes a benchmark and
700

Validity in Europe is decided by the court in the jurisdiction in which the patent was issued. A U.K. court would
have jurisdiction to hear an infringement dispute so long as the infringer was based in the U.K. and there was no
dispute to patent validity, regardless of where the infringement took place in Europe.
701
See Supra note 699, WIPO Patent Statistics, Patent grants by patent office (1883-2010) by resident and nonresident
702
See Supra note 699, WIPO Patent Statistics, Patent grants by patent office (1883-2010) by resident and nonresident (The combined English and Canadian patent offices issue roughly 10% of the patent of the
patents that the US Patent and Trademark Office issues).

178

a call to eliminate injunctions or an absolute property view that demands injunctions, neither
reflects the current reality. These models clearly do not account for the variety of NPE business
models operating today. These economic models are incapable of supporting an absolute
justification for either a property or liability based solution. Without more examples involving
non-practicing entities using the courts, it is mere speculation how courts should approach
injunction grants. However, these incomplete economic results can also be an opportunity for
law-makers to be proactive in limiting some of patent system issues.
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Conclusion
The goals of the patent system include encouraging innovation, investment,
commercialization, and follow-on inventions. These goals are pursued through a balancing of
social benefits and social costs. In attempts to balance benefits and costs, innovators are granted
certain rights with a patent grant that entail legal protection. The protection given to inventors
comes in the form of a property right to exclude other users for a limited period. Property rights
in a patent granted to an innovator are part of the patent laws of Canada, the U.K., and the U.S.A.
Recently, the balance of costs and benefits of the granted rights has been questioned as
transactions involving just the patents, separate from the underlying innovation, have been
multiplying. There has been an increase in non-practicing entities using patent rights not only as
a means of excluding competition while commercializing an innovation but also for strategic
reasons designed to maximize profits. Maximizing profits is a perfectly legitimate pursuit but
not when the spirit of the patent laws and the goals of the system are being undermined in the
process.
Non-practicing entities have proliferated, and in their wake nuisance suits, crosslicensing, and other offensive and defensive business strategies used by all sizes and manners of
companies. None of these practices are illegal, but they do pose concerns for future innovation
as they tend to involve patent-only transactions without concern for the underlying innovation.
With the increase in patent applications and grants, obtaining the rights associated with a patent
grant has become an increasing reason for transactions rather than the innovation. In fact, it is
questionable whether these transactions actually do anything to encourage innovation. These
transactions also do not necessarily involve either innovation or commercialization and may
actually stifle efforts to market goods and services.
Trade in patents for patent rights has led to an increase in litigation, nuisance suits, and
licensing fees. Again, these may not necessarily be detrimental to the system, but a connection
between litigation costs and nuisance settlements exists. High litigation costs are also a
consideration because these costs only exist if parties to a patent infringement suit want courts to
settle a dispute. While it may seem self-evident, a legal remedy will not exist unless parties are
willing to go through the legal process. However, parties may be willing to settle disputes if the
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licensing costs are lower than the potential legal costs of protracted litigation to determine patent
validity and infringement.
Patent quality has only been mentioned insofar as it related to patent troll strategies.
Fischer and Henkel noted that business strategies where companies purchase patents for
enforcement purposes require higher quality patents. However, there is enough anecdotal
evidence in the U.S. to suggest that more questionable patents, or paper patents, are being
obtained by companies who use the threat of lawsuits to obtain nuisance settlements. Patent
office grants are presumed valid, but validity is not conclusively determined until the patent has
been examined by the courts. Both quality patents and questionable patents are accumulated
strategically by companies in both an offensive and a defensive manner. This is in addition to
strategies used by alleged patent trolls. There is also evidence that large companies are
accumulating patents in various jurisdictions for strategic use against competitors.
In the U.S., the volume of patent-only transactions has raised questions about treating all
patent owners equally and about the power of remedies available to owners enforcing their
patents. Scholars have attempted to justify remedy approaches through a law and economics
analysis of remedy impact. While the conclusions and slippery slope arguments raised by such
scholars may be questionable, their investigations helped pave the way towards a re-evaluation
of how remedies have been awarded to patent owners. This remedy analysis has also raised
questions about how incentives created through patent rights and subsequent remedies help
achieve the goals of the patent system.
In Canada and the U.K., there has been less evidence and less concern about patent trolls.
While trolls have entered the marketplace and have attempted to use the legal system to develop
their business models, it is still not clear whether they have entered the marketplace in numbers
comparable to the U.S. figures. It is also not clear what impact such a small number of trolls will
have. However, the U.K. is a potential forum for lawsuits over the increasing number of patents
issued by the European Patent Office. In Canada the sharp increase both in patent application
filings and in patent grants creates a potential forum for nuisance suits and for strategic suits by
multinational corporations in strategic battles with competitors.
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Legal scholars in the U.S. have turned to remedy analysis in an effort to make
suggestions within the existing patent framework which may curb patent trolling behavior. Such
work has had an influence on the Supreme Court in its eBay v. MercExchange decision. The
eBay v. MercExchange case has been much discussed because it potentially limited remedies
available to non-practicing entities. However, while the decision may have caused a stir in the
U.S., it merely reasserted the equitable nature of an injunction grant in a patent case. The
decision forced courts to perform a legal analysis balancing the remedy impact on the parties in
dispute before granting an injunction. Rather than grant an injunction upon a finding of
infringement, courts were instructed to balance the harms to the parties and the public to see
whether an injunction should be awarded.
Current remedies available in Canada, the U.K., and the U.S. include injunctions and
likely damages, in an effort to compensate the infringed party. In lieu of damages, patent owners
in Canada and the U.K. may seek an account of profits to recover wrongfully obtained profits
from the infringer. An account of profits is considered a property rule remedy in these two
jurisdictions while damages are considered liability rule remedies. Injunctions and an account of
profits are considered equitable remedies, with discretion to award either one or both lying with
the courts. In the vast majority of disputes in all three jurisdictions, courts will likely grant an
injunction because there is a clear policy reason for it, but the court must nonetheless perform a
fact-dependent, balancing of convenience examination. There has been some debate about
presumptions when deciding whether to award an injunction, but the court is nevertheless
required to determine whether the remedy is appropriate. Despite the equitable nature of an
account for profits, English courts view it as an extraordinary remedy while Canadian courts still
seem to favor it. Nonetheless, an account for profits, like an injunction, requires courts to see
whether the remedy is appropriate. While injunctions and an account for profits may be
preferred by patent owners, and many legal scholars, these remedies still lie within judicial
discretion and depend on the facts facing the court.
Injunctions have been a standard remedy for all types of patent owners in all three
jurisdictions once courts found infringement. However, damages have been calculated differently
based on whether the patent owner was practicing the innovation. In Canada and the U.K. an
account of profits is generally not available for NPEs or, if granted, the remedy is calculated
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differently. Thus monetary compensation for patent holders depends on whether an innovation is
practiced. In all three jurisdictions, if a patent owner was practicing her patent, she would be
entitled to lost profits as compensation for damages. However, this remedy is not available to
non-practicing entities. NPEs are eligible to receive a royalty instead. Even if a practicing entity
claims lost profit damages, the patent holder would have to show that she could have made the
sales tied to the lost profits claim before she would be entitled to the remedy. Otherwise the
patent holder would only be entitled to a royalty for those sales. While an account for profits is
not part of damages, it is a remedy which English and Canadian courts have not made available
to NPEs. English courts have stated that the profits an NPE would have made were royalties,
and thus the account for profits becomes a reasonable royalty assessment. Courts already have
created distinctions in the type of remedy available for different types of entities, adjusting
remedies with the facts presented.
Courts in all three jurisdictions generally separate damages from validity and
infringement hearings, indicating a preference to give the parties a chance to agree on their own
terms rather than to have the court decide the remedy. Allowing the parties to come to their own
agreement concerning patent boundaries and infringement eliminates considerable uncertainty.
Courts step in to award remedies if the parties cannot agree. A judicial remedy will likely
include an injunction along with damages for prior infringement. Future compensation for
continued innovation use will rely on an agreement between the parties and may actually be
independent of any court decision. While the injunction tends to be a standard part of the
remedy process, with little regard for the type of patent holder, monetary compensation will vary
according to whether the holder practices the patented innovation or not. Monetary
compensation will also vary with the holder’s production capabilities. Whereas the court creates
a distinction in compensation between practicing and non-practicing entities, an injunction
greatly skews compensation in favor of the patent holder. This is especially true if the infringer
would like to continue using the innovation. An infringer who is faced with a complete business
shutdown due to an injunction is likely to agree to a patent holder’s demands for future royalties.
Some commentators have indicated that an injunction can amount to a holdup or
blackmail. Other commentators have countered that since the right to exclude comes with a
patent grant, the holder of a valid patent should be able to enforce that right, regardless of the
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business reasons for enforcing that right. While this second group of commentators rightly
indicates that an injunction is a valid remedy which has traditionally been awarded, there are
many considerations beyond tradition which a court can take into account when making its
decision. The discretionary nature of equitable remedies allows the court to examine several
factors before granting an injunction. This is not to say that an injunction should be abandoned
as a remedy but that courts are perfectly capable of discerning business models, motives, and
intentions when it is necessary to tailor compensatory remedies. Furthermore, the Patent Acts of
all three jurisdictions indicate that injunctions are just one remedy and not the only remedy.
Economic analysis has put forward several propositions to attempt to discern whether
injunctions are an essential component of the patent system or whether alternative remedies are
better suited. While the current scholarly economic analysis of patent remedies has shown itself
to be either incomplete or tied to an ideological perspective, the debate still illustrates some
issues which exist when establishing a patent system and what goals are addressed by the current
system. Innovation and efficiency are two major assumptions of economic scholars. The
efficiency aspect depends on transaction costs involved in a general property transaction, but
some analysts have adapted this to intellectual property. Given the complexities of a patent (and
the necessity of having courts determine validity, boundaries, and infringement), efficient
remedies will depend on what point of the dispute process is used to start examining transaction
costs. If boundaries, validity, and infringement are part of the transaction costs that need to be
determined by a court, then it may be more efficient to impose a liability rule, or damages in lieu
of an injunction. However, if boundaries, validity, and infringement are not considered part of
the transaction cost in determining patent value but are merely a precursor to a transaction cost
that involves value determination, then a property rule in the form of an injunction is a more
suitable remedy. The innovation aspect relies on the incentives given to an innovator. It is
unclear, despite various models, whether an inventor requires an absolute right to exclude as
incentive to invest in the innovation process. It is also unclear whether rights that would allow
an inventor to obtain full economic value for a patent are necessary to encourage innovation; and
it is far from certain that profit falling short of full economic value would discourage innovation.
Limited empirical data indicates that startups do not depend on patent protections for their
incentive to innovate, but there is also an indication that there are multiple reasons to patent. It is
not clear whether larger companies would require the right to exclude, through patent protection,
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before they would invest in R&D. The only conclusion is that current economic models ignore
several goals of a patent system, focusing on only certain aspects that often support ideological
positions. These economic models provide conflicting legal justifications. For a more accurate
economic analysis, the other goals of the system need to be included, as do inventor motivations
to patent.
As stated previously, the goals of a patent system are to benefit society through
encouraging innovation, commercialization, follow-on invention, and investment by providing
incentives to inventors while limiting the social costs of inventor encouragements and system
administration. Injunctions are a valid but not necessary remedy according to the laws of all
three jurisdictions. Given the power of the injunction, it is questionable whether the goals of the
patent system are furthered every time an injunction is granted. The laws also provide for
damages or an account for profits to provide additional compensation to the patent owner, if
necessary, or even to provide compensation in lieu of an injunction. This gives the courts
considerable leeway to adjust remedies as needed, based on the facts. Courts can also make
decisions in line with the goals of the system. In all three systems, the remedies are intended to
compensate the patent owner and not to punish the infringer. Analysis that suggests patent
owners are being overcompensated by patent remedies is questionable, but it is also clear that
compensation determined by the court rather than through an agreement between the parties in
dispute is far from the undercompensation predicted by critics of liability rules. The current
remedies which the courts in all three jurisdictions apply are easily balanced in light of the
system goals.
Another reason for allowing courts leeway is because the right held by a patentee is not
necessarily tied to a particular remedy. Entities have different motivations to obtain a patent, not
all of which involve practicing the innovation. These motivations will vary with the size of the
patent-owning company, the technology involved, and the business model. Offensive and
defensive strategies, as well as investment gathering strategies, may be used to prevent
competition while marketing an innovation. Other business models often involve gathering
licensing revenue from companies that are currently practicing the innovation or plan to practice
the underlying innovation. However, there are business models that involve gathering licensing
revenues even though the underlying innovation will not be practiced by either the licensor or
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licensee. There is also a growing patent trade among both big and small companies, involving
patents being purchased for enforcement purposes against others. However, just because a
business model is viable does not mean that a company using that model should receive all
possible remedies when only some remedies will suffice to compensate the party. If a patent
owner is looking for monetary compensation, the nature of the compensation in a patent dispute
may become very fact dependent and will require court intervention to protect the public. It does
not follow that just because a right exists a particular remedy will be necessary to support that
right. Courts are generally able to handle remedies for complicated sales calculations. If parties
resort to the courts to determine a patent dispute, then courts should be allowed to award an
appropriate remedy.
The call to require that courts award an injunction in all disputes because the property
right allows it becomes difficult to justify in all situations. In the case of eBay or RIM, the
patent holder may have the right to exclude; but a remedy involving an injunction becomes
difficult to justify if the parties genuinely disagreed on infringement and an injunction award will
result in a potential remedy completely out of proportion with initial licensing demands. In both
the eBay and RIM decisions, a system-wide exclusion of infringing technology would have
effectively shut down multi-billion dollar businesses heavily relied on by the public. Some will
argue that these companies should just have paid the initial licensing demands. Others will point
out that a valid patent holder is entitled to an injunction, specifically because a patent is property
that entitles the holder to a property remedy. Others note that all three jurisdictions have voiced
great objections to compulsory licenses. These are all valid points. But is difficult to justify a
property remedy in all situations, particularly when the remedy is an equitable one and other
equitable or legal remedies exist. The courts in all three jurisdictions have been reluctant to
grant windfalls to patent owners as well.
While there has been a general reluctance to move away from granting an injunction as a
standard patent remedy, in all three jurisdictions there have been situations where courts have
exercised their discretion. U.K. courts have shown a willingness to consider alternatives to an
injunction in exceptional situations, even if competing companies are involved. Canadian courts
have awarded damages in lieu of an injunction for an NPE. U.S. courts have been more willing
to grant damages in lieu of an injunction, but it has been in situations where the patent holder is
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an NPE. While NPEs are not a new phenomenon, unforeseen business models have begun to
take shape, using patents in unforeseen manners. The rise in alternative business models that use
patents in ways similar to tradable commodities in the U.S. has caused great concern, particularly
because of the separation of patent from its underlying innovation. There are companies which
accumulate patents as part of a patent-enforcement business. The nascent auction markets have
facilitated these practices. Large companies have created subsidiaries whose assets consist of the
parent company’s patent portfolio and whose sole purpose is to aggressively enforce its patents.
These business practices may not have moved to Canada and the U.K. in significant numbers but
attempts have been made. Whether NPE practices grow is another question, but the courts
should be prepared to deal with some of the issues faced by U.S. courts.
It has been argued that given the search tools available in all three jurisdictions, there is
no excuse to be unaware of the existence of a patent. There is some merit to this argument but it
is also not feasible to expect every potential inventor, product user, or developer to perform an
in-depth search before moving towards a new area of research. The sheer volume of research
and innovation being performed in each of the three jurisdictions makes it very difficult to
perform a search every time. Even if a search is performed, it is often difficult for inventors to
determine whether their area of research actually falls within the language claimed by a patent.
RIM and eBay had genuine disputes with NTP and MercExchange respectively, over
infringement. Furthermore, not all inventors have the luxury of receiving legal opinions prior to
commencing research and development. Small companies and sole inventors can easily fail to
find an infringing patent given the esoteric language used to draft a patent. Large companies
with dedicated patent departments may have a greater ability to perform a search; but it may not
be practicable for even dedicated patent departments to search for infringement for every
possible area of research, design, or method within a large company. This is not to say that
companies, big or small, should not make an attempt to search for a patent: but given the
proliferation of patent applications and grants, it may be difficult to effectively determine
whether a technology infringes before making R&D investments. Furthermore, even upon notice
from a patent holder about infringement, it is possible that there will be a difference of opinion
about infringement.
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Non-practicing entities are here to stay and the variety of business models will continue
to grow as long as there is a potential for profit from patent ownership and as long as there are
demands for services provided by many non-practicing entities. While courts should have
flexibility to award remedies to patent holders and courts should consider the goals of the patent
system when granting remedies, there are limitations to the effectiveness of a court’s ability to
grant remedies that encourage the goals of the patent system. If a right is infringed, the remedy
for the infringement can only be awarded by agreement between the parties or through access to
the courts. If there is no agreement, then the parties will resort to the courts. For a court to be
able to award a remedy there must be access to the courts. It is the cost of court access which
has given rise to business methods exploiting high litigation costs. Nuisance settlements are
outside the power of the courts since settlements are reached long before the full dispute reaches
the court.
The high cost of enforcing a patent through the courts is why business models such as
patent trolling have managed to find patents to enforce relatively cheaply. The high costs are
also a reason for their business success. These high litigation costs and the ultimate uncertainty
of a court decision have often encouraged parties to settle before a final decision has been made.
Many companies will often perform either a formal or informal cost-benefit analysis to
determine whether it is cheaper to pay royalty demands or go to court. Such analyses have also
encouraged aggressive patent enforcement by companies with large portfolios, particularly
against smaller companies, because the cost of defending a suit, whether valid or not, against a
portfolio consisting of thousands of patents is cost-prohibitive relative to a settlement payment.
Success through the nuisance model has encouraged large companies to spin-off their portfolios
into patent enforcement companies or subsidiaries. While businesses are finding success using
such tactics, these practices are not necessarily encouraging innovation and are certainly not
helping to commercialize the innovation. Given that patent rights have not necessarily been the
encouraging force behind many startup companies, there is some question regarding the
effectiveness of the current systems and even the ability of remedies to influence such practices.
There is also a question of whether patents act as an encouraging force for large companies.
Patent troll profitability is greatest if a temporary injunction is awarded during the trial.
Infringer business disruption is maximized and the infringers are most willing to meet the
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demands in this situation. However it is rare that courts in all three jurisdictions will grant
injunctions to non-practicing entities prior to determining validity and infringement. Once courts
have decided that infringement exists, infringers are almost always willing to meet the demands
of a patent holder if a permanent injunction threatens. If an infringer faces damages in lieu of an
injunction, the willingness to settle will depend on the uncertainty of the court award for
damages and the desire for parties to avoid a perceived compulsory license. Arguments that
suggest that non-practicing entities will die away if injunctions are removed as a potential award
are speculative. Business models will continue as long as there are profits to be made. That is,
as long as royalty awards to non-practicing entities are not nominal or insignificant, allowing for
sizeable profits above and beyond the amounts paid for the invention. The search for
profitability through trolling tactics will encourage greater patent search expertise to find
unexploited patents. It may also lead to patent troll business strategies that attempt to gauge
profitability potential, by taking into account litigation risk in relation to the spread between the
patent sale price and potential remedy awards. In situations where a patent is unexploited and
owned by a sole inventor or small company, such patents may actually be obtained relatively
cheaply and can result in large profits regardless of whether royalties have been calculated by the
courts or through negotiations under pressure of a looming injunction.
A business strategy which has not been examined but which also exploits high litigation
costs is one in which a large company fails to perform searches, relying on high litigation costs
to minimize patent infringement suits. Such a strategy, combined with a settlement pool
calculated into operating costs, may actually be a cheaper solution to litigation. However, such a
strategy will still require a team of patent lawyers who can evaluate infringement claims and still
use the threat of a court battle to minimize nuisance claims. This strategy will still require
vigilance when it comes to patent infringement disputes with competitors and other large
companies. More empirical studies should be conducted to determine the viability of strategies
and the use of patents.
Judicial remedies have their limitations, particularly when limited access to the courts
precludes many disputes from actually reaching judges. It has been shown that changes to
remedies can have an impact on certain business strategies but those changes seem to have
limited only certain extreme behavior. Since there are profits to be made even if judges award
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damages in lieu of an injunction, patent trolling practices continue. Other business models have
also sprouted to take advantage of high litigation costs and patent accumulation. These business
models seem to be achieving profits, but there are still questions about whether these businesses
are resulting in a net social benefit.
Several factors which were not considered in this work should be examined in future
studies involving patent systems in Canada and the U.S. In the U.K., study of its ties to the
European Union should include an examination of factors that are Europe wide. Increases in
patent application volume and patent grant volume have led to a race for patents between
competitors for cross-licensing royalty supremacy and for strategic supremacy. This volume has
led to questions about patent quality due to patent office resource limitations. The limited ability
of patent examiners to thoroughly examine patent applications raises questions about whether a
patent is actually valid and whether a patented innovation is obvious in light of existing
innovations. Furthermore, the volume has raised questions about patentable subject matter
related to business methods, software, bio-chemistry and other areas. A deeper examination of
patent business strategies also raises questions about the system. All of these factors may
actually lead to greater patent exploitation but less actual innovation exploitation.
In Canada and the U.K., only a limited number of cases involving non-practicing entities
have come before the courts. However, there are indications that non-practicing business models
are testing the marketplace in both countries. Non-practicing entities include sole inventors,
trolls, patent holding companies, and even large companies. The situation in the U.S. should be
closely watched by Canadian and U.K. courts and legislators so that the intended goals of the
patent system can be maintained in light of changing business strategies and models.
In the U.S. non-practicing entities have been active market participants for some time. It
seems that all manner and sizes of companies are finding new ways to exploit patents and the
patent system rather than exploiting the innovations on which the patents are based. Clearly
there are profits to be made through the patents themselves. However, given that such profits
were not necessarily anticipated by those who created the current U.S. Patent Act, especially in
light of the goals which a patent system is supposed to achieve, it may be time to reconsider the
system goals or to reconsider the system itself in light of current goals.

190

191

Bibliography
Statutes Used
1. Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. P-4, s. 20.
2. Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. P-4, s. 27(4).
3. Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. P-4, s. 42.
4. Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. P-4, s. 49.
5. Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. P-4, s. 55(1).
6. Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. P-4, s. 55.2.
7. Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. P-4, s. 57.1.
8. Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. P-4, s. 60 (2).
9. Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. P-4, s65.
10. Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. P-4, ss21.01 - 21.2.
11. Patented Medicines Notice of Compliance (Linkage Regulations), SOR 93/133.
12. Patented Medicines Regulations, SOR 94/688.
13. The Constitution Act 1867 (U.K.) 30 & 31 Vict., c.3, as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5
(Appendix 1985), App. II, No. 5, s. 91(22).
14. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS) and
European Economic Union Directive 2004/48.
15. Tucker Act 28 U.S.C §1491.
16. U.K. Patents Act 1977 (c.37).
17. U.K. Patents Act 1977, Section 30 (Section 31 deals with patents in Scotland but
because of legal distinctions between England and Scotland, only English law will be
considered).
18. U.K. Patents Act 1977, Section 30.
19. U.K. Patents Act 1977, Section 55-59.
20. U.K. Patents Act 1977, Section 61(1)(b).
21. U.K. Patents Act 1977, Section 61(1)(b);
22. U.K. Patents Act 1977, Section 61.
23. U.K. Patents Act 1977, Sections 1(3).
24. U.K. Patents Act 1977, Sections 22.
25. U.K. Patents Act 1977, Sections 23.
26. U.K. Patents Act 1977, Sections 30.
27. U.K. Patents Act 1977, Sections 46.
28. U.K. Patents Act 1977, Sections 48A-B.
29. U.K. Patents Act 1977, Sections 55-59.
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
31. U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §154.
32. U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 200, Policy and Objective
33. U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 261
34. U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 261.
35. U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 283.
192

36. U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 284.
37. U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 289.
38. U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-188, Chapter 17, Secrecy of Certain Inventions and
Filing Applications in Foreign Countries.
39. U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §284.
40. U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §287.
41. Use of Patented Product for International Humanitarian Purposes Regulations (Access
to Medicines Regime), SOR 2005-143.

Secondary Materials
1. Allied Security Trust (http://www.alliedsecuritytrust.com/).
2. Andrews, Kurtis and Jeremy De Beer. Accounting of Profits to Remedy Biotechnology
Patent Infringement, 47 Osgoode Hall L.J. 619, 641 (2009).
3. Armond, Michelle. Introducing the Defense of Independent Invention to Motions for
Preliminary Injunctions in Patent Infringement Lawsuits, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 117.
4. Article One Partners' Litigation Avoidance Program
(http://info.articleonepartners.com/litigation-avoidance/).
5. Balganesh, Shyamkrishna. Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability,
and Automatic Injunctions, 31 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 593, 598 (2008).
6. Bessen, James and Michael Meurer. Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and
Lawyers Put Innovation at Risk (Princeton University Press 2008).
7. Bird, Keith and Donald H. MacOdrum, Significant Differences Between Canadian and
American Patent Law (Part 2), (Fall 2008) http://www.mcmillan.ca/SignificantDifferences-Between-Canadian-and-American-Patent-Law-Part-2 (last visited Nov. 16,
2011).
8. Blair, Roger D. & Thomas F. Cotter. Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 Tex. Intell. Prop.
L.J. 1, 44,45 (2001).
9. Blumberg, Alex and Laura Sydell. When Patents Attack,
http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/07/26/138576167/when-patents-attack (last
visited Oct. 23, 2011).
10. Calabresi, Guido & A. Douglas Melamed. Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972).
11. Canadian Intellectual Property Office http://www.cipo.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernetinternetopic.nsf/eng/wr01090.html (last visited November 20, 2012).
12. Canadian Marketplace Policy Framework Branch
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/693.nsf/eng/h_00024.html (last visited November 20, 2012).
13. Carr, Henry. Intellectual Property Litigation, Oxford Intellectual Property Research
Centre, EJIPR Papers (22 Nov. 2005).
14. Coase, R.H. The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
15. Coury, Larry. C'est What? Saisie! A comparison of Patent Infringement Remedies
Among the G7 Economic Nations, 12 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1101
(2003).
16. Cutler, Matther L. International Patent Litigation Survey, (2008 Harness, Dickey, &
193

Pierce PLC) http://blog.hdp.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/60549706_1.PDF(last
visited August 1, 2012).
17. De Wit, Severin. The Case eBay Inv. V. MercExchange LLC, its Impact on NPE's and
Patent Enforcement http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1613585 (last
visited July 7, 2012).
18. Department of Justice 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/0167.htm (last visited Sept.24,
2011).
19. Edelman, James. The Measure of Restitution and the Future of Restitutionary Damages,
(26 April 2010) (advance proof to be published in [2010] Restitution Law Review)
http://www.propertybar.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/83778/The_measure_of_resti
tution_and_the_future_of_restitutionary_damages,_J_Edelman.pdf .
20. Elmer-DeWitt, Philip. Apple's $2 billion claim comes from a twist in U.S. patent law,
CNNMoney, http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2012/08/01/apples-2-billion-claim-comesfrom-a-twist-in-u-s-patent-law/ (last visited July 12, 2013).
21. Fischer, Timo & Joachim Henkel. Patent Trolls on Markets for Technology - An
Empirical Analysis of Trolls' Patent Acquisitions, Paper presented at "Opening Up
Innovation: Strategy, Organization and Technology" at Imperial College London
Business School, June 16 - 18, 2010,
http://www2.druId.dk/conferences/viewpaper.php?id=501834&cf=43(last visited Dec.
12, 2010);
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1523102&rec=1&srcabs=1498390(a
lternate source last visited Dec. 12 2010).
22. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (2007): 'A Guide to Patent Litigation in Europe England and Wales'.
23. Giglio, Francesco. Pseudo-Restitutionary Damages: Some Thoughts on the Dual Theory
of Restitution for Wrongs, (2009) 22 Can. J.L. & Juris.
24. Golden, John M. "Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 2111, 2144
(2007).
25. Golden, John M. Patent Infringement Injunction's Scope (Draft material February 01,
2011)
http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events_media/John%20Golden%2
0-%20Injunctions'%20Scope.pdf (last visited April 01, 2012).
26. Golden, John M. Principles For Patent Remedies, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 505, 514 (2010).
27. Graham, Stuart and Ted Sichelman. Why Do Start-ups Patent?, 23 Berkeley Tech. L.J.
1063 (2008).
28. Graham, Stuart J. H., Robert P. Merges, Pam Samuelson, and Ted Sichelman. High
Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent
Survey, 24 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1255 (2009).
29. Grenier, Francois. Monetary Relief - Damages, Intellectual Property Disputes:
Resolutions and Remedies, Vol. 2, 17-1, (Thomson Canada Limited 2004).
30. Injunctions in cases of Infringement of IPRs, United Kingdom Committee Group Report
for Q219 for AIPPI Working Committee, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
https://www.aippi.org/download/commitees/219/GR219united_kingdom.pdf (last visited
August 22, 2012).
194

31. Inpro Licensing website http://www.inprolicensing.com/about.html (last visited
September 07, 2012).
32. Intellectual Property Policy Directorate http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ippddppi.nsf/eng/h_ip00003.html (last visited November 20, 2012).
33. Jacob, Robin. Patent Trolls in Europe - Does Patent Law Require New Barriers?, For
the May 2008 GRUR Meeting, Stuttgart, (23 May, 2008)
http://www.grur.de/cms/upload/pdf/Jahrestagung/2008/GRUR_JT2008_Rede_Jacob_20
08-05-23.pdf .
34. Jacob, Robin. The Rt. Hon. Sir, THE HAROLD FOX LECTURE 2011, The Common Law of
Intellectual Property, 23 I.P.J. 159, 165 (2011).
35. Kesan, Jay P. and Gwendolyn G. Ball, How are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 Wash. U. L.
Rev. 237, 258-65 (2006).
36. Kierans, Patrick E. and Rowena Borenstein. Injunctions - Interlocutory and Permanent,
Intellectual Property Disputes: Resolutions and Remedies, Vol. 2, 15, (Thomson Canada
Limited 2004).
37. Landers, Amy. Working Together in a Digital World: Liquid Patents, 84 Denv. U.L.
Rev. 199 (2006).
38. Landes, William M. & Richard A. Posner. The Economic Structure of Intellectual
Property Law,. 329-30 (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2003).
39. Lee, Jung-Ah. Samsung, Apple Building Up 4G Patents As Courtroom Battle Escalates,
DOW JONES NEWSWIRES http://www.nasdaq.com/article/samsung-apple-buildingup-4g-patents-as-courtroom-battle-escalates-20120911-01389 (last visited 12September, 2012).
40. Lemley, Mark A. & Carl Shapiro. Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Texas L.
Rev. 1991, 1993 (2007).
41. Lemley, Mark A. & Carl Shapiro. The Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking: Reply to
John Golden, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 2163, 2173 (2007).
42. Lemley, Mark and Philip Weiser. Should Property or Liability Rules Govern
Information?, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 783, 798 (March 2007).
43. Levmore, Saul. Unifying Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules and Startling Rules,
106 Yale L. J. 2149, 2153-2157 (1997).
44. Lowensohn, Josh. Where most of Nortel's $4.5B patent collection ended up, CNET
NEWS, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13579_3-57438221-37/where-most-of-nortels-$4.5bpatent-collection-ended-up/ (last viewed July 24, 2012).
45. Luxardo, Victoria E. Towards a Solution to the Problem of Illegitimate Patent
Enforcement Practices in the United States, 20 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 791 (2006).
46. McDonough III, James F. The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the
Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 205-06 (2006).
47. McKenna, Barrie, Paul Waldie, and Simon Avery. Patently absurd, GLOBE AND
MAIL http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/technology/patentlyabsurd/article810328/singlepage/#articlecontent (last examined May 4, 2012).
48. Menell, Peter S. The Property Rights Movement's Embrace of Intellectual Property:
True Love or Doomed Relationship?, 34 Ecology L. Q. 713, 722 (2007).
49. Merges, Robert P. Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 Colum. L.
Rev. 2655 (1994).
195

50. Merges Robert, The Trouble With Trolls, 24 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1583 (2009).
51. Mueller, Florian. When it comes to patents, IBM stands for 'International Bullying
Machines', http://fosspatents.blogspot.com/2010/04/when-it-comes-to-patents-ibmstands-for.html.
52. Ollis, Andrew M. and Colin B. Harris. Design Patent Damages, Landslide Magazine,
(May/June 2010)
http://www.oblon.com/sites/default/files/news/Design%20Patent%20Damages%20%20May-June%202010.pdf (last visited July 12, 2013).
53. O'Rourke, Maureen A. Rethinking Remedies at the Intersection of Intellectual Property
and Contract: Toward a Unified Body of Law, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 1137 (1997).
54. Patent Policy Issues, U.K. Intellectual Property Office http://www.ipo.gov.uk/protypes/pro-patent/p-policy.htm (last visited November 20, 2012).
55. Pearson, Hilary. Software and business method patents - recent leading European and
U.S. decisions (August 11, 2010),
http://www.twobirds.com/English/News/Articles/Pages/Software_business_method_pat
ents_recent_leading_European_US_decisions.Aspx (last visited November 20, 2012).
56. Reitzig, Markus, Joachim Henkel, Christopher Heath. On sharks, trolls, and their patent
prey-Unrealistic damage awards and firms' strategies of "being infringed", Research
Policy 36 (2007) 134-154,
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048733306002071(Last checked
Sept 28, 2013).
57. Roberts, Caprice L. BUSINESS LAW FORUM: Intellectual Property remedies: The Case
for Restitution and Unjust Enrichment Remedies in Patent Law, 14 Lewis & Clark L.
Rev. 653 (2010).
58. Roberts, Caprice L. The Case for Restitution and Unjust Enrichment Remedies in Patent
Law, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 653.
59. RPX (http://www.rpxcorp.com/).
60. Rudgard, Nick and Richard Kempner. Taming the costs tiger - Court control of IP
litigation costs (May 2006),
http://www.addleshawgoddard.com/asset_store/document/ip_publication__taming_the_costs_tiger_-_court_control_of_ip_litigation_costs_113950.pdf (last
visited Nov. 16, 2011).
61. Shaughnessy, Andrew M. and Andrew E. Bernstein. Patent Litigation: Choosing
Between The United States And Canada, The Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, (Feb
2005), http://www.torys.com/Publications/Documents/Publication%20PDFs/ARTech51T.pdf (last visited 09 Nov. 2011).
62. Sherwin, Emily. Introduction: Property Rules as Remedies, 106 Yale L. J. 2083, 208586 (1997).
63. Sherwin, Emily. Property, Rules, and Property Rules, Cornell Law Faculty Working
Papers, 38 (8-16-2007) http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops_papers/26/ (last visited
September 27, 2011).
64. Shrestha, Sannu K. Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis of Nonpracticing
Entities, 110 Columbia L.R. 114 (2010).
65. Sidak, J. Gregory. Holdup, Patent Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive relief For
Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro,92 Minn. L. Rev. 714, 715, 718
(2008).
196

66. Steele, Alexandra. QUEBEC SUPERIOR COURT REAFFIRMS ITS JURISDICTION
OVER PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES, citing Beauchesne v. Roy, C.S.Q. 615-17000209-048, October 1, 2004 (http://www.robic.ca/admin/pdf/409/142.170-AST.pdf)).
67. Stevens, David and Jason W. Neyers. What's Wrong With Restitution?, (1999) 37 Alta.
L. Rev. 221-270.
68. Thambisetty, Sivaramjani. SMEs and Patent Litigation: Policy Based Evidence
Making?, E.I.P.R. 2010, 32(4), 143-145 (2010).
69. The Patents County Court guide, HM Courts and Tribunal Services Guide (December
2012) http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/courts/patents-court/patents-courtguide.pdf.
70. Thorley, Simon, Richard Miller, Guy Burkill, Colin Birss, and Douglas Campbell.
Terrell on the Law of Patents, 569 (Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), citing Chiron Corporation
and Others v. Organon Teknika Ltd (No. 10) [1995] R.P.C. 325.
71. U.K. Intellectual Property Office,http://www.ipo.gov.uk/pro-types/pro-patent/p-law/ppn/p-pn-businessmethod.htm (last visited June 17, 2012).
72. U.S. Government Accounting Office, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Assessing
Factors That Affect Patent Infringement Litigation Could Help Improve Patent Quality
GAO-13-465.
73. U.S. policy as reflected on the US Patent and Trademark Office website
http://www.uspto.gov/about/ipm/index.jsp (last visited November 20, 2012).
74. Varchaver, Nicholas. Who's afraid of Nathan Myhrvold?, FORTUNE MAGAZINE,
(June 26, 2006),
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/07/10/8380798/index.ht
m (Last visited October 24, 2011).
75. Vaver,David. Canada's Intellectual Property Framework: A Comparative Overview 17
I.P.J. 125 (2004).
76. Vaver,David. Intellectual Property Law: Copyright, Patents, Trade-marks (Irwin Law
2011).
77. Vaver,David. Need Intellectual Property be Everywhere? Against Ubiquity and
Uniformity, 25 Dalhousie L.J. 1, 9 (2002).
78. Vaver,David. Reforming Intellectual Property Law: An Obvious and Not-So-Obvious
Agenda, Stephen Stewart Lecture for 2008.
79. Vaver,David. Sprucing Up Patent Law, 23 I.P.J. 63, 64 (2010).
80. Weatherall, Kimberlee, Elizabeth Webster, and Lionel Bently. IP Enforcement in the
UK and Beyond: A Literature Review, Intellectual Property Research Institute of
Australia (2009) http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresearch-ipenforcement-200905.pdf (last
visited 09 Nov. 2011).
81. Wells, Peter. Monetary Relief -Profits, Intellectual Property Disputes: Resolutions and
Remedies, Vol. 2, 18-2, (Thomson Canada Limited 2004).
82. WIPO Patent Statistics, Patent grants by country of origin and by office (1995-2010)
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/xls/wipo_pat_grant_b
y_origin_office_table.xls .
83. WIPO Patent Statistics, Patent grants by patent office (1883-2010) by resident and nonresident,
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/xls/wipo_pat_grant_fr
om_1883_table.xls (last visited 10 September, 2012).
197

Jurisprudence
1. A-G v. Blake [2001] AC 268 (HL).
2. AlliedSignal Inc. v. Du Pont Canada Inc. ( 1998), 142 F.T.R. 241 (F.C.T.D.), 78 C.P.R.
( 3d) 129, 1998 CarswellNat 271 (Fed. T.D.).
3. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) [2010] 4 F.C.R. 541.
4. American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] 2 W.L.R. 316, 407-08 (H.L.)
5. Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 823 F.2d 1538, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
6. Another v Hill & Smith Ltd. [1983] F.S.R. 512.
7. Apotex Inc. v. Canada (Health), 2012 FCA 322 (CanLII).
8. Apotex Inc. v. Merck & Co. [2009] F.C.J. No. 712.
9. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro II), 377 U.S. 476, 505 (1964).
10. Astrazeneca Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 2013 FCA 77 (CanLII).
11. Attorney General v Blake, [2001] 1 A.C. 268.
12. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., (U.S. Dist. Arizona, 2010)
aff'd Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 670 F.3d 1171, 2012 U.S.
App. LEXIS 2612 (Fed. Cir., Feb. 10, 2012).
13. Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v. Apotex Inc. (2001), 10 C.P.R. (4th) 151 ( Ont. Sup. Ct.).
14. Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 SCR 559.
15. Beloit Canada Ltd v. Valmet-Dominion Inc., [1997] 3 F.C. 497 (F.C.A.).
16. Biogen Inc. v Medeva Plc, [1993] R.P.C. 475 (Ch.), [1995] F.S.R. 4 (C.A.), [1997]
R.P.C. 1.
17. Brantford Chemicals Inc. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents) (F.C.) [2007] 4 F.C.R.
547.
18. Cabot Safety Corp.'s Patent [1992] R.P.C. 39.
19. Cadbury Schweppes Inc. v. FBI Foods Ltd., [1999] 1 SCR 142.
20. Canada (Attorney General) v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2011 FCA 328 (CanLII).
21. Catnic Components Ltd and another v Hill and Smith Ltd [1982] RPC 183, [1983]
F.S.R. 512.
22. Chiron Corp v Organon Teknika Ltd (No.10) [1995] F.S.R. 325.
23. Coflexip S.A. v. Stolt Comex Seaway MS LTD, [2001] R.P.c. 9 (C.A.).
24. Colonial Fastener Co. v. Lightning Fastener Co., [1937] S.C.R. 36.
25. Devenish Nutrition Limited v Sanofi-Aventis SA (France) & Ors, [2008] EWCA Civ
1086, , [2009] Ch 390, 2008 WL 4153573.
26. Diamond v. Chakrabarty,447 U.S. 303 at 308 (1980).
27. Diversified Products Corp. v. Tye-Sil Corp. (1990), 38 F.T.R. 251 at para. 2.
(F.C.T.D.).
28. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
29. Eli Lilly and Co. v. Apotex Inc. [2009] F.C.J. No. 1229.
30. Entertainment Software Association v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music
Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 34, [2012] 2 SCR 231.
198

31. Federal Court of Canada Docket: T-1472-07, The Toronto Dominion Bank and Others
v. DataTreasury Corp http://cas-ncr-nter03.cassatj.gc.ca/IndexingQueries/infp_moreInfo_e.php?T-1472-07 (last visited November 20,
2012).
32. Federal Court of Canada Docket: T-1661-07, DataTreasury Corp. v. Royal Bank of
Canada ET AL.http://cas-ncr-nter03.cassatj.gc.ca/IndexingQueries/infp_moreInfo_e.php?T-1661-07 (last visited November 20,
2012).
33. Fletcher Moulton LJ in Meters Ltd v Metropolitan Gas Meters Ltd ((1911) 28 RPC
157.
34. Free World Trust v. Électro Santé Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1024.
35. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648 (1983).
36. General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. Ltd. [1975] F.S.R. 273.
37. Georgia Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
38. Gerber Garment Technology Inc. v Lectra Systems Ltd. and Anr. [1995] R.P.C. 383.
39. Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
40. Hartington Conway Ltd's Patent Applications [2004] R.P.C. 7.
41. Hartness Intern. Inc. v. Simplimatic Engineering Co., 819 F.2d 1100, 1106 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
42. Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), 2002 SCC 76.
43. Hebert v. Lisle Corp., 99 F.3d 1109, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
44. In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
45. J.M. Voith GmbH v. Beloit Corp. (1993), 47 C.P.R. (3d) 448 (F.C.T.D.) Rouleau J;
affirmed on this point (1997), 73 C.P.R. (3d) 321 (F.C.A.).
46. Jay-Lor International Inc. v. Penta Farm Systems Ltd., 2007 CarswellNat 1218, 2007
FC 358, 59 C.P.R. (4th) 228, 313 F.T.R. 1 (Eng.).
47. King Instrument Co. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
48. Kingstreet Investments Ltd v New Brunswick [2007] SCC 1 and [2007] 1 SCR 3.
49. Kirin-Amgen Inc v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Limited, [2004] UKHL 46.
50. Laboratoires Servier v. Apotex Inc.[2008] F.C.J. No. 1094.
51. Litster v Forth Dry Dock & Engineering Co Ltd., 1989 S.C. (H.L.) 96.
52. Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co. (1880) 5 A.C. 25.
53. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
54. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Pharmascience Inc., 2010 FC 510 (CanLII).
55. Micro Chemical, Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 318 F.3d 1119, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
56. Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser [2004] S.C.J. No. 29.
57. NTP Inc. v. Research in Motion, 2003 WL 23100881 at 1 (E.D. Va. Aug 5, 2003).
58. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978).
59. Paper Converting Machines Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
60. Patlex Corporation v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
61. Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart, [1993] I.C.R. 291.
62. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 549 F.3d 842, 847 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
199

63. R. v. James Lorimer & Co., [1984] 1 F.C. 1065 at 1073 (C.A.).
64. R. v. Oakes, 50 C.R. (3d) 1, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
65. Research in Motion UK Limited v. Inpro Licensing SARL [2006] EWHC 70 (Pat).
66. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995)(en banc).
67. RJR MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 SCR 311.
68. Seager v. Copydex, LTD. (No. 2) [1969] 2 All ER 718, [1969] 1 WLR 809, [1969] RPC
250, [1969] FSR 261.
69. Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co (No.1) [1895] 1 Ch. 287.
70. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1985
CarswellNat 60.
71. Spring Form Inc. v. Toy Brokers Ltd. [2002] F.S.R. 17.
72. Sun Microsystems Inc. v Amtec Computer Corporation Ltd, [2006] EWHC 62 (Ch).
73. Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess Technologies, Inc., 222 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
74. Torpharm Inc. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents) (F.C.), [2004] 4 F.C.R. 29.
75. TWM Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
76. Ultraframe (UK) Limited v Eurocell Building Plastics Limited, Eurocell Profiles
Limited [2006] EWHC 1344 (Pat).
77. Unilever PLC v. Proctor & Gamble Inc., [1993] F.C.J. No. 117 aff'd Unilever PLC v.
Proctor & Gamble Inc., [1995] F.C.J. No. 1005.
78. Uniloc USA, Inc., v. Microsoft, 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed.Cir.2011).
79. Vercoe v Rutland Fund Management Ltd [2010] EWHC 424 (Ch).
80. Vestergaard Frandsen A/S v Bestnet Europe Ltd [2010] F.S.R. 2.
81. Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v Premium Aircraft Interiors Group [2009] EWCA Civ
1513 (C.A.).
82. Wechsler v. Macke Intern. Trade, Inc., 86 F.3d 1286, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
83. Wellcome Foundation Ltd. v. Apotex Inc. (1991), 40 C.P.R. (3d) 361 at 369 (F.C.T.D.).
84. Wi-Lan Technologies Corp. v. D-Link Systems Inc. (2006), 57 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 2006 FC
1484.
85. Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Per Curiam).

200

